Jeffrey Sanford Russell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jeffrey Sanford Russell has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- John Hawthorne
University of Oxford
3 shared publications - Lara Buchak
University of California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Possible Patterns
“There are no gaps in logical space,” writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” Jumping off from discussions from Forrest and Armstrong (1984) and Nolan (1996), the authors use resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Possible Patterns
“There are no gaps in logical space,” writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” Jumping off from discussions from Forrest and Armstrong (1984) and Nolan (1996), the authors use resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Duke University Press in Philosophical Review
- Vol. 125 (3) , 307-339
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Duke University Press in Philosophical Review
- Vol. 125 (3) , 307-339
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A popular reply to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the commitments of the project of dynamic semantics.
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 22 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (5) , 1287-1309
Groupthink
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (485) , 85-134
Actuality for Counterpart Theorists
The counterpart theorist has a problem: there is no obvious way to understand talk about actuality in terms of counterparts. Fara and Williamson have charged that this obstacle cannot be overcome. Here I defend the counterpart theorist by offering systematic interpretations of a quantified modal language that includes an actuality operator. Centrally, I disentangle the counterpart relation from a related notion, a ‘representation relation’. The relation of possible things to the actual things they represent is variable, and an adequate account of modal language must keep track of the way it is systematically shifted by modal operators. I apply my account to resolve several puzzles about counterparts and actuality. In technical appendices, I prove some important logical results about this ‘representational’ counterpart system and its relationship to other modal systems.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 122 (485) , 85-134
Actuality for Counterpart Theorists
The counterpart theorist has a problem: there is no obvious way to understand talk about actuality in terms of counterparts. Fara and Williamson have charged that this obstacle cannot be overcome. Here I defend the counterpart theorist by offering systematic interpretations of a quantified modal language that includes an actuality operator. Centrally, I disentangle the counterpart relation from a related notion, a ‘representation relation’. The relation of possible things to the actual things they represent is variable, and an adequate account of modal language must keep track of the way it is systematically shifted by modal operators. I apply my account to resolve several puzzles about counterparts and actuality. In technical appendices, I prove some important logical results about this ‘representational’ counterpart system and its relationship to other modal systems.