Yuqing Zhou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yuqing Zhou has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ko Wang
Department of Finance, College of Business and Economics, California State University–Fullerton, Fullerton, CA 92834 or
1 shared publication - Ko Wang
Baruch College (CUNY)
1 shared publication - Rose Neng Lai
University of Macau
1 shared publication - Tao Li
Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 10 (4) , 365-403
Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 10 (4) , 365-403
Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation
- 14 February 2006
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 1-49
Equilibrium Real Options Exercise Strategies with Multiple Players: The Case of Real Estate Markets
- 14 February 2006
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 1-49
Equilibrium Real Options Exercise Strategies with Multiple Players: The Case of Real Estate Markets
- 18 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 32 (2) , 329-357
Sale before Completion of Development: Pricing and Strategy
The paper examines the risk‐and‐return characteristics of a popular development strategy, the presale system (or sale before completion), used in many Asian cities. We model a presale decision in a real‐options framework and suggest that the use of presale is primarily for a risk‐sharing purpose. That is, developers can reduce bankruptcy and marketing risks by selling (or leasing) their projects before their completion dates. Our model also indicates that, because of the presale system, there is a barrier for new developers to enter into a market, which helps explain the anecdotal observation that most real estate markets in Asian cities are oligopolistic in nature and dominated by large developers.
- 18 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 32 (2) , 329-357
Sale before Completion of Development: Pricing and Strategy
The paper examines the risk‐and‐return characteristics of a popular development strategy, the presale system (or sale before completion), used in many Asian cities. We model a presale decision in a real‐options framework and suggest that the use of presale is primarily for a risk‐sharing purpose. That is, developers can reduce bankruptcy and marketing risks by selling (or leasing) their projects before their completion dates. Our model also indicates that, because of the presale system, there is a barrier for new developers to enter into a market, which helps explain the anecdotal observation that most real estate markets in Asian cities are oligopolistic in nature and dominated by large developers.