Robyn M. Dawes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robyn M. Dawes has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alphons J. C. van de Kragt
Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, Electronic mail
2 shared publications- John M. Orbell
Political Science Department & Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403
2 shared publications Alphons J. Van de Kragt
1 shared publication- John M. Orbell
Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, Electronic mall
1 shared publication - Linnda R. Caporael
Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12181, Electronic mail
1 shared publication - Linnda R. Caporael
Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180, Electronic mail
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 727-739
Thinking in sociality
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 727-739
Thinking in sociality
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 683-699
Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives
Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional views of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must provide evidence that people donotcooperatewithoutsuch incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared “bonus” that would be provided only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices; contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that cannot be explained by “economic man” or “selfish gene” theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor shaping the evolution ofHomo sapiens. The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and makes novel predictions about human choice.
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 683-699
Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives
Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional views of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must provide evidence that people donotcooperatewithoutsuch incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared “bonus” that would be provided only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices; contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that cannot be explained by “economic man” or “selfish gene” theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor shaping the evolution ofHomo sapiens. The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and makes novel predictions about human choice.
- 1 January 1988
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (5) , 811-819
Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
In a social dilemma game, a period of discussion among subjects substantially increases the incidence of cooperative choices. We conducted two experiments in an effort to explain this effect. Experiment 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that discussion of the dilemma problem promotes generalized norms in favor of cooperation. Content analysis of discussion sessions in Experiment 1 suggested that promises to cooperate are important in an explanation of discussion's effect. Experiment 2 showed that promises to cooperate substantially increased cooperation rates, but only when everyone in the discussing group promised. We discuss one model in which discussion promotes group identity (as indicated by consensual promising) and therefore cooperation, and another in which discussion provides an opportunity for promise making, which—at least when it is universal—explains discussion's effect without any involvement of group identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
- 1 January 1988
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (5) , 811-819
Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
In a social dilemma game, a period of discussion among subjects substantially increases the incidence of cooperative choices. We conducted two experiments in an effort to explain this effect. Experiment 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that discussion of the dilemma problem promotes generalized norms in favor of cooperation. Content analysis of discussion sessions in Experiment 1 suggested that promises to cooperate are important in an explanation of discussion's effect. Experiment 2 showed that promises to cooperate substantially increased cooperation rates, but only when everyone in the discussing group promised. We discuss one model in which discussion promotes group identity (as indicated by consensual promising) and therefore cooperation, and another in which discussion provides an opportunity for promise making, which—at least when it is universal—explains discussion's effect without any involvement of group identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)