Emilia Sansone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Emilia Sansone has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ilan Eshel
4 shared publications- Ilan Eshel
Department of Statistics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel
4 shared publications - Avner Shaked
Economics Department, Bonn University, 24 Adenauerallee, D-53113 Bonn, Germany DE
3 shared publications - Avner Shaked
Economics Department, Bonn University, Bonn, Germany
1 shared publication Frans Jacobs
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-1610, USA US
1 shared publicationIllan Eshel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 80 (2) , 150-157
On the evolution of group-escape strategies of selfish prey
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 80 (2) , 150-157
On the evolution of group-escape strategies of selfish prey
- 31 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 70 (1) , 76-81
Evolutionarily stable strategies and short-term selection in Mendelian populations re-visited
- 31 August 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 70 (1) , 76-81
Evolutionarily stable strategies and short-term selection in Mendelian populations re-visited
- 28 December 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 52 (5) , 595-612
Gregarious behaviour of evasive prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey's gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group. Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n+1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
- 28 December 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 52 (5) , 595-612
Gregarious behaviour of evasive prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey's gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group. Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n+1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
- Open Access
Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey’s gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which, gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group.Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n + 1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
Open AccessGregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey’s gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which, gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group.Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n + 1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
- 1 May 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 46 (5) , 445-459
Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- 1 May 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 46 (5) , 445-459
Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- 1 July 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 45 (1) , 1-21
A long-term genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference: the theories of Fisher and Zahavi re-examined
- 1 July 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 45 (1) , 1-21
A long-term genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference: the theories of Fisher and Zahavi re-examined
- 21 December 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 177 (4) , 341-356
Owner-Intruder Conflict, Grafen Effect and Self-assessment. The Bourgeois Principle Re-Examined
- 21 December 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 177 (4) , 341-356
Owner-Intruder Conflict, Grafen Effect and Self-assessment. The Bourgeois Principle Re-Examined
- 1 June 1994
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The American Naturalist
- Vol. 143 (6) , 987-1006
Parent-Offspring Conflict Over Sex Ratio. II. Offspring Response to Parental Manipulation
- 1 June 1994
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The American Naturalist
- Vol. 143 (6) , 987-1006
Parent-Offspring Conflict Over Sex Ratio. II. Offspring Response to Parental Manipulation
- Open Access
Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure
A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in another neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual with a higher payo is more likely to be imitated or to replace his neighbor. An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any mutant. We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy is an ESS of a population game with inclu- sive tness parameter which depends on the size of the interac- tion and propagation neighborhoods. We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in such populations and observe that allowing the players more information eases the development of altruistic behavior.
Open AccessEvolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure
A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in another neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual with a higher payo is more likely to be imitated or to replace his neighbor. An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any mutant. We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy is an ESS of a population game with inclu- sive tness parameter which depends on the size of the interac- tion and propagation neighborhoods. We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in such populations and observe that allowing the players more information eases the development of altruistic behavior.