Claus-Jochen Haake
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Claus-Jochen Haake has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Walter Trockel
Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
4 shared publications - Francis Edward Su
University of Michigan and MSRI
3 shared publications - Akemi Kashiwada
Department of Mathematics Harvey Mudd College 91711 Claremont CA U.S.A
2 shared publications - Bettina Klaus
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Dinko Dimitrov
Bielefeld University
1 shared publication - Jan Thomas Martini
Bielefeld University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (1) , 6
An axiomatization of the Banzhaf index to measure influence in qualitative comparative analysis
The Banzhaf power index can be used to quantify the explanatory power of single conditions in a configurational analysis that aims at identifying whether combinations of conditions are sufficient for an outcome. This analysis of sufficiency is an integral part of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) widely used in the field of Business and International Management. Haake and Schneider (J Int Manag 30(2):101065, 2023) give a rigorous description of the connection between the empirical and game theoretic modeling. To justify that the Banzhaf index is an appropriate tool to measure the influence of a condition, this paper discusses an axiomatization of the Banzhaf index using axioms that are directly linked to the QCA methodology. As a side result, we demonstrate that in our model the Banzhaf index can be reinterpreted as an average of Shapley-Shubik indices.
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (1) , 6
Open AccessAn axiomatization of the Banzhaf index to measure influence in qualitative comparative analysis
The Banzhaf power index can be used to quantify the explanatory power of single conditions in a configurational analysis that aims at identifying whether combinations of conditions are sufficient for an outcome. This analysis of sufficiency is an integral part of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) widely used in the field of Business and International Management. Haake and Schneider (J Int Manag 30(2):101065, 2023) give a rigorous description of the connection between the empirical and game theoretic modeling. To justify that the Banzhaf index is an appropriate tool to measure the influence of a condition, this paper discusses an axiomatization of the Banzhaf index using axioms that are directly linked to the QCA methodology. As a side result, we demonstrate that in our model the Banzhaf index can be reinterpreted as an average of Shapley-Shubik indices.
- Open Access
- 7 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 125 (2) , 403-440
Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*
- 7 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 125 (2) , 403-440
Open AccessWage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 27 (2) , 471
Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 27 (2) , 471
Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
- Open Access
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (4) , 635-649
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (4) , 635-649
Open AccessSocio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 37 (1-2) , 1-6
Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 37 (1-2) , 1-6
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
- 11 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 22 (4) , 657-680
Negotiating Transfer Prices
- 11 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 22 (4) , 657-680
Negotiating Transfer Prices
- 4 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 7 (2) , 189-200
Proportionality and the power of unequal parties
- 4 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 7 (2) , 189-200
Proportionality and the power of unequal parties
- 28 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 14 (1-2) , 17-25
On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
- 28 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 14 (1-2) , 17-25
On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
- 28 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 69 (4) , 537-554
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- 28 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 69 (4) , 537-554
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- 29 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 41 (3) , 393-410
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- 29 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 41 (3) , 393-410
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts