Ann B. Gillette
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ann B. Gillette has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University
1 shared publication - Lucy F. Ackert
Department of Economics and Finance Michael J. Coles College of Business Kennesaw State University Kennesaw Georgia
1 shared publication - Mark Rider
Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
1 shared publication Thomas H. Noe
A.B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 307-321
Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design
We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 307-321
Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design
We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.
- 19 January 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 19 (2) , 561-603
If at First You Don’t Succeed: The Effect of the Option to Resolicit on Corporate Takeovers
This article models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. The outcomes of our experiment support this prediction and produce losses from free riding even higher than theoretically predicted. These dissipation losses reduce raider gains to less than 3% of synergy value of the acquisition
- 19 January 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 19 (2) , 561-603
If at First You Don’t Succeed: The Effect of the Option to Resolicit on Corporate Takeovers
This article models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. The outcomes of our experiment support this prediction and produce losses from free riding even higher than theoretically predicted. These dissipation losses reduce raider gains to less than 3% of synergy value of the acquisition