Thibaud Vergé
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Thibaud Vergé has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laurent Linnemer
CREST, ENSAE Institut Polytechnique de Paris Palaiseau France
2 shared publications - Patrick Rey
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIE Route de Saclay 91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX
2 shared publications - Philippe Choné
CREST, ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
2 shared publications Arthur Cazaubiel
CREST, ENSAE Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, France
1 shared publication- Bjørn Hansen
University of South-Eastern Norway, Notodden, Norway
1 shared publication Bjørn Olav Johansen
Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
Double marginalization, market foreclosure, and vertical integration
Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer’s bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
Double marginalization, market foreclosure, and vertical integration
Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer’s bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.
- 21 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1884-1935
Double Marginalization, Market Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer’s bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.
- 21 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1884-1935
Double Marginalization, Market Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer’s bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 64 (1-3) , 34-47
Co-operative investment by downstream rivals: network sharing in telecom markets
- 9 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 64 (1-3) , 34-47
Open AccessCo-operative investment by downstream rivals: network sharing in telecom markets
- 7 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 69, 102577
Substitution between online distribution channels: Evidence from the Oslo hotel market
- 7 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 69, 102577
Substitution between online distribution channels: Evidence from the Oslo hotel market
- 16 July 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 123 (573) , 1279-1312
The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices: Evidence from the Loi Galland
- 16 July 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 123 (573) , 1279-1312
The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices: Evidence from the Loi Galland
- 16 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 9 (4) , 721-741
BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION
- 16 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 9 (4) , 721-741
BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 928-961
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS*
Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM. We analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers. We show that RPM indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry‐wide monopoly pricing. The impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties' influence in determining the terms of the contracts. Our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies.
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 928-961
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS*
Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM. We analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers. We show that RPM indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry‐wide monopoly pricing. The impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties' influence in determining the terms of the contracts. Our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies.
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 723-741
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH ASSETS*
Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell and Shapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger is highly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structural remedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at least two different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relatively important pre‐merger market shares.
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 723-741
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH ASSETS*
Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell and Shapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger is highly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structural remedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at least two different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relatively important pre‐merger market shares.