Dilip Abreu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Dilip Abreu has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Pearce
Department of Economics; New York University
2 shared publications - Ennio Stacchetti
Department of Economics; New York University
1 shared publication - Markus K. Brunnermeier
Princeton University
1 shared publication - Yuliy Sannikov
Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544‐1021, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 September 2015
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 10 (3) , 719-773
One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature in their conclusion that there is a negligible delay to agreement. Perturbing the model with a slightly broader class of behavioral types that allows the informed player to delay making his initial demand again achieves powerful equilibrium refinement. But there is substantial delay to agreement, and predictions depend continuously on the ex ante probabilities of the patient and impatient types of the informed player, counter to what the literature suggests
- 1 September 2015
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 10 (3) , 719-773
Open AccessOne-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature in their conclusion that there is a negligible delay to agreement. Perturbing the model with a slightly broader class of behavioral types that allows the informed player to delay making his initial demand again achieves powerful equilibrium refinement. But there is substantial delay to agreement, and predictions depend continuously on the ex ante probabilities of the patient and impatient types of the informed player, counter to what the literature suggests
- 21 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-167
A Model of Bubbles and Crashes
- Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 313-338
An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signi\ufb01cant e\ufb03ciency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). These e\ufb03ciency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payo\ufb00 set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, \u2264 3 where A is the set of action pro\ufb01les of the stage game
- 1 May 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (2) , 313-338
Open AccessAn algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signi\ufb01cant e\ufb03ciency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). These e\ufb03ciency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payo\ufb00 set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, \u2264 3 where A is the set of action pro\ufb01les of the stage game
- 1 May 2007
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 75 (3) , 653-710
Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
- 1 May 2007
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 75 (3) , 653-710
Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
- 1 January 2003
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 71 (1) , 173-204
Bubbles and Crashes
- 1 January 2003
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 71 (1) , 173-204
Bubbles and Crashes