John Hawthorne
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
John Hawthorne has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Manley
Department of Philosophy University of Michigan
8 shared publications - Herman Cappelen
Arché, AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind University of St Andrews St Andrews KY16 9AL, UK
5 shared publications - Jeffrey Sanford Russell
University of Southern California
3 shared publications - Herman Cappelen
The University of Hong Kong
2 shared publications - Ofra Magidor
University of Oxford
2 shared publications - Andrew McGonigal
University of Leeds
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Possible Patterns
“There are no gaps in logical space,” writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” Jumping off from discussions from Forrest and Armstrong (1984) and Nolan (1996), the authors use resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Possible Patterns
“There are no gaps in logical space,” writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” Jumping off from discussions from Forrest and Armstrong (1984) and Nolan (1996), the authors use resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Duke University Press in Philosophical Review
- Vol. 125 (3) , 307-339
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Duke University Press in Philosophical Review
- Vol. 125 (3) , 307-339
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics.
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (488) , 867-913
Embedding Epistemic Modals
Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (488) , 867-913
Embedding Epistemic Modals
Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper develops an explanation of the puzzling facts about embedding within an orthodox framework.
- 26 August 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 161 (2) , 347
Erratum to: Knowledge and epistemic necessity
- 26 August 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 161 (2) , 347
Erratum to: Knowledge and epistemic necessity
- 1 April 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 158 (3) , 493-501
Knowledge and epistemic necessity
- 1 April 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 158 (3) , 493-501
Knowledge and epistemic necessity
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 243-248
Afterword
The Afterword re-evaluates the central questions of the book. It begins by examining the possibility (suggested by Paul Pietroski) that no expressions of natural language are paradigmatically referential, and that the only dedicated vehicles of reference are cognitive object representations of a special kind. It also reconsiders philosophical orthodoxy about reference and singular thought in light of the emerging semantic picture of the expressions we use to talk about particular individuals. They argue that, for those who have abandoned acquaintance-theoretic constraints, there is a more natural way of carving the semantic and cognitive joints.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 243-248
Afterword
The Afterword re-evaluates the central questions of the book. It begins by examining the possibility (suggested by Paul Pietroski) that no expressions of natural language are paradigmatically referential, and that the only dedicated vehicles of reference are cognitive object representations of a special kind. It also reconsiders philosophical orthodoxy about reference and singular thought in light of the emerging semantic picture of the expressions we use to talk about particular individuals. They argue that, for those who have abandoned acquaintance-theoretic constraints, there is a more natural way of carving the semantic and cognitive joints.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 203-242
Et tu, ‘Brute’?
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 203-242
Et tu, ‘Brute’?
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 155-202
What ‘the’?
Chapter 5 is about definite descriptions. It begins with the observation that definites require specific restriction as a matter of convention, and explores the consequences of this fact for some major theories of definite descriptions, including Russellianism and neo-Fregeanism. The authors make a tentative case for a view on which definites are much like specific indefinites: they are existential quantifier phrases whose domain is presupposed to be restricted to a single individual (or plurality). That is, they are ‘specific existentials’, differing from specific indefinites only in their presuppositional profile.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 155-202
What ‘the’?
Chapter 5 is about definite descriptions. It begins with the observation that definites require specific restriction as a matter of convention, and explores the consequences of this fact for some major theories of definite descriptions, including Russellianism and neo-Fregeanism. The authors make a tentative case for a view on which definites are much like specific indefinites: they are existential quantifier phrases whose domain is presupposed to be restricted to a single individual (or plurality). That is, they are ‘specific existentials’, differing from specific indefinites only in their presuppositional profile.