Patrick Rey
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Patrick Rey has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thibaud Vergé
CREST, ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris
2 shared publications - Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI‐GREMAQ) and CNRS;
1 shared publication - Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics CNRS France
1 shared publication - Jean Tirole
Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
1 shared publication - Jeanine Miklós-Thal
University of Rochester
1 shared publication Mathias Dewatripont
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and CEPR
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 9 (4) , 721-741
BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION
- 16 March 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 9 (4) , 721-741
BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 928-961
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS*
Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM. We analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers. We show that RPM indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry‐wide monopoly pricing. The impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties' influence in determining the terms of the contracts. Our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies.
- 24 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 58 (4) , 928-961
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS*
Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM. We analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers. We show that RPM indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry‐wide monopoly pricing. The impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties' influence in determining the terms of the contracts. Our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (3) , 372-409
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE‐TRIAL BARGAINING*
- 27 August 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (3) , 372-409
Open AccessPRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE‐TRIAL BARGAINING*
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 983-1001
Resale price maintenance and collusion
The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 983-1001
Resale price maintenance and collusion
The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 115-138
Transferable Control
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. (JEL: C70, C72, D23, L2)
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 115-138
Transferable Control
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. (JEL: C70, C72, D23, L2)
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 259
Pricing Regulation under Bypass Competition
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 29 (2) , 259
Pricing Regulation under Bypass Competition
- 1 January 1997
- Published by PERSEE Program in Revue française d'économie
- Vol. 12 (1) , 3-32
Analyse économique de la notion de prix de prédation
This note aims at clarifying the debate on « abnormally low prices », where many arguments rely on predatory pricing behaviour. It thus offers a survey of : —predatory pricing theory, —detection problems (are they different from collusion or dominant position detection problems ?) —prédation in competition law and policy. The first part of this note thus surveys the existing literature on predatory pricing. Its implications for competition policy are then discussed. The concluding section gathers the economic arguments that have been presented and, in the light of the French competition law, offers some comments that may help clarifying the debate.
- 1 January 1997
- Published by PERSEE Program in Revue française d'économie
- Vol. 12 (1) , 3-32
Analyse économique de la notion de prix de prédation
This note aims at clarifying the debate on « abnormally low prices », where many arguments rely on predatory pricing behaviour. It thus offers a survey of : —predatory pricing theory, —detection problems (are they different from collusion or dominant position detection problems ?) —prédation in competition law and policy. The first part of this note thus surveys the existing literature on predatory pricing. Its implications for competition policy are then discussed. The concluding section gathers the economic arguments that have been presented and, in the light of the French competition law, offers some comments that may help clarifying the debate.