Avner Shaked
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Avner Shaked has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emilia Sansone
Department of Mathematics and its Applications, University of Naples, Naples, Italy
3 shared publications Ilan Eshel
2 shared publicationsEmilia Sansone
Department of Mathematics and its Applications, University of Naples, I-80138 Naples, Italy IT
1 shared publication- Ilan Eshel
Department of Statistics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel
1 shared publication Illan Eshel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 80 (2) , 150-157
On the evolution of group-escape strategies of selfish prey
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 80 (2) , 150-157
On the evolution of group-escape strategies of selfish prey
- Open Access
Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey’s gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which, gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group.Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n + 1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
Open AccessGregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey’s gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which, gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group.Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n + 1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.
- 16 November 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 28 (4) , 447-463
The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals
- 16 November 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 28 (4) , 447-463
The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals
- Open Access
Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure
A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in another neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual with a higher payo is more likely to be imitated or to replace his neighbor. An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any mutant. We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy is an ESS of a population game with inclu- sive tness parameter which depends on the size of the interac- tion and propagation neighborhoods. We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in such populations and observe that allowing the players more information eases the development of altruistic behavior.
Open AccessEvolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure
A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in another neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual with a higher payo is more likely to be imitated or to replace his neighbor. An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any mutant. We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy is an ESS of a population game with inclu- sive tness parameter which depends on the size of the interac- tion and propagation neighborhoods. We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in such populations and observe that allowing the players more information eases the development of altruistic behavior.