JCJay Pil Choi

Jay Pil Choi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jay Pil Choi has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • “Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy

    by Jay Pil Choi, Kyungmin Kim, Arijit Mukherjee

    Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers’ data to develop competing products, but the threat of future competition can deter sellers’ entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform’s entry on the marketplace and the referral fee it charges to the third-party sellers. We first characterize the platform’s optimal fee under different degrees of commitment on its own entry policy. We show that full commitment maximizes not only the platform’s payoff but also consumer surplus, as the associated fee induces maximal entry by the sellers. Next, we show how and when the platform’s policy on information sharing between its marketplace and product divisions can substitute for its commitment to entry. We characterize the platform’s optimal information policy and examine how it interacts with the platform’s fee structure. We show that an outright ban on information sharing between the platform’s divisions can reduce consumer welfare as it may lead to a higher referral fee that thwarts sellers’ entry. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the platform’s fee structure as a strategic response in the policy debates on marketplace regulation. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: J. P. Choi is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2023S1A5A2A01074511]. K. Kim is supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [Grant NRF-2020S1A5A2A03043516].


    • 3 April 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Tying with network effects

    by Jay Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon, Michael Whinston, Michael Dennis, Whinston Tying, Jacques Crémer, Vincenzo Denicolò, Chiara Fumagalli, Igal Hendel, Louis Kaplow, et al.

    We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.

  • Open Access

    Tax havens and cross-border licensing with transfer pricing regulation

    by Jay Pil Choi, Jota Ishikawa, Hirofumi Okoshi

    Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have incentive to reduce tax payment through transfer pricing. The incentive is stronger when MNEs own intangibles, because it is easy to transfer them across countries. To mitigate such strategic tax planning, the OECD proposes the arm’s length principle (ALP). This paper deals with technology patents as an example of intangibles and investigates how the ALP affects MNEs’ licensing strategies and welfare in a model with a tax haven. The ALP may distort MNEs’ licensing decisions, because providing a license to unrelated firms restricts MNEs’ profit-shifting opportunities due to the emergence of comparable transaction. Interestingly, the termination of licensing in the presence of the ALP may worsen domestic welfare if the (potential) licensee and the MNE’s subsidiary do not compete in the domestic market but may improve welfare if they compete. The results under ad valorem royalty are in distinct contrast with those under per-unit royalty.


  • Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals

    by Jay Pil Choi, Arijit Mukherjee

    We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.


  • Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions

    by Jay Pil Choi, Yusuke Zennyo

    This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.


  • Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges

    by Jay Pil Choi, Doh‐Shin Jeon, Byung‐Cheol Kim

    We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high‐bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion‐sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.


  • Tying in Two‐Sided Markets with Multi‐Homing: Corrigendum and Comment

    by Jay Pil Choi, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We identify two issues in Choi's [2010] paper on tying in two‐sided markets published in this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural equilibrium refinement criterion. We offer an alternative timing structure that validates the equilibrium derived in Choi [2010] under the conditions provided there. Second, we show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a profitable deviation. We rectify this analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed‐strategy) equilibrium with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare‐enhancing whenever it is profitable, which is consistent with the main finding in Choi [2010].


  • Open Access

    A Theory of Patent Portfolios

    by Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

    This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better off if firms with weaker portfolios acquire them. (JEL D43, K11, L13, O34)