Andreas Warntjen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Andreas Warntjen has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anne Rasmussen
King’s College London
1 shared publication Björn Lindberg
1 shared publication- Christophe Crombez
Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)
1 shared publication Simon Hix
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 39 (6) , 673-687
Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union
- 25 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 39 (6) , 673-687
Open AccessDo votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union
- 8 October 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 36 (6) , 1239-1255
The Elusive Goal of Continuity? Legislative Decision-Making and the Council Presidency before and after Lisbon
This study compares the role of the Council presidency before and after Lisbon focusing on the continuity of the legislative work of the Council, which was a major concern in the discussions leading to the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty established an elected presidency to head the European Council for a period of up to five years. In addition, 18-month programmes should facilitate smooth proceedings in the Council. The presidency of the Council, however, continues to rotate every six months between member states at the ministerial and working group level where the bulk of the legislative work takes place. Discontinuity of leadership in negotiations decreases their efficiency. Different priorities of the changing chairmen can be disruptive and lead to major delay. The hybrid solution of the Lisbon Treaty falls short of an institutional design that would have put a premium on continuity in the legislative work of the Council.
- 8 October 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 36 (6) , 1239-1255
The Elusive Goal of Continuity? Legislative Decision-Making and the Council Presidency before and after Lisbon
This study compares the role of the Council presidency before and after Lisbon focusing on the continuity of the legislative work of the Council, which was a major concern in the discussions leading to the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty established an elected presidency to head the European Council for a period of up to five years. In addition, 18-month programmes should facilitate smooth proceedings in the Council. The presidency of the Council, however, continues to rotate every six months between member states at the ministerial and working group level where the bulk of the legislative work takes place. Discontinuity of leadership in negotiations decreases their efficiency. Different priorities of the changing chairmen can be disruptive and lead to major delay. The hybrid solution of the Lisbon Treaty falls short of an institutional design that would have put a premium on continuity in the legislative work of the Council.
- 13 December 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 168-182
Measuring salience in EU legislative politics
To describe and explain legislative politics in the European Union and to assess its democratic quality we need to measure the political importance (salience) of legislative proposals. The existing literature uses several indicators to measure salience. This article compares measures of salience based on three types of data source (expert interviews, text analysis and media coverage) using a large number of legislative proposals that cover a variety of policy fields and types of proposal. Different measures of salience often do not yield similar values.
- 13 December 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 168-182
Measuring salience in EU legislative politics
To describe and explain legislative politics in the European Union and to assess its democratic quality we need to measure the political importance (salience) of legislative proposals. The existing literature uses several indicators to measure salience. This article compares measures of salience based on three types of data source (expert interviews, text analysis and media coverage) using a large number of legislative proposals that cover a variety of policy fields and types of proposal. Different measures of salience often do not yield similar values.
- 21 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (5) , 665-679
Between bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in the Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union (EU) is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how it reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is norm-guided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal ‘culture of consensus’. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to maximize their utility and move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. This contribution explores the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, it discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research. Due to observational equivalence empirical findings are often inconclusive.
- 21 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (5) , 665-679
Between bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in the Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union (EU) is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how it reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is norm-guided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal ‘culture of consensus’. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to maximize their utility and move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. This contribution explores the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, it discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research. Due to observational equivalence empirical findings are often inconclusive.
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1243-1253
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
This research note provides an overview of the party political make-up of EU legislative bodies for the period 1979–2004 (Commission: 1979–2007) in terms of the left–right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions. The various methods of measuring political positions are discussed and compared. Measures for the left–right dimension based on party manifestos and expert surveys are relatively strongly correlated for the time period. This is not the case for the pro-/anti-Europe dimension. The dataset is available via the homepage of the European Legislative Politics Research Group (www.elprg.eu).
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1243-1253
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
This research note provides an overview of the party political make-up of EU legislative bodies for the period 1979–2004 (Commission: 1979–2007) in terms of the left–right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions. The various methods of measuring political positions are discussed and compared. Measures for the left–right dimension based on party manifestos and expert surveys are relatively strongly correlated for the time period. This is not the case for the pro-/anti-Europe dimension. The dataset is available via the homepage of the European Legislative Politics Research Group (www.elprg.eu).
- Open Access
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1107-1126
Party politics as usual? The role of political parties in EU legislative decision-making
Scholars have raised doubts about the ability of political parties to fulfil their traditional role as ‘transmission belts’ between citizens and legislators in the EU. We discuss how the different institutional environment of the EU affects the assumptions and predictions of theories of political parties developed for the national context and discuss how political parties can influence EU legislative decision-making. We distinguish between partisan effects in the electoral and legislative arena, and argue for a clear distinction between the effects of national parties, national party delegations and transnational party groups when studying EU party politics. The empirical literature shows that, whereas parties play a role in most institutions, they are not always the dominant players, and their effect varies both across and within these institutions.
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1107-1126
Open AccessParty politics as usual? The role of political parties in EU legislative decision-making
Scholars have raised doubts about the ability of political parties to fulfil their traditional role as ‘transmission belts’ between citizens and legislators in the EU. We discuss how the different institutional environment of the EU affects the assumptions and predictions of theories of political parties developed for the national context and discuss how political parties can influence EU legislative decision-making. We distinguish between partisan effects in the electoral and legislative arena, and argue for a clear distinction between the effects of national parties, national party delegations and transnational party groups when studying EU party politics. The empirical literature shows that, whereas parties play a role in most institutions, they are not always the dominant players, and their effect varies both across and within these institutions.
- 12 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1135-1157
Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on Legislative Activity in the Council*
- 12 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1135-1157
Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on Legislative Activity in the Council*