Jay Pil Choi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jay Pil Choi has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Heiko Gerlach
Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Australia
2 shared publications - Arijit Mukherjee
Michigan State University
1 shared publication - Arijit Mukherjee
Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824
1 shared publication - Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics CNRS France
1 shared publication - Byung‐Cheol Kim
Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa Alabama U.S.A.
1 shared publication - Byung‐Cheol Kim
The School of Economics Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA 30322 byung
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (11) , 9812-9830
“Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy
Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers’ data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers’ entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform’s entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform’s optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform’s payoff but also consumer surplus, as the associated fee induces maximal entry by the sellers. Next, we show how and when the platform’s policy on information sharing between its marketplace and product divisions can substitute for its commitment to entry. We characterize the platform’s optimal information policy and examine how it interacts with the platform’s fee structure. We show that an outright ban on information sharing between the platform’s divisions can reduce consumer welfare as it may lead to a higher referral fee that thwarts sellers’ entry. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the platform’s fee structure as a strategic response in the policy debates on marketplace regulation. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: J. P. Choi is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2023S1A5A2A01074511]. K. Kim is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2020S1A5A2A03043516].
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (11) , 9812-9830
“Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy
Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers’ data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers’ entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform’s entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform’s optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform’s payoff but also consumer surplus, as the associated fee induces maximal entry by the sellers. Next, we show how and when the platform’s policy on information sharing between its marketplace and product divisions can substitute for its commitment to entry. We characterize the platform’s optimal information policy and examine how it interacts with the platform’s fee structure. We show that an outright ban on information sharing between the platform’s divisions can reduce consumer welfare as it may lead to a higher referral fee that thwarts sellers’ entry. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the platform’s fee structure as a strategic response in the policy debates on marketplace regulation. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: J. P. Choi is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2023S1A5A2A01074511]. K. Kim is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2020S1A5A2A03043516].
- Open Access
Tying with network effects
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.
Open AccessTying with network effects
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.
- Open Access
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (2) , 333-366
Tax havens and cross-border licensing with transfer pricing regulation
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have incentive to reduce tax payment through transfer pricing. The incentive is stronger when MNEs own intangibles, because it is easy to transfer them across countries. To mitigate such strategic tax planning, the OECD proposes the arm’s length principle (ALP). This paper deals with technology patents as an example of intangibles and investigates how the ALP affects MNEs’ licensing strategies and welfare in a model with a tax haven. The ALP may distort MNEs’ licensing decisions, because providing a license to unrelated firms restricts MNEs’ profit-shifting opportunities due to the emergence of comparable transaction. Interestingly, the termination of licensing in the presence of the ALP may worsen domestic welfare if the (potential) licensee and the MNE’s subsidiary do not compete in the domestic market but may improve welfare if they compete. The results under ad valorem royalty are in distinct contrast with those under per-unit royalty.
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 31 (2) , 333-366
Open AccessTax havens and cross-border licensing with transfer pricing regulation
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have incentive to reduce tax payment through transfer pricing. The incentive is stronger when MNEs own intangibles, because it is easy to transfer them across countries. To mitigate such strategic tax planning, the OECD proposes the arm’s length principle (ALP). This paper deals with technology patents as an example of intangibles and investigates how the ALP affects MNEs’ licensing strategies and welfare in a model with a tax haven. The ALP may distort MNEs’ licensing decisions, because providing a license to unrelated firms restricts MNEs’ profit-shifting opportunities due to the emergence of comparable transaction. Interestingly, the termination of licensing in the presence of the ALP may worsen domestic welfare if the (potential) licensee and the MNE’s subsidiary do not compete in the domestic market but may improve welfare if they compete. The results under ad valorem royalty are in distinct contrast with those under per-unit royalty.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 57, 100942
Investigative journalism and media capture in the digital age
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 57, 100942
Investigative journalism and media capture in the digital age
- 13 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 989-1013
Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals
We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.
- 13 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 989-1013
Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals
We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.
- 4 January 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 28 (1) , 73-88
Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions
This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.
- 4 January 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 28 (1) , 73-88
Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions
This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 351-379
You are judged by the company you keep: Reputation leverage in vertically related markets
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 351-379
You are judged by the company you keep: Reputation leverage in vertically related markets
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 66 (1) , 172-204
Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges
We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high‐bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion‐sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 66 (1) , 172-204
Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges
We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high‐bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion‐sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.
- 18 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 65 (4) , 872-886
Tying in Two‐Sided Markets with Multi‐Homing: Corrigendum and Comment
We identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two‐sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural equilibrium refinement criterion. We offer an alternative timing structure that validates the equilibrium derived in Choi [2010] under the conditions provided there. Second, we show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a profitable deviation. We rectify this analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed‐strategy) equilibrium with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare‐enhancing whenever it is profitable, which is consistent with the main finding in Choi [2010].
- 18 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 65 (4) , 872-886
Tying in Two‐Sided Markets with Multi‐Homing: Corrigendum and Comment
We identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two‐sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural equilibrium refinement criterion. We offer an alternative timing structure that validates the equilibrium derived in Choi [2010] under the conditions provided there. Second, we show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a profitable deviation. We rectify this analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed‐strategy) equilibrium with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare‐enhancing whenever it is profitable, which is consistent with the main finding in Choi [2010].
- Open Access
- 1 February 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 315-351
A Theory of Patent Portfolios
This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them. (JEL D43, K11, L13, O34)
- 1 February 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 315-351
Open AccessA Theory of Patent Portfolios
This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them. (JEL D43, K11, L13, O34)