David P. Myatt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David P. Myatt has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Torun Dewan
London School of Economics and Political Science
2 shared publications Chris Wallace
University of Leicester
1 shared publication- David Ronayne
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT Berlin), 10178 Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication - Justin P. Johnson
Cornell University;
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 264
Decreasing returns to sampling without replacement
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 264
Open AccessDecreasing returns to sampling without replacement
- 24 August 2018
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 49 (3) , 541-573
The determinants of product lines
- 24 August 2018
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 49 (3) , 541-573
The determinants of product lines
- 7 April 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (609) , 845-886
Information Use and Acquisition In Price‐Setting Oligopolies
- 7 April 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (609) , 845-886
Information Use and Acquisition In Price‐Setting Oligopolies
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 127 (603) , 1527-1567
A Theory of Protest Voting
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 127 (603) , 1527-1567
A Theory of Protest Voting
- 23 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in London Business School Review
- Vol. 26 (1) , 20-23
PLAYING FOR THE WINNING TEAM
- 23 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in London Business School Review
- Vol. 26 (1) , 20-23
PLAYING FOR THE WINNING TEAM
- Open Access
- 20 February 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 106 (1) , 123-145
Dynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence
We use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government's longevity and its performance. Ministers perform well when their careers are valuable; this is so when the government's duration is expected to be long; the government's survival depends on its popularity; and, finally, that popularity depends on its ministers’ performance. The feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational-expectations equilibria can arise: Ministers work hard for a popular government, but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed; these alternatives are both self-fulfilling prophecies. However, the presence of (perhaps small) random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium. We explore the dynamics that arise: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government's performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold.
- 20 February 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 106 (1) , 123-145
Open AccessDynamic Government Performance: Honeymoons and Crises of Confidence
We use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government's longevity and its performance. Ministers perform well when their careers are valuable; this is so when the government's duration is expected to be long; the government's survival depends on its popularity; and, finally, that popularity depends on its ministers’ performance. The feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational-expectations equilibria can arise: Ministers work hard for a popular government, but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed; these alternatives are both self-fulfilling prophecies. However, the presence of (perhaps small) random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium. We explore the dynamics that arise: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government's performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold.