Yuliy Sannikov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yuliy Sannikov has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrzej Skrzypacz
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305‐5015, U.S.A.
1 shared publication - Dilip Abreu
Department of Economics; Princeton University
1 shared publication - Eduardo Faingold
Dept. of Economics, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520‐8281, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 313-338
An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signi\ufb01cant e\ufb03ciency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). These e\ufb03ciency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payo\ufb00 set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, \u2264 3 where A is the set of action pro\ufb01les of the stage game
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 313-338
Open AccessAn algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signi\ufb01cant e\ufb03ciency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). These e\ufb03ciency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payo\ufb00 set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, \u2264 3 where A is the set of action pro\ufb01les of the stage game
- 1 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 79 (3) , 773-876
Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
- 1 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 79 (3) , 773-876
Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 78 (3) , 847-882
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 78 (3) , 847-882
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.