Justin Esarey
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Justin Esarey has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Charles Barrilleaux
Barrilleaux: Leroy Collins Professor, Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306. Phone (850) 644‐7643, Fax (850) 644‐0581
1 shared publication - Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt
Department of Political Science, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA
1 shared publication Timothy C. Salmon
Salmon: Professor, Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306‐2180. Phone 850‐644‐7207, Fax 850‐644‐4535
1 shared publication- William D. Berry
Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (3) , 604-624
WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PREFERENCES? SELF‐INTEREST, IDEOLOGY, AND FAIRNESS IN A LABORATORY DEMOCRACY
Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacrifice their own well being to make financial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games, but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general finding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self‐interest: above‐average earners vote for low tax rates and below‐average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self‐reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self‐interest in this context. We do, however, find evidence for a possible indirect effect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self‐interest than the more liberal subjects.(JELC90, D63)
- 21 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (3) , 604-624
WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PREFERENCES? SELF‐INTEREST, IDEOLOGY, AND FAIRNESS IN A LABORATORY DEMOCRACY
Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacrifice their own well being to make financial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games, but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general finding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self‐interest: above‐average earners vote for low tax rates and below‐average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self‐reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self‐interest in this context. We do, however, find evidence for a possible indirect effect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self‐interest than the more liberal subjects.(JELC90, D63)
- 28 December 2009
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (1) , 248-266
Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term Essential?
Political scientists presenting binary dependent variable (BDV) models often hypothesize that variables interact to influence the probability of an event, Pr(Y). The current typical approach to testing such hypotheses is (1) estimate a logit or probit model with a product term, (2) test the hypothesis by determining whether the coefficient for this term is statistically significant, and (3) characterize the nature of any interaction detected by describing how the estimated effect of one variable on Pr(Y) varies with the value of another. This approach makes a statistically significant product term necessary to support the interaction hypothesis. We show that a statistically significant product term is neither necessary nor sufficient for variables to interact meaningfully in influencing Pr(Y). Indeed, even when a logit or probit model contains no product term, the effect of one variable on Pr(Y) may be strongly related to the value of another. We present a strategy for testing for interaction in a BDV model, including guidance on when to include a product term.
- 28 December 2009
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (1) , 248-266
Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term Essential?
Political scientists presenting binary dependent variable (BDV) models often hypothesize that variables interact to influence the probability of an event, Pr(Y). The current typical approach to testing such hypotheses is (1) estimate a logit or probit model with a product term, (2) test the hypothesis by determining whether the coefficient for this term is statistically significant, and (3) characterize the nature of any interaction detected by describing how the estimated effect of one variable on Pr(Y) varies with the value of another. This approach makes a statistically significant product term necessary to support the interaction hypothesis. We show that a statistically significant product term is neither necessary nor sufficient for variables to interact meaningfully in influencing Pr(Y). Indeed, even when a logit or probit model contains no product term, the effect of one variable on Pr(Y) may be strongly related to the value of another. We present a strategy for testing for interaction in a BDV model, including guidance on when to include a product term.