Ko Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ko Wang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Leslie Young
Chinese University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication- Rose Neng Lai
University of Macau
1 shared publication - Su Han Chan
Department of Finance, California State University–Fullerton, Fullerton, CA 92834 or
1 shared publication - Wai-Kin Leung
Faculty of Business Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong or
1 shared publication Yuqing Zhou
Chinese University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication- Yuqing Zhou
Department of Finance, Faculty of Business Administration, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2005
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 33 (1) , 89-120
Changes in REIT Structure and Stock Performance: Evidence from the Monday Stock Anomaly
- 1 March 2005
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 33 (1) , 89-120
Changes in REIT Structure and Stock Performance: Evidence from the Monday Stock Anomaly
- 18 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 32 (2) , 329-357
Sale before Completion of Development: Pricing and Strategy
The paper examines the risk‐and‐return characteristics of a popular development strategy, the presale system (or sale before completion), used in many Asian cities. We model a presale decision in a real‐options framework and suggest that the use of presale is primarily for a risk‐sharing purpose. That is, developers can reduce bankruptcy and marketing risks by selling (or leasing) their projects before their completion dates. Our model also indicates that, because of the presale system, there is a barrier for new developers to enter into a market, which helps explain the anecdotal observation that most real estate markets in Asian cities are oligopolistic in nature and dominated by large developers.
- 18 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 32 (2) , 329-357
Sale before Completion of Development: Pricing and Strategy
The paper examines the risk‐and‐return characteristics of a popular development strategy, the presale system (or sale before completion), used in many Asian cities. We model a presale decision in a real‐options framework and suggest that the use of presale is primarily for a risk‐sharing purpose. That is, developers can reduce bankruptcy and marketing risks by selling (or leasing) their projects before their completion dates. Our model also indicates that, because of the presale system, there is a barrier for new developers to enter into a market, which helps explain the anecdotal observation that most real estate markets in Asian cities are oligopolistic in nature and dominated by large developers.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2002
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 15 (3) , 959-985
Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary Liquidating Costs
Since liquidation and bankruptcy are costly, researchers have tried to find out why the claimants of a troubled firm do not work out a deal to avoid these costs. In this article we show that if a creditor has to deal with multiple borrowers who might default, it may be optimal for the creditor to randomly reject requests for a loan workout. We further demonstrate that the optimal acceptance rate used by a creditor is positively related to the liquidating cost and negatively related to the default benefit. Our model is particularly relevant when analyzing the default decisions of mortgage borrowers and small business owners.
- 1 April 2002
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 15 (3) , 959-985
Open AccessNondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary Liquidating Costs
Since liquidation and bankruptcy are costly, researchers have tried to find out why the claimants of a troubled firm do not work out a deal to avoid these costs. In this article we show that if a creditor has to deal with multiple borrowers who might default, it may be optimal for the creditor to randomly reject requests for a loan workout. We further demonstrate that the optimal acceptance rate used by a creditor is positively related to the liquidating cost and negatively related to the default benefit. Our model is particularly relevant when analyzing the default decisions of mortgage borrowers and small business owners.