BJBruno Jullien

Bruno Jullien

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Bruno Jullien has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 1 February 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Price cap regulation with limited commitment

    by Matthieu Bouvard, Bruno Jullien

    We consider the price-cap regulation of a monopolistic network operator when the regulator has limited commitment. Operating the network requires xed investments and the regulator has the opportunity to unilaterally revise the price cap at random times. When the regulator maximizes consumer surplus, he has an incentive to lower the price cap once the operator's xed investments are sunk. This hold-up problem gives rise to two types of ineciencies. In one type of equilibrium, the operator breaks even but strategically under-invests to induce the regulator to maintain the price cap. In another type of equilibrium the operator makes strictly positive prots and periods of high investment and high prices are followed by periods of low prices and capacity decline. Overall, the model suggests that the regulator's lack of commitment limits the deployment of network infrastructures.

    • 28 July 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Horizontal Mergers and Incremental Innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on the incentives of merging …rms to invest in incremental innovation. We provide a decomposition of this impact that clari…es the various forces at work and the di¤erences between demand-enhancing and cost-reducing innovation. Moreover, we derive su¢ cient conditions for a merger to either reduce or raise the merging …rms'incentives to innovate, and show that the comparison of the price diversion ratio and the innovation diversion ratio can help screen mergers. We also uncover a useful connection between the level of production synergies induced by a merger and its impact on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

    • 16 April 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Mergers and demand-enhancing innovation

    by Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili

    We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms’ incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer succient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms’ incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and effciency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

  • Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies

    by Bruno Jullien, Markus Reisinger, Patrick Rey

    The availability of consumer data is inducing a growing number of firms to adopt more personalized pricing policies. This affects both the performance of, and the competition between, alternative distribution channels, which in turn has implications for firms’ distribution strategies. We develop a formal model to examine a brand manufacturer’s choice between mono distribution (selling only through its own direct channel) or dual distribution (selling through an independent retailer as well). We consider different demand patterns, covering both horizontal and vertical differentiation and different pricing regimes, with the manufacturer and retailer each charging personalized prices or a uniform price. We show that dual distribution is optimal for a large number of cases. In particular, this is always the case when the channels are horizontally differentiated, regardless of the pricing regime; moreover, if both firms charge personalized prices, a well-designed wholesale tariff allows them to extract the entire consumer surplus. These insights obtained here for the case of intrabrand competition between vertically related firms are thus in stark contrast to those obtained for interbrand competition, where personalized pricing dissipates industry profit. With vertical differentiation, dual distribution remains optimal if the manufacturer charges a uniform price. By contrast, under personalized pricing, mono distribution can be optimal when the retailer does not expand demand sufficiently. Interestingly, the industry profit may be largest in a hybrid pricing regime, in which the manufacturer forgoes the use of personalized pricing and only the retailer charges personalized prices. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: The financial support of the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme [Grant Agreement 670494] and of the Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) [Grant ANITI (ANR Grant 3IA)] and [Grant CHESS ANR-17-EURE-0010] (Investissements d’Avenir program) is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4437 .