Olle Häggström
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Olle Häggström has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Maria Deijfen
Stockholm University
2 shared publications - Timo Hirscher
Chalmers University of Technology
2 shared publications - Alexander E. Holroyd
Microsoft Research
1 shared publication - Catherine Rhodes
University of Manchester
1 shared publication - James Daniel Miller
Department of Economics, Smith College
1 shared publication - Johan Wästlund
Department of Mathematical Sciences Chalmers University of Technology Gothenburg Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 August 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Computer Sciences & Mathematics Forum
- Vol. 8 (1) , 68
Are Large Language Models Intelligent? Are Humans?
Claims that large language models lack intelligence are abundant in current AI discourse. To the extent that the claims are supported by arguments, these usually amount to claims that the models (a) lack common sense, (b) know only facts they have been trained with, (c) are merely matrix multiplications, (d) only predict the next word in a chain, (e) lack a world model, (f) have no grounding of symbols, (g) lack creativity, or (h) lack consciousness. Here, each of these arguments is applied, with minor modifications, to demonstrate that humans also lack intelligence. This should make us suspicious of the validity of these arguments.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Computer Sciences & Mathematics Forum
- Vol. 8 (1) , 68
Open AccessAre Large Language Models Intelligent? Are Humans?
Claims that large language models lack intelligence are abundant in current AI discourse. To the extent that the claims are supported by arguments, these usually amount to claims that the models (a) lack common sense, (b) know only facts they have been trained with, (c) are merely matrix multiplications, (d) only predict the next word in a chain, (e) lack a world model, (f) have no grounding of symbols, (g) lack creativity, or (h) lack consciousness. Here, each of these arguments is applied, with minor modifications, to demonstrate that humans also lack intelligence. This should make us suspicious of the validity of these arguments.
- 15 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-160
Artificial General Intelligence and the Common Sense Argument
- 15 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-160
Artificial General Intelligence and the Common Sense Argument
- 28 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Mathematical Intelligencer
- Vol. 45 (2) , 183-185
What Are the Chances of That? How to Think About Uncertainty by Andrew C. A. Elliot
- 28 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Mathematical Intelligencer
- Vol. 45 (2) , 183-185
What Are the Chances of That? How to Think About Uncertainty by Andrew C. A. Elliot
- Open Access
- 1 December 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 5 (4) , 40
An AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Strong Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 5 (4) , 40
Open AccessAn AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Strong Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI.
- 11 March 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foresight
- Vol. 21 (1) , 153-166
Challenges to the Omohundro–Bostrom framework for AI motivations
Purpose: This paper aims to contribute to the futurology of a possible artificial intelligence (AI) breakthrough, by reexamining the Omohundro–Bostrom theory for instrumental vs final AI goals. Does that theory, along with its predictions for what a superintelligent AI would be motivated to do, hold water?Design/methodology/approach: The standard tools of systematic reasoning and analytic philosophy are used to probe possible weaknesses of Omohundro–Bostrom theory from four different directions: self-referential contradictions, Tegmark’s physics challenge, moral realism and the messy case of human motivations.Findings: The two cornerstones of Omohundro–Bostrom theory – the orthogonality thesis and the instrumental convergence thesis – are both open to various criticisms that question their validity and scope. These criticisms are however far from conclusive: while they do suggest that a reasonable amount of caution and epistemic humility is attached to predictions derived from the theory, further work will be needed to clarify its scope and to put it on more rigorous foundations.Originality/value: The practical value of being able to predict AI goals and motivations under various circumstances cannot be overstated: the future of humanity may depend on it. Currently, the only framework available for making such predictions is Omohundro–Bostrom theory, and the value of the present paper is to demonstrate its tentative nature and the need for further scrutiny.
- 11 March 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foresight
- Vol. 21 (1) , 153-166
Challenges to the Omohundro–Bostrom framework for AI motivations
Purpose: This paper aims to contribute to the futurology of a possible artificial intelligence (AI) breakthrough, by reexamining the Omohundro–Bostrom theory for instrumental vs final AI goals. Does that theory, along with its predictions for what a superintelligent AI would be motivated to do, hold water?Design/methodology/approach: The standard tools of systematic reasoning and analytic philosophy are used to probe possible weaknesses of Omohundro–Bostrom theory from four different directions: self-referential contradictions, Tegmark’s physics challenge, moral realism and the messy case of human motivations.Findings: The two cornerstones of Omohundro–Bostrom theory – the orthogonality thesis and the instrumental convergence thesis – are both open to various criticisms that question their validity and scope. These criticisms are however far from conclusive: while they do suggest that a reasonable amount of caution and epistemic humility is attached to predictions derived from the theory, further work will be needed to clarify its scope and to put it on more rigorous foundations.Originality/value: The practical value of being able to predict AI goals and motivations under various circumstances cannot be overstated: the future of humanity may depend on it. Currently, the only framework available for making such predictions is Omohundro–Bostrom theory, and the value of the present paper is to demonstrate its tentative nature and the need for further scrutiny.
- Open Access
Water transport on infinite graphs
If the nodes of a graph are considered to be identical barrels - featuring different water levels - and the edges to be (locked) water-filled pipes in between the barrels, consider the optimization problem of how much the water level in a fixed barrel can be raised with no pumps available, i.e. by opening and closing the locks in an elaborate succession. This model is related to an opinion formation process, the so-called Deffuant model. We consider i.i.d. random initial water levels and ask whether the supremum of achievable levels at a given node has a degenerate distribution, i.e. concentrates on a single value. This turns out to be the case for all infinite connected quasi-transitive graphs with exactly one exception: the two-sided infinite path.
Open AccessWater transport on infinite graphs
If the nodes of a graph are considered to be identical barrels - featuring different water levels - and the edges to be (locked) water-filled pipes in between the barrels, consider the optimization problem of how much the water level in a fixed barrel can be raised with no pumps available, i.e. by opening and closing the locks in an elaborate succession. This model is related to an opinion formation process, the so-called Deffuant model. We consider i.i.d. random initial water levels and ask whether the supremum of achievable levels at a given node has a degenerate distribution, i.e. concentrates on a single value. This turns out to be the case for all infinite connected quasi-transitive graphs with exactly one exception: the two-sided infinite path.
- Open Access
- 9 June 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 1 (3) , 161
Should Apocalyptic AI Scenarios Be Taken Seriously?
Can it be taken for granted that humans will remain in control in a situation where a breakthrough in artificial intelligence (AI) has led to our no longer being the foremost creatures on our planet in terms of general intelligence?
- 9 June 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 1 (3) , 161
Open AccessShould Apocalyptic AI Scenarios Be Taken Seriously?
Can it be taken for granted that humans will remain in control in a situation where a breakthrough in artificial intelligence (AI) has led to our no longer being the foremost creatures on our planet in terms of general intelligence?
- Open Access
- 9 June 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 1 (3) , 237
Aspects of Mind Uploading
Mind uploading is the transfer of a subject’s mind to a computer using whole brain emulation.
- 9 June 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 1 (3) , 237
Open AccessAspects of Mind Uploading
Mind uploading is the transfer of a subject’s mind to a computer using whole brain emulation.