Jonathan Cohen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jonathan Cohen has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian P. McLaughlin
Rutgers University
4 shared publications - Clyde L. Hardin
Syracuse University
4 shared publications - Craig Callender
University of California, San Diego
3 shared publications - Aaron Meskin
University of Leeds
1 shared publication - Amitabh Varshney
University of Maryland, College Park
1 shared publication Andrew Bakir
Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 41 (4) , 469-481
Is secondary affect secondary? Anosmia, perceptual absence, and veridical secondary affect without primary affect
This paper challenges the traditional understanding of secondary affect, on which the latter is a cognitive appraisal of a somatic state that already has an antecedent, primary affect. We appeal to cases of acquired anosmia—the loss of the sense of smell—to argue that there are instances where secondary affect arises in the absence of (indeed, because of the absence of) primary affect, and that this can be so even when the secondary state is completely veridical. We conclude that, in this specific sense, secondary affect need not be secondary after all.
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 41 (4) , 469-481
Is secondary affect secondary? Anosmia, perceptual absence, and veridical secondary affect without primary affect
This paper challenges the traditional understanding of secondary affect, on which the latter is a cognitive appraisal of a somatic state that already has an antecedent, primary affect. We appeal to cases of acquired anosmia—the loss of the sense of smell—to argue that there are instances where secondary affect arises in the absence of (indeed, because of the absence of) primary affect, and that this can be so even when the secondary state is completely veridical. We conclude that, in this specific sense, secondary affect need not be secondary after all.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Molyneux's question about perceptual knowledge
Molyneux addressed his question to Locke in two forms. The question that is most often discussed in the literature is the 1693 version–about whether a newly sighted man could distinguish a globe and a cube when they are presented to his sight alone. But in 1688, he asked whether this man could know which was the globe. While Locke and Molyneux probably thought this an unnecessary add-on, we argue that it changes the question. Locke had no account of how one could know a contingent singular fact by sight or by vision. We argue that we know in these ways by using a process of active sensory exploration that employs the modality in question. A new form of Molyneux’s question emerges from this understanding of perceptual knowledge. While the variety of sensory exploration methods within and across modalities raises considerable difficulties for a positive answer, the original question, like the later version, can ultimately be answered only by empirical investigation.
- 18 October 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Open AccessMolyneux's question about perceptual knowledge
Molyneux addressed his question to Locke in two forms. The question that is most often discussed in the literature is the 1693 version–about whether a newly sighted man could distinguish a globe and a cube when they are presented to his sight alone. But in 1688, he asked whether this man could know which was the globe. While Locke and Molyneux probably thought this an unnecessary add-on, we argue that it changes the question. Locke had no account of how one could know a contingent singular fact by sight or by vision. We argue that we know in these ways by using a process of active sensory exploration that employs the modality in question. A new form of Molyneux’s question emerges from this understanding of perceptual knowledge. While the variety of sensory exploration methods within and across modalities raises considerable difficulties for a positive answer, the original question, like the later version, can ultimately be answered only by empirical investigation.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 40 (1) , 40-52
On locational sensory individuals and spacetime
Perception not only registers property instances, but also connects with and attributes properties to individual entities—so‐called sensory individuals, or SIs. But what are SIs? The most‐discussed answers are: (i) SIs are ordinary material objects—cohesive, temporally persistent objects extended and bounded in space, and (ii) SIs are locations or regions in spacetime. I will argue for the object view of SIs on the grounds that its rival, the locational view, faces obstacles concerning the relationship between SIs and spacetime: it makes a mystery of perception's representation of SIs as occupying locations in and moving in ordinary spacetime.
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 40 (1) , 40-52
Open AccessOn locational sensory individuals and spacetime
Perception not only registers property instances, but also connects with and attributes properties to individual entities—so‐called sensory individuals, or SIs. But what are SIs? The most‐discussed answers are: (i) SIs are ordinary material objects—cohesive, temporally persistent objects extended and bounded in space, and (ii) SIs are locations or regions in spacetime. I will argue for the object view of SIs on the grounds that its rival, the locational view, faces obstacles concerning the relationship between SIs and spacetime: it makes a mystery of perception's representation of SIs as occupying locations in and moving in ordinary spacetime.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (3) , 833-843
Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be
- 29 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (3) , 833-843
Open AccessDaylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 79 (4) , 720-730
Schellenberg on Perceptual Capacities
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 79 (4) , 720-730
Schellenberg on Perceptual Capacities
- Open Access
- 9 August 2017
- Published by University of Virginia
Digital Highlighting and Annotating as Formative Assessment: Paths to Technology-Enabled Reading Comprehension
- 9 August 2017
- Published by University of Virginia
Open AccessDigital Highlighting and Annotating as Formative Assessment: Paths to Technology-Enabled Reading Comprehension
- Open Access
- 7 December 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 26, 961-979
On the Presuppositional Behavior of Coherence-Driven Pragmatic Enrichments
When interpreting a sentence such as Every time the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union complaint is lodged, an addressee is likely to infer that the union will only complain when an employee is fired because he came in late. One is thus led to ask why a purely pragmatic enrichment of this sort -- one drawn despite no risk of interpretative failure nor other linguistic mandate -- would intrude upon truth conditions. We argue that this effect results from the interaction among three pragmatic phenomena: presupposition, the associative mechanisms that underlie the establishment of coherence in discourse, and the calculation of domain restriction for quantificational operators. Because the analysis does not consider the operative enrichments to be species of implicature, we claim that such cases do not represent an intrusion of implicature into truth-conditional content. Instead, they merely involve the context-dependent determination of quantificational domains.
- 7 December 2016
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 26, 961-979
Open AccessOn the Presuppositional Behavior of Coherence-Driven Pragmatic Enrichments
When interpreting a sentence such as Every time the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union complaint is lodged, an addressee is likely to infer that the union will only complain when an employee is fired because he came in late. One is thus led to ask why a purely pragmatic enrichment of this sort -- one drawn despite no risk of interpretative failure nor other linguistic mandate -- would intrude upon truth conditions. We argue that this effect results from the interaction among three pragmatic phenomena: presupposition, the associative mechanisms that underlie the establishment of coherence in discourse, and the calculation of domain restriction for quantificational operators. Because the analysis does not consider the operative enrichments to be species of implicature, we claim that such cases do not represent an intrusion of implicature into truth-conditional content. Instead, they merely involve the context-dependent determination of quantificational domains.
- Open Access
- 11 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 26 (3) , 287-301
Chromatic layering and color relationalism
- 11 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 26 (3) , 287-301
Open AccessChromatic layering and color relationalism
- 9 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1512-1518
Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception
Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (henceforth, HSP) argue that perception was not selected for veridical representation, hence that, contrary to a very widespread consensus, there's much less of the latter than you might expect in perception. And they put forward an alternative "interface" theory, on which perception is an adaptively useful but truth-obscuring veil between perceiver and perceived. But HSP's case against veridical perception, and their case for an alternative account, turn crucially on significant misapprehensions in the early going about what veridicality amounts to. In this paper I'll identify this mistake, and then argue that it both undercuts HSP's arguments against perceptual veridicality and prevents them from seeing that their own preferred conception of perception is itself committed to veridical representation, rather than an alternative to it. In the end, I'll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.
- 9 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1512-1518
Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception
Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (henceforth, HSP) argue that perception was not selected for veridical representation, hence that, contrary to a very widespread consensus, there's much less of the latter than you might expect in perception. And they put forward an alternative "interface" theory, on which perception is an adaptively useful but truth-obscuring veil between perceiver and perceived. But HSP's case against veridical perception, and their case for an alternative account, turn crucially on significant misapprehensions in the early going about what veridicality amounts to. In this paper I'll identify this mistake, and then argue that it both undercuts HSP's arguments against perceptual veridicality and prevents them from seeing that their own preferred conception of perception is itself committed to veridical representation, rather than an alternative to it. In the end, I'll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by IMAPS - International Microelectronics Assembly and Packaging Society in International Symposium on Microelectronics
- Vol. 2015 (1) , 000486-000492
A New In-line Laser-based Acoustic Technique for Pillar Bump Metrology
The drive to reduce the interconnect pitch and increase the number of connections for packaging in mobile devices has led to the development of copper pillar bumps. The key drivers for the adoption of copper pillars are improved performance, reduced form factor and lower cost. In this paper, we present a laser-based acoustic technique for the characterization of multi-layer pillars. This non-contact technique has a high sensitivity for materials characterization with micron-scale spatial resolution. Absorption of laser light causes excitation of elastic waves that propagate through the pillar and are reflected by the pillar walls, exciting vibrational modes in the structure. We have demonstrated that our approach is sensitive to the thicknesses of individual layers in bi-layer and tri-layer copper pillar stacks. Focused ion beam scanning electron microscopy (FIB SEM) has been used to optimize the model and to validate the accuracy of the technique.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by IMAPS - International Microelectronics Assembly and Packaging Society in International Symposium on Microelectronics
- Vol. 2015 (1) , 000486-000492
A New In-line Laser-based Acoustic Technique for Pillar Bump Metrology
The drive to reduce the interconnect pitch and increase the number of connections for packaging in mobile devices has led to the development of copper pillar bumps. The key drivers for the adoption of copper pillars are improved performance, reduced form factor and lower cost. In this paper, we present a laser-based acoustic technique for the characterization of multi-layer pillars. This non-contact technique has a high sensitivity for materials characterization with micron-scale spatial resolution. Absorption of laser light causes excitation of elastic waves that propagate through the pillar and are reflected by the pillar walls, exciting vibrational modes in the structure. We have demonstrated that our approach is sensitive to the thicknesses of individual layers in bi-layer and tri-layer copper pillar stacks. Focused ion beam scanning electron microscopy (FIB SEM) has been used to optimize the model and to validate the accuracy of the technique.