Eduardo Faingold
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Eduardo Faingold has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alfredo Di Tillio
IGIER and Department of Economics, Universita' Bocconi
1 shared publication - Siyang Xiong
Dept. of Economics, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, U.S.A.
1 shared publication - Yi-Chun Chen
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Yuliy Sannikov
Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544‐1021, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 79 (3) , 773-876
Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
- 1 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 79 (3) , 773-876
Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
- Open Access
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 5 (3) , 445-478
Uniform topologies on types
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet 1989). We show that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris 2006). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform-weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 5 (3) , 445-478
Open AccessUniform topologies on types
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet 1989). We show that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris 2006). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform-weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games