Craig Callender
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Craig Callender has a total of 178 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ralph Edney
23 shared publicationsRobert Weingard
5 shared publications- Jonathan Cohen
Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego La Jolla California USA
3 shared publications - Alan C. Love
University of Minnesota
2 shared publications - Christian Wüthrich
University of Geneva
2 shared publications - Eugene Yew Siang Chua
School of Humanities, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
The Toll of the Tolman Effect: On the Status of Classical Temperature in General Relativity
The Tolman effect is well-known in relativistic cosmology but rarely discussed outside it. That is surprising because the effect -- that systems extended over a varying gravitational potential exhibit temperature gradients while in thermal equilibrium -- conflicts with ordinary classical thermodynamics. In this paper we try to better understand this effect from a foundational perspective. We make five claims. First, as Tolman knew, it was Einstein who first discovered the effect, and furthermore, Einstein's derivation helps us appreciate how robust it is. Second, the standard interpretation of the effect in terms of 'local temperature' leads to the breakdown of much of classical thermodynamics. Third, one can rescue thermodynamics by using Einstein's preferred interpretation in terms of the 'wahre Temperatur' -- what we'll call global temperature -- but it too has some costs. Fourth, the effect is perhaps best understood in terms of clocks as opposed to energy loss. Fifth, inspired by a proposal of Einstein's elsewhere, we sketch an interpretation of the effect in terms of a third novel temperature, which we call the 'wahre-local temperature'. On this view, temperature -- and thermodynamics -- is defined only in relation to local clocks. In sum, we view the fragmentation of temperature in thermodynamics as a natural and expected result of the fragmentation of time in general relativity.
Open AccessThe Toll of the Tolman Effect: On the Status of Classical Temperature in General Relativity
The Tolman effect is well-known in relativistic cosmology but rarely discussed outside it. That is surprising because the effect -- that systems extended over a varying gravitational potential exhibit temperature gradients while in thermal equilibrium -- conflicts with ordinary classical thermodynamics. In this paper we try to better understand this effect from a foundational perspective. We make five claims. First, as Tolman knew, it was Einstein who first discovered the effect, and furthermore, Einstein's derivation helps us appreciate how robust it is. Second, the standard interpretation of the effect in terms of 'local temperature' leads to the breakdown of much of classical thermodynamics. Third, one can rescue thermodynamics by using Einstein's preferred interpretation in terms of the 'wahre Temperatur' -- what we'll call global temperature -- but it too has some costs. Fourth, the effect is perhaps best understood in terms of clocks as opposed to energy loss. Fifth, inspired by a proposal of Einstein's elsewhere, we sketch an interpretation of the effect in terms of a third novel temperature, which we call the 'wahre-local temperature'. On this view, temperature -- and thermodynamics -- is defined only in relation to local clocks. In sum, we view the fragmentation of temperature in thermodynamics as a natural and expected result of the fragmentation of time in general relativity.
- 4 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-61
The Prodigy That Time Forgot: The Incredible and Untold Story of John von Newton
- 4 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-61
The Prodigy That Time Forgot: The Incredible and Untold Story of John von Newton
- Open Access
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Timing & Time Perception
- Vol. 12 (2) , 132-137
Going ‘Humean’ on the Flow of Time
We argue that the problem of the flow of time is a special problem, one unlike many other challenges in reconciling temporal phenomena with time in physics. After clarifying this point, we develop a Humean account of the flow of time according to which the psychological stream of experience explains why we think the world is tensed. On our account, the flow of time is not all inferential, as the invitation to think time flows comes from the deepest aspects of human experience, making it an offer we cannot refuse.
- 22 August 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Timing & Time Perception
- Vol. 12 (2) , 132-137
Open AccessGoing ‘Humean’ on the Flow of Time
We argue that the problem of the flow of time is a special problem, one unlike many other challenges in reconciling temporal phenomena with time in physics. After clarifying this point, we develop a Humean account of the flow of time according to which the psychological stream of experience explains why we think the world is tensed. On our account, the flow of time is not all inferential, as the invitation to think time flows comes from the deepest aspects of human experience, making it an offer we cannot refuse.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
Open AccessPSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- Open Access
No Time for Time from No-Time
Programs in quantum gravity often claim that time emerges from fundamentally timeless physics. In the semiclassical time program time arises only after approximations are taken. Here we ask what justifies taking these approximations and show that time seems to sneak in when answering this question. This raises the worry that the approach is either unjustified or circular in deriving time from no-time.
Open AccessNo Time for Time from No-Time
Programs in quantum gravity often claim that time emerges from fundamentally timeless physics. In the semiclassical time program time arises only after approximations are taken. Here we ask what justifies taking these approximations and show that time seems to sneak in when answering this question. This raises the worry that the approach is either unjustified or circular in deriving time from no-time.
- 17 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (5) , 1469-1479
Temporal Neutrality Implies Exponential Temporal Discounting
How should one discount utility across time? The conventional wisdom in social science is that one should use an exponential discount function. Such a function is a representation of the axioms that provide a well-defined utility function plus a condition known as stationarity. Yet stationarity doesnt really have much intuitive normative pull on its own. Here I try to cast it in a normative glow by deriving stationarity from two explicitly normative premises, both suggested by the philosophical thesis of temporal neutralism. Putting the argument in this form helps us better understand exponential discounting and challenges to it.
- 17 February 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (5) , 1469-1479
Temporal Neutrality Implies Exponential Temporal Discounting
How should one discount utility across time? The conventional wisdom in social science is that one should use an exponential discount function. Such a function is a representation of the axioms that provide a well-defined utility function plus a condition known as stationarity. Yet stationarity doesnt really have much intuitive normative pull on its own. Here I try to cast it in a normative glow by deriving stationarity from two explicitly normative premises, both suggested by the philosophical thesis of temporal neutralism. Putting the argument in this form helps us better understand exponential discounting and challenges to it.
- 3 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Philosophical Review
- Vol. 5 (3) , 227-253
The Normative Standard for Future Discounting
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational. If this is correct, Instead of trying to ‘fix’ non-exponential discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational.
- 3 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Philosophical Review
- Vol. 5 (3) , 227-253
The Normative Standard for Future Discounting
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational. If this is correct, Instead of trying to ‘fix’ non-exponential discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational.
- 3 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Philosophical Review
- Vol. 5 (3) , 309-321
Response to Critics
Let me begin by sincerely thanking the commentators for taking the time to share their insightful reactions to the target article [Callender 2022a]. I am very fortunate to have so many talented, di...
- 3 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Philosophical Review
- Vol. 5 (3) , 309-321
Response to Critics
Let me begin by sincerely thanking the commentators for taking the time to share their insightful reactions to the target article [Callender 2022a]. I am very fortunate to have so many talented, di...
- 4 November 2020
- Published by EDP Sciences
- p. 110-111
Un second problème pour le temps avec les temps
Un second problème pour le temps avec les temps was published in Le temps en images on page 110.
- 4 November 2020
- Published by EDP Sciences
- p. 110-111
Un second problème pour le temps avec les temps
Un second problème pour le temps avec les temps was published in Le temps en images on page 110.
- 4 November 2020
- Published by EDP Sciences
- p. 123
L’espace s’arrête-t-il quelque part ?
L’espace s’arrête-t-il quelque part ? was published in Le temps en images on page 123.
- 4 November 2020
- Published by EDP Sciences
- p. 123
L’espace s’arrête-t-il quelque part ?
L’espace s’arrête-t-il quelque part ? was published in Le temps en images on page 123.