James Daniel Miller
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
James Daniel Miller has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Roman V. Yampolskiy
University of Louisville
2 shared publications - Alexey Turchin
Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), Lafayette, CO 80026, USA
1 shared publication Olle Häggström
1 shared publication- Olle Häggström
Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden
1 shared publication Roman Yampolskiy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 2 (6)
Precedents for the Unprecedented: Historical Analogies for Thirteen Artificial Superintelligence Risks
Since artificial superintelligence has never existed, claims that it poses a serious risk of global catastrophe can be easy to dismiss as fearmongering. Yet many of the specific worries about such systems are not free-floating fantasies but extensions of patterns we already see. This essay examines thirteen distinct ways artificial superintelligence could go wrong and, for each, pairs the abstract failure mode with concrete precedents where a similar pattern has already caused serious harm. By assembling a broad cross-domain catalog of such precedents, I aim to show that concerns about artificial superintelligence track recurring failure modes in our world. This essay is also an experiment in writing with extensive assistance from artificial intelligence, producing work I couldn’t have written without it. That a current system can help articulate a case for the catastrophic potential of its own lineage is itself a significant fact; we have already left the realm of speculative fiction and begun to build the very agents that constitute the risk. On a personal note, this collaboration with artificial intelligence is part of my effort to rebuild the intellectual life that my stroke disrupted and hopefully push it beyond where it stood before.
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 2 (6)
Open AccessPrecedents for the Unprecedented: Historical Analogies for Thirteen Artificial Superintelligence Risks
Since artificial superintelligence has never existed, claims that it poses a serious risk of global catastrophe can be easy to dismiss as fearmongering. Yet many of the specific worries about such systems are not free-floating fantasies but extensions of patterns we already see. This essay examines thirteen distinct ways artificial superintelligence could go wrong and, for each, pairs the abstract failure mode with concrete precedents where a similar pattern has already caused serious harm. By assembling a broad cross-domain catalog of such precedents, I aim to show that concerns about artificial superintelligence track recurring failure modes in our world. This essay is also an experiment in writing with extensive assistance from artificial intelligence, producing work I couldn’t have written without it. That a current system can help articulate a case for the catastrophic potential of its own lineage is itself a significant fact; we have already left the realm of speculative fiction and begun to build the very agents that constitute the risk. On a personal note, this collaboration with artificial intelligence is part of my effort to rebuild the intellectual life that my stroke disrupted and hopefully push it beyond where it stood before.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2025
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 2 (2)
Quantum Immortality
What should you believe will be the likely cause of your survival if you are an AI Doomer who believes in quantum immortality? An AI Doomer believes that if their understanding of AI existential risks is correct, humanity must get extremely lucky to survive. A person who believes in quantum immortality thinks that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics implies that their consciousness will necessarily continue in some branch of the multiverse. This article shows that combining these two beliefs requires rejecting or going beyond simple Bayesian reasoning when estimating one's most likely cause of survival. Such estimates may have practical implications for investment decisions, reputation management, and anthropic shadows.
- 29 May 2025
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 2 (2)
Open AccessQuantum Immortality
What should you believe will be the likely cause of your survival if you are an AI Doomer who believes in quantum immortality? An AI Doomer believes that if their understanding of AI existential risks is correct, humanity must get extremely lucky to survive. A person who believes in quantum immortality thinks that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics implies that their consciousness will necessarily continue in some branch of the multiverse. This article shows that combining these two beliefs requires rejecting or going beyond simple Bayesian reasoning when estimating one's most likely cause of survival. Such estimates may have practical implications for investment decisions, reputation management, and anthropic shadows.
- Open Access
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 1 (1)
On Yampolskiy, Against Purposeful Artificial Intelligence Failures
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Carlson Research LLC in SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
- Vol. 1 (1)
Open AccessOn Yampolskiy, Against Purposeful Artificial Intelligence Failures
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-45
Expecting the Future: How AI’s Potential Performance Will Shape Current Behavior
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-45
Expecting the Future: How AI’s Potential Performance Will Shape Current Behavior
- Open Access
- 1 December 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 5 (4) , 40
An AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Strong Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 5 (4) , 40
Open AccessAn AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Strong Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the strong orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI’s intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory. Nothing in our analysis weakens arguments concerning the risks of AGI.
- Open Access
An AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI's intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory.
Open AccessAn AGI Modifying Its Utility Function in Violation of the Orthogonality Thesis
An artificial general intelligence (AGI) might have an instrumental drive to modify its utility function to improve its ability to cooperate, bargain, promise, threaten, and resist and engage in blackmail. Such an AGI would necessarily have a utility function that was at least partially observable and that was influenced by how other agents chose to interact with it. This instrumental drive would conflict with the orthogonality thesis since the modifications would be influenced by the AGI's intelligence. AGIs in highly competitive environments might converge to having nearly the same utility function, one optimized to favorably influencing other agents through game theory.
- Open Access
An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theorists who use economists' standard method of discounting. This trap is implicitly and falsely assuming that a rational AGI would have time-consistent preferences. An agent with time-inconsistent preferences knows that its future self will disagree with its current self concerning intertemporal decision making. Such an agent cannot automatically trust its future self to carry out plans that its current self considers optimal.
Open AccessAn AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theorists who use economists' standard method of discounting. This trap is implicitly and falsely assuming that a rational AGI would have time-consistent preferences. An agent with time-inconsistent preferences knows that its future self will disagree with its current self concerning intertemporal decision making. Such an agent cannot automatically trust its future self to carry out plans that its current self considers optimal.
- 11 March 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foresight
- Vol. 21 (1) , 130-137
When two existential risks are better than one
Purpose: The great filter and an unfriendly artificial general intelligence might pose existential risks to humanity, but these two risks are anti-correlated. The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of having evidence that mankind is at significant peril from both these risks. Design/methodology/approach: This paper creates Bayesian models under which one might get evidence for being at risk for two perils when we know that we are at risk for at most one of these perils. Findings: Humanity should possibly be more optimistic about its long-term survival if we have convincing evidence for believing that both these risks are real than if we have such evidence for thinking that only one of these perils would likely strike us. Originality/value: Deriving implications of being greatly concerned about both an unfriendly artificial general intelligence and the great filter.
- 11 March 2019
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foresight
- Vol. 21 (1) , 130-137
When two existential risks are better than one
Purpose: The great filter and an unfriendly artificial general intelligence might pose existential risks to humanity, but these two risks are anti-correlated. The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of having evidence that mankind is at significant peril from both these risks. Design/methodology/approach: This paper creates Bayesian models under which one might get evidence for being at risk for two perils when we know that we are at risk for at most one of these perils. Findings: Humanity should possibly be more optimistic about its long-term survival if we have convincing evidence for believing that both these risks are real than if we have such evidence for thinking that only one of these perils would likely strike us. Originality/value: Deriving implications of being greatly concerned about both an unfriendly artificial general intelligence and the great filter.
- 23 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 229-244
Singularity Blog Insights
- 23 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 223-228
Reflections on the Singularity Journey