Selmer Bringsjord
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Selmer Bringsjord has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu
RAIR Lab, RPI
14 shared publications- Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy New York
7 shared publications - Michael Giancola
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
6 shared publications - Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
6 shared publications Michael Giancola
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning Laboratory, RPI, Troy NY 12180 USA
4 shared publications- James T. Oswald
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Toward Detecting and Measuring Consciousness in Service of Formal Theories of Intelligence
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Open AccessToward Detecting and Measuring Consciousness in Service of Formal Theories of Intelligence
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 374-390
A Legg-Hutter Intelligence Measure for Continuous-Time Analog Agents and Environments
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 374-390
A Legg-Hutter Intelligence Measure for Continuous-Time Analog Agents and Environments
- Open Access
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Qeios Ltd
Review of: "The Monty Hall Problem: Does Performance Improve After the Acquisition of Some Probability Knowledge?"
- 25 November 2025
- Published by Qeios Ltd
Open AccessReview of: "The Monty Hall Problem: Does Performance Improve After the Acquisition of Some Probability Knowledge?"
- 26 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 50-71
Should It Be Illegal To Mistreat Robots? Yes
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-33
On the Arrowian Impossibility of Machine Intelligence Measures
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-33
On the Arrowian Impossibility of Machine Intelligence Measures
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-59
Ethically Permissible Pursuit of Quantum Consciousness
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 49-59
Ethically Permissible Pursuit of Quantum Consciousness
- 4 February 2025
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 23-34
Robot Cognition Simultaneously Social, Multi-Modal, Hypothetico-Causal, and Attention-Guided … Solves the Symbol Grounding Problemc
The so-called symbol-grounding problem (SGP) has long plagued cognitive robotics (and AI). If Rob, a humanoid household robot, is asked to remove and discard the faded rose from among the dozen in the vase, and accedes, does Rob grasp the formulae/data he processed to get the job done? Does he for instance really understand the formulae inside him that logicizes “There’s exactly one faded rose in the vase”? Some (e.g., Searle, Harnad, Bringsjord) have presented and pressed a negative answer, and have held that engineering a robot for whom the answer is ‘Yes’ is, or at least may well be, insoluble. This negativity increases if Rob must understand that giving a faded rose to someone as a sign of love might not be socially adept. We change the landscape, by bringing to bear, in a cognitive robot, an unprecedented, intertwined quartet of capacities that make all the difference: namely, (i) social planning; (ii) multi-modal perception; (iii) pre-meditated attention to guide such perception; and (iv) automated defeasible reasoning about causation. In other words, a genuinely social robot that senses in varied ways under the guidance of how it directs its attention, and adjudicates among competing arguments for what it perceives, solves SGP, or at least a version thereof. An exemplar of such a robot is our PERI.2, which we demonstrate in an environment called ‘Logi-Forms,’ intelligent navigation of which requires social reasoning.
- 4 February 2025
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 23-34
Robot Cognition Simultaneously Social, Multi-Modal, Hypothetico-Causal, and Attention-Guided … Solves the Symbol Grounding Problemc
The so-called symbol-grounding problem (SGP) has long plagued cognitive robotics (and AI). If Rob, a humanoid household robot, is asked to remove and discard the faded rose from among the dozen in the vase, and accedes, does Rob grasp the formulae/data he processed to get the job done? Does he for instance really understand the formulae inside him that logicizes “There’s exactly one faded rose in the vase”? Some (e.g., Searle, Harnad, Bringsjord) have presented and pressed a negative answer, and have held that engineering a robot for whom the answer is ‘Yes’ is, or at least may well be, insoluble. This negativity increases if Rob must understand that giving a faded rose to someone as a sign of love might not be socially adept. We change the landscape, by bringing to bear, in a cognitive robot, an unprecedented, intertwined quartet of capacities that make all the difference: namely, (i) social planning; (ii) multi-modal perception; (iii) pre-meditated attention to guide such perception; and (iv) automated defeasible reasoning about causation. In other words, a genuinely social robot that senses in varied ways under the guidance of how it directs its attention, and adjudicates among competing arguments for what it perceives, solves SGP, or at least a version thereof. An exemplar of such a robot is our PERI.2, which we demonstrate in an environment called ‘Logi-Forms,’ intelligent navigation of which requires social reasoning.
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-153
Prolegomenon for a Family of Theorems Regarding Trustworthiness in Autonomous Artificial Agents
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-153
Prolegomenon for a Family of Theorems Regarding Trustworthiness in Autonomous Artificial Agents
- Open Access
- 29 May 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Humanities
- Vol. 13 (3) , 82
Illusory Arguments by Artificial Agents: Pernicious Legacy of the Sophists
To diagnose someone’s reasoning today as “sophistry” is to say that this reasoning is at once persuasive (at least to a significant degree) and logically invalid. We begin by explaining that, despite some recent scholarly arguments to the contrary, the understanding of ‘sophistry’ and ‘sophistic’ underlying such a lay diagnosis is in fact firmly in line with the hallmarks of reasoning proffered by the ancient sophists themselves. Next, we supply a rigorous but readable definition of what constitutes sophistic reasoning (=sophistry). We then discuss “artificial” sophistry: the articulation of sophistic reasoning facilitated by artificial intelligence (AI) and promulgated in our increasingly digital world. Next, we present, economically, a particular kind of artificial sophistry, one embodied by an artificial agent: the lying machine. Afterward, we respond to some anticipated objections. We end with a few speculative thoughts about the limits (or lack thereof) of artificial sophistry, and what may be a rather dark future.
- 29 May 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Humanities
- Vol. 13 (3) , 82
Open AccessIllusory Arguments by Artificial Agents: Pernicious Legacy of the Sophists
To diagnose someone’s reasoning today as “sophistry” is to say that this reasoning is at once persuasive (at least to a significant degree) and logically invalid. We begin by explaining that, despite some recent scholarly arguments to the contrary, the understanding of ‘sophistry’ and ‘sophistic’ underlying such a lay diagnosis is in fact firmly in line with the hallmarks of reasoning proffered by the ancient sophists themselves. Next, we supply a rigorous but readable definition of what constitutes sophistic reasoning (=sophistry). We then discuss “artificial” sophistry: the articulation of sophistic reasoning facilitated by artificial intelligence (AI) and promulgated in our increasingly digital world. Next, we present, economically, a particular kind of artificial sophistry, one embodied by an artificial agent: the lying machine. Afterward, we respond to some anticipated objections. We end with a few speculative thoughts about the limits (or lack thereof) of artificial sophistry, and what may be a rather dark future.
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in KI - Künstliche Intelligenz
- Vol. 38 (1-2) , 69-77
Spectra: An Expressive STRIPS-Inspired AI Planner Based on Automated Reasoning
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in KI - Künstliche Intelligenz
- Vol. 38 (1-2) , 69-77
Spectra: An Expressive STRIPS-Inspired AI Planner Based on Automated Reasoning