John M. Orbell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
John M. Orbell has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- James E. Hanley
Political Studies Program PAC 366, University of Illinois, Springfield, One University Plaza, Springfield, IL 62703, USA.
2 shared publications - Robyn M. Dawes
Department of Decision and Social Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, Electronic mail
2 shared publications - Tomonori Morikawa
Center for International Education, Waseda University, 1-7-14-404, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku Tokyo, Japan.
2 shared publications Alphons J. C. van de Kragt
Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, Electronic mail
1 shared publicationAlphons J. Van de Kragt
1 shared publication- Linnda R. Caporael
Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12181, Electronic mail
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 21 (1) , 3-12
Cognitive requirements for hawk-dove games: A functional analysis for evolutionary design
Like other social animals, humans play adaptively important games, and current evolutionary theory predicts special-purpose, domain-specific cognitive mechanisms for playing such games. We offer a functional analysis of the information requirements for successfully playing one important social game, the “hawk-dove” conflict-of-interest game, developing new graphic conventions for doing so. In particular, we address the orders of recognition necessary for successfully playing such games, showing that there are adaptive advantages of capacities for first, second, third, and fourth such orders, but no more. We suggest that first-order recognition is not only the most basic in analytic terms but is likely to have been the first to evolve, with subsequent orders added later in evolution.
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 21 (1) , 3-12
Cognitive requirements for hawk-dove games: A functional analysis for evolutionary design
Like other social animals, humans play adaptively important games, and current evolutionary theory predicts special-purpose, domain-specific cognitive mechanisms for playing such games. We offer a functional analysis of the information requirements for successfully playing one important social game, the “hawk-dove” conflict-of-interest game, developing new graphic conventions for doing so. In particular, we address the orders of recognition necessary for successfully playing such games, showing that there are adaptive advantages of capacities for first, second, third, and fourth such orders, but no more. We suggest that first-order recognition is not only the most basic in analytic terms but is likely to have been the first to evolve, with subsequent orders added later in evolution.
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 21 (1) , 13-18
The cost of misinformation in deadly conflicts: Hawk-Dove games and suicidal terrorism
The hijacking and purposeful crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, prompts questions about why the passengers and crew of those airplanes did not act to prevent these attacks, as did at least some passengers on a hijacked flight that crashed in Pennsylvania. We argue, first, that humans have an evolved cognitive bias that leads to the expectation that antagonists hope to survive conflict and, second, that highly credible information to the contrary is needed to overcome this bias. Absent such information, the passengers on at least two airplanes incorrectly interpreted the game being played as a hawk-dove version of a conflict-of-interest game, when it was actually a “suicidal terrorism” variant of that family. Given that other terrorists may have been in the air and ready to act, the airlines' policy of not informing passengers about such events could have risked disabling them from reacting forcefully when force alone was advisable.
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and the Life Sciences
- Vol. 21 (1) , 13-18
The cost of misinformation in deadly conflicts: Hawk-Dove games and suicidal terrorism
The hijacking and purposeful crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, prompts questions about why the passengers and crew of those airplanes did not act to prevent these attacks, as did at least some passengers on a hijacked flight that crashed in Pennsylvania. We argue, first, that humans have an evolved cognitive bias that leads to the expectation that antagonists hope to survive conflict and, second, that highly credible information to the contrary is needed to overcome this bias. Absent such information, the passengers on at least two airplanes incorrectly interpreted the game being played as a hawk-dove version of a conflict-of-interest game, when it was actually a “suicidal terrorism” variant of that family. Given that other terrorists may have been in the air and ready to act, the airlines' policy of not informing passengers about such events could have risked disabling them from reacting forcefully when force alone was advisable.
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 727-739
Thinking in sociality
- 1 June 1989
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (4) , 727-739
Thinking in sociality
- 1 January 1988
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (5) , 811-819
Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
In a social dilemma game, a period of discussion among subjects substantially increases the incidence of cooperative choices. We conducted two experiments in an effort to explain this effect. Experiment 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that discussion of the dilemma problem promotes generalized norms in favor of cooperation. Content analysis of discussion sessions in Experiment 1 suggested that promises to cooperate are important in an explanation of discussion's effect. Experiment 2 showed that promises to cooperate substantially increased cooperation rates, but only when everyone in the discussing group promised. We discuss one model in which discussion promotes group identity (as indicated by consensual promising) and therefore cooperation, and another in which discussion provides an opportunity for promise making, which—at least when it is universal—explains discussion's effect without any involvement of group identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
- 1 January 1988
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 54 (5) , 811-819
Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
In a social dilemma game, a period of discussion among subjects substantially increases the incidence of cooperative choices. We conducted two experiments in an effort to explain this effect. Experiment 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that discussion of the dilemma problem promotes generalized norms in favor of cooperation. Content analysis of discussion sessions in Experiment 1 suggested that promises to cooperate are important in an explanation of discussion's effect. Experiment 2 showed that promises to cooperate substantially increased cooperation rates, but only when everyone in the discussing group promised. We discuss one model in which discussion promotes group identity (as indicated by consensual promising) and therefore cooperation, and another in which discussion provides an opportunity for promise making, which—at least when it is universal—explains discussion's effect without any involvement of group identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)