Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
6 shared publications - Michael Giancola
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
3 shared publications - Aidan Flaherty
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
1 shared publication - Alexander Bringsjord
Lally School of Management, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Troy, NY 12180, USA
1 shared publication - James T. Oswald
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
1 shared publication - John Angel
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 November 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 11 (6) , 220
Formal Assessment of Brachman–Levesque Common Human Intelligence
The level of reasoning capacity seen in, for example, Kurt Gödel cannot be rationally called “common,” by any reasonable metric. Gödel, regarded by many to be the greatest human logician, was able to routinely discover solutions to reasoning challenges that, realistically, would perpetually paralyze most human beings, however high their educational level might reach. What then is the nature of common (= everyday) human reasoning (CHR)? Some scholars have proposed substantive answers to this question; for example, Johnson-Laird et al. have proposed what they declare to be an explicitly anti-logic one (according to which common reasoning is based on mental objects that are “iconic possibilities”). Very recently, in the context of an attempt on their part to contribute to the engineering of AIs with common-sense, or—as we prefer to say—common human intelligence (CHI), Brachman and Levesque (B&L) have ventured an extremely interesting logic-based answer to this question. We analyze their answer—CHRB-L—herein, and find that it posits a level of intelligence too low to do justice to intuitive, pre-analytic concepts of CHR, and much too low to do justice to our own (admittedly elevated) CHRB-F. At the heart of matters is the level of expressivity that a given reasoning challenge displays, and correspondingly, the level of expressivity that a given theory of common reasoning enjoys.
- 13 November 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 11 (6) , 220
Open AccessFormal Assessment of Brachman–Levesque Common Human Intelligence
The level of reasoning capacity seen in, for example, Kurt Gödel cannot be rationally called “common,” by any reasonable metric. Gödel, regarded by many to be the greatest human logician, was able to routinely discover solutions to reasoning challenges that, realistically, would perpetually paralyze most human beings, however high their educational level might reach. What then is the nature of common (= everyday) human reasoning (CHR)? Some scholars have proposed substantive answers to this question; for example, Johnson-Laird et al. have proposed what they declare to be an explicitly anti-logic one (according to which common reasoning is based on mental objects that are “iconic possibilities”). Very recently, in the context of an attempt on their part to contribute to the engineering of AIs with common-sense, or—as we prefer to say—common human intelligence (CHI), Brachman and Levesque (B&L) have ventured an extremely interesting logic-based answer to this question. We analyze their answer—CHRB-L—herein, and find that it posits a level of intelligence too low to do justice to intuitive, pre-analytic concepts of CHR, and much too low to do justice to our own (admittedly elevated) CHRB-F. At the heart of matters is the level of expressivity that a given reasoning challenge displays, and correspondingly, the level of expressivity that a given theory of common reasoning enjoys.
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-153
Prolegomenon for a Family of Theorems Regarding Trustworthiness in Autonomous Artificial Agents
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-153
Prolegomenon for a Family of Theorems Regarding Trustworthiness in Autonomous Artificial Agents
- Open Access
- 21 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Digital Society
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-19
A Partially Synthesized Position on the Automation of Machine Ethics
We economically express our respective prior positions on the automation of machine ethics, and then seek a corporate, partly synthesized position that could underlie, at least to a degree, our future machine-ethics work, and such work by others as well.
- 21 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Digital Society
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-19
Open AccessA Partially Synthesized Position on the Automation of Machine Ethics
We economically express our respective prior positions on the automation of machine ethics, and then seek a corporate, partly synthesized position that could underlie, at least to a degree, our future machine-ethics work, and such work by others as well.
- 14 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-230
Toward Generating Natural-Language Explanations of Modal-Logic Proofs
- 14 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 220-230
Toward Generating Natural-Language Explanations of Modal-Logic Proofs
- 14 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 178-187
PERI.2 Goes to PreSchool and Beyond, in Search of AGI
- 14 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 178-187
PERI.2 Goes to PreSchool and Beyond, in Search of AGI
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Paladyn, Journal of Robotics, Intelligent Agents, and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 12 (1) , 310-335
Automated argument adjudication to solve ethical problems in multi-agent environments
Suppose an artificial agent a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} , as time unfolds, (i) receives from multiple artificial agents (which may, in turn, themselves have received from yet other such agents…) propositional content, and (ii) must solve an ethical problem on the basis of what it has received. How should a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} adjudicate what it has received in order to produce such a solution? We consider an environment infused with logicist artificial agents a 1 , a 2 , … , a n {a}_{1},{a}_{2},\ldots ,{a}_{n} that sense and report their findings to “adjudicator” agents who must solve ethical problems. (Many if not most of these agents may be robots.) In such an environment, inconsistency is a virtual guarantee: a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} may, for instance, receive a report from a 1 {a}_{1} that proposition ϕ \phi holds, then from a 2 {a}_{2} that ¬ ϕ \neg \phi holds, and then from a 3 {a}_{3} that neither ϕ \phi nor ¬ ϕ \neg \phi should be believed, but rather ψ \psi instead, at some level of likelihood. We further assume that agents receiving such incompatible reports will nonetheless sometimes simply need, before long, to make decisions on the basis of these reports, in order to try to solve ethical problems. We provide a solution to such a quandary: AI capable of adjudicating competing reports from subsidiary agents through time, and delivering to humans a rational, ethically correct (relative to underlying ethical principles) recommendation based upon such adjudication. To illuminate our solution, we anchor it to a particular scenario.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Paladyn, Journal of Robotics, Intelligent Agents, and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 12 (1) , 310-335
Open AccessAutomated argument adjudication to solve ethical problems in multi-agent environments
Suppose an artificial agent a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} , as time unfolds, (i) receives from multiple artificial agents (which may, in turn, themselves have received from yet other such agents…) propositional content, and (ii) must solve an ethical problem on the basis of what it has received. How should a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} adjudicate what it has received in order to produce such a solution? We consider an environment infused with logicist artificial agents a 1 , a 2 , … , a n {a}_{1},{a}_{2},\ldots ,{a}_{n} that sense and report their findings to “adjudicator” agents who must solve ethical problems. (Many if not most of these agents may be robots.) In such an environment, inconsistency is a virtual guarantee: a adj {a}_{\text{adj}} may, for instance, receive a report from a 1 {a}_{1} that proposition ϕ \phi holds, then from a 2 {a}_{2} that ¬ ϕ \neg \phi holds, and then from a 3 {a}_{3} that neither ϕ \phi nor ¬ ϕ \neg \phi should be believed, but rather ψ \psi instead, at some level of likelihood. We further assume that agents receiving such incompatible reports will nonetheless sometimes simply need, before long, to make decisions on the basis of these reports, in order to try to solve ethical problems. We provide a solution to such a quandary: AI capable of adjudicating competing reports from subsidiary agents through time, and delivering to humans a rational, ethically correct (relative to underlying ethical principles) recommendation based upon such adjudication. To illuminate our solution, we anchor it to a particular scenario.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 317-335
Are Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?
- 16 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 317-335
Open AccessAre Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?