Heiko Giebler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Heiko Giebler has a total of 55 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Annika Werner
University of Southampton, UK
4 shared publications - Susan Banducci
University of Birmingham
3 shared publications - Sylvia Kritzinger
Department of Government, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
3 shared publications Aiko Wagner
2 shared publicationsLukas Antoine
Free University of Berlin
2 shared publicationsRasmus Ollroge
Free University of Berlin
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-22
Authoritarian orientations and the contestation of liberal self-determination: Cross-national evidence from 30 countries
In contrast to expectations of global liberal convergence, liberal values and institutions are increasingly contested. This study investigates whether core liberal conditions for self-determination are likewise subject to contestation and how this varies across societal contexts. Drawing from liberal theory, we identify five enabling conditions for self-determination: physical well-being, basic economic security, learning and personal growth, moral equality, and influence on political decision-making. These conditions differ in their degree of ‘liberal uniqueness’, with the latter two representing distinctly liberal ideals. Using original survey data from over 45,000 respondents across 30 countries, we examine how authoritarian orientations – conceptualised as preferences for authority, conformity, order, and security – relate to support for these conditions. Such orientations are consistently and negatively associated with uniquely liberal conditions, especially moral equality and political influence. In contrast, there is no meaningful relationship with basic economic security and a positive association with physical well-being. Preferences for learning and personal growth fall in between. These associations vary with levels of societal modernisation; in more modernised societies, the gap between respondents with stronger and weaker authoritarian orientations grows wider, with the strongest widening observed for the uniquely liberal conditions. Our findings suggest that authoritarian orientations are linked to different understandings of self-determination. These competing visions of what it means to live freely are more polarised in modern societies. Recognising this divergence helps to better understand the normative foundations of contemporary societal conflicts across diverse countries.
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-22
Open AccessAuthoritarian orientations and the contestation of liberal self-determination: Cross-national evidence from 30 countries
In contrast to expectations of global liberal convergence, liberal values and institutions are increasingly contested. This study investigates whether core liberal conditions for self-determination are likewise subject to contestation and how this varies across societal contexts. Drawing from liberal theory, we identify five enabling conditions for self-determination: physical well-being, basic economic security, learning and personal growth, moral equality, and influence on political decision-making. These conditions differ in their degree of ‘liberal uniqueness’, with the latter two representing distinctly liberal ideals. Using original survey data from over 45,000 respondents across 30 countries, we examine how authoritarian orientations – conceptualised as preferences for authority, conformity, order, and security – relate to support for these conditions. Such orientations are consistently and negatively associated with uniquely liberal conditions, especially moral equality and political influence. In contrast, there is no meaningful relationship with basic economic security and a positive association with physical well-being. Preferences for learning and personal growth fall in between. These associations vary with levels of societal modernisation; in more modernised societies, the gap between respondents with stronger and weaker authoritarian orientations grows wider, with the strongest widening observed for the uniquely liberal conditions. Our findings suggest that authoritarian orientations are linked to different understandings of self-determination. These competing visions of what it means to live freely are more polarised in modern societies. Recognising this divergence helps to better understand the normative foundations of contemporary societal conflicts across diverse countries.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-22
The democratic ideal under stress: Citizen commitment to democratic rights and procedures in challenging times
To what extent do citizens support democratic rights and procedures in the face of major societal challenges? Drawing on a Dahlian ideal of democracy, we exploit the context of the Covid-19 pandemic to address this question with two preregistered survey experiments covering 9,000 respondents in six countries (Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain). A conjoint experiment on preferences for pandemic policies reveals that citizens strongly oppose restrictions that interfere with their private lives but are largely indifferent to constraints on core democratic rights (elections, rallies, freedom of the press). A framing experiment assessing citizens’ procedural preferences, elicited using best-worst scaling, shows that expert and business input are consistently ranked higher than parliamentary votes or partisan consensus – regardless of whether Covid-19, climate change, or generic ‘societal challenges’ are at stake. We discuss alternative readings of our results and conclude that commitment to democracy does not appear particularly robust when citizens confront concrete crisis-related trade-offs, with largely similar patterns across countries. While our findings diverge from those of some other experimental studies, they are broadly consistent with accounts that point to rising technocratic preferences, concerns about stealth democracy, and risks of gradual democratic erosion rather than abrupt autocratic shifts.
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-22
Open AccessThe democratic ideal under stress: Citizen commitment to democratic rights and procedures in challenging times
To what extent do citizens support democratic rights and procedures in the face of major societal challenges? Drawing on a Dahlian ideal of democracy, we exploit the context of the Covid-19 pandemic to address this question with two preregistered survey experiments covering 9,000 respondents in six countries (Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain). A conjoint experiment on preferences for pandemic policies reveals that citizens strongly oppose restrictions that interfere with their private lives but are largely indifferent to constraints on core democratic rights (elections, rallies, freedom of the press). A framing experiment assessing citizens’ procedural preferences, elicited using best-worst scaling, shows that expert and business input are consistently ranked higher than parliamentary votes or partisan consensus – regardless of whether Covid-19, climate change, or generic ‘societal challenges’ are at stake. We discuss alternative readings of our results and conclude that commitment to democracy does not appear particularly robust when citizens confront concrete crisis-related trade-offs, with largely similar patterns across countries. While our findings diverge from those of some other experimental studies, they are broadly consistent with accounts that point to rising technocratic preferences, concerns about stealth democracy, and risks of gradual democratic erosion rather than abrupt autocratic shifts.
- Open Access
- 5 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-13
Threat perceptions and the globalisation divide
- 5 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-13
Open AccessThreat perceptions and the globalisation divide
- Open Access
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (2) , 607-635
Mobilizing Europe’s citizens to take action on migration and climate change: behavioral evidence from 27 EU member states
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (2) , 607-635
Open AccessMobilizing Europe’s citizens to take action on migration and climate change: behavioral evidence from 27 EU member states
- Open Access
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 19 (8) , e0308702
The limits of sportswashing. How the 2022 FIFA World Cup affected attitudes about Qatar
Non-democratic regimes have increasingly been hosting major sports events to boost their visibility and image abroad, which sparked debates about the potential for “sportswashing”. Using the case of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar we examine how the framing of the tournament influenced opinions about Qatar abroad. Our pre-registered survey experiment with more than 14,000 respondents in eight European countries conducted before the tournament shows that framing it in light of human rights issues in Qatar leads to more negative attitudes towards the host of the World Cup. In contrast, frames emphasizing Qatar’s organizational capacity improve respondents’ attitudes. The heterogeneity of effects across countries highlights the relevance of the national information environment for the effects of major sports events on public opinion. These findings suggest that critical media coverage could potentially mitigate sportswashing efforts while uncritical coverage can increase the legitimacy of autocracies.
- 16 August 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 19 (8) , e0308702
Open AccessThe limits of sportswashing. How the 2022 FIFA World Cup affected attitudes about Qatar
Non-democratic regimes have increasingly been hosting major sports events to boost their visibility and image abroad, which sparked debates about the potential for “sportswashing”. Using the case of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar we examine how the framing of the tournament influenced opinions about Qatar abroad. Our pre-registered survey experiment with more than 14,000 respondents in eight European countries conducted before the tournament shows that framing it in light of human rights issues in Qatar leads to more negative attitudes towards the host of the World Cup. In contrast, frames emphasizing Qatar’s organizational capacity improve respondents’ attitudes. The heterogeneity of effects across countries highlights the relevance of the national information environment for the effects of major sports events on public opinion. These findings suggest that critical media coverage could potentially mitigate sportswashing efforts while uncritical coverage can increase the legitimacy of autocracies.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Bristol University Press in European Journal of Politics and Gender
- Vol. 6 (1) , 92-113
Unequal electoral participation: the negative effects of long work hours and unsociable work schedules in Europe
Considering gender inequality in time as a resource for political participation and using Wave 5 of the European Social Survey data on 24 European countries, this study examines: (1) the relationship of both long working hours and unsociable work schedules to participation in national elections in Europe before or during 2010; (2) factors that may mediate this association; and (3) gender differences in this relationship and occupation-specific patterns. The findings show that both working more than 45 hours per week and working evenings, nights or weekends are associated with lower national electoral participation in women with both high and low occupational status. Among men with the lowest occupational status, working long hours is also linked to lower participation. These findings are robust against controlling for important confounders. Political interest seems to partially mediate the negative effect of unsociable work schedules on voting in women. Neither health nor social engagement plays a mediation role.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Bristol University Press in European Journal of Politics and Gender
- Vol. 6 (1) , 92-113
Unequal electoral participation: the negative effects of long work hours and unsociable work schedules in Europe
Considering gender inequality in time as a resource for political participation and using Wave 5 of the European Social Survey data on 24 European countries, this study examines: (1) the relationship of both long working hours and unsociable work schedules to participation in national elections in Europe before or during 2010; (2) factors that may mediate this association; and (3) gender differences in this relationship and occupation-specific patterns. The findings show that both working more than 45 hours per week and working evenings, nights or weekends are associated with lower national electoral participation in women with both high and low occupational status. Among men with the lowest occupational status, working long hours is also linked to lower participation. These findings are robust against controlling for important confounders. Political interest seems to partially mediate the negative effect of unsociable work schedules on voting in women. Neither health nor social engagement plays a mediation role.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 13 (3) , f1-f3
EPR volume 13 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 8 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 13 (3) , f1-f3
Open AccessEPR volume 13 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- Open Access
- 3 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 329-341
Support for insider parties: The role of political trust in a longitudinal-comparative perspective
European democracies have experienced drastic changes in electoral competition. Voter support for insider parties that have traditionally governed has declined while support for radical and populist parties has increased. Simultaneously, citizens’ declining political trust has become a concern, as confidence in political institutions and actors is low across numerous countries. Interestingly, the linkage between political trust and support for insider parties has not been empirically established but deduced from the fact that outsider parties are often supported by dissatisfied citizens. We address this gap adopting both an institutional- and an actor-centered approach by investigating whether trust in parliaments and in parties is associated with the electoral performance of insider parties on the aggregate level. Combining different data sources in a novel way, we apply time-series cross-section models to a dataset containing 30 countries and 137 elections from 1998 to 2018. Our results show that when political trust is low, particularly institutional trust, insider parties receive less electoral support. Hence, we provide empirical evidence that decreasing levels of political trust are the downfall of insider parties, thereby opening a window of opportunity for challenging outsider parties.
- 3 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 329-341
Open AccessSupport for insider parties: The role of political trust in a longitudinal-comparative perspective
European democracies have experienced drastic changes in electoral competition. Voter support for insider parties that have traditionally governed has declined while support for radical and populist parties has increased. Simultaneously, citizens’ declining political trust has become a concern, as confidence in political institutions and actors is low across numerous countries. Interestingly, the linkage between political trust and support for insider parties has not been empirically established but deduced from the fact that outsider parties are often supported by dissatisfied citizens. We address this gap adopting both an institutional- and an actor-centered approach by investigating whether trust in parliaments and in parties is associated with the electoral performance of insider parties on the aggregate level. Combining different data sources in a novel way, we apply time-series cross-section models to a dataset containing 30 countries and 137 elections from 1998 to 2018. Our results show that when political trust is low, particularly institutional trust, insider parties receive less electoral support. Hence, we provide empirical evidence that decreasing levels of political trust are the downfall of insider parties, thereby opening a window of opportunity for challenging outsider parties.
- Open Access
- 14 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 69 (4) , 900-920
Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support
Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.
- 14 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 69 (4) , 900-920
Open AccessDiscontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support
Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 56 (3) , 293-306
Cure, Poison or Placebo? The Consequences of Populist and Radical Party Success for Representative Democracy
The spread and success of radical and populist parties has triggered a profound debate on the state of democracy. Not only are these parties described as the outcome of a democratic malaise in which democratic regimes had ceased to integrate, represent and engage all their citizens. At the same time, questions arose as to the consequences of these parties for existing representative democracies. Could radical and populist parties be a (partial) cure to the woes of established democracies? Or would they make the democratic malaise even worse, further poisoning an already sick patient? Could it be that these parties act like a placebo that exists because of the democratic malaise but does not actually change anything except for those who desperately want to believe in an effect? The contributions to this Special Issue address questions of the impact of radical and populist parties on representative democracy. This introduction systematise their findings along party functions and draws broader conclusions.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 56 (3) , 293-306
Cure, Poison or Placebo? The Consequences of Populist and Radical Party Success for Representative Democracy
The spread and success of radical and populist parties has triggered a profound debate on the state of democracy. Not only are these parties described as the outcome of a democratic malaise in which democratic regimes had ceased to integrate, represent and engage all their citizens. At the same time, questions arose as to the consequences of these parties for existing representative democracies. Could radical and populist parties be a (partial) cure to the woes of established democracies? Or would they make the democratic malaise even worse, further poisoning an already sick patient? Could it be that these parties act like a placebo that exists because of the democratic malaise but does not actually change anything except for those who desperately want to believe in an effect? The contributions to this Special Issue address questions of the impact of radical and populist parties on representative democracy. This introduction systematise their findings along party functions and draws broader conclusions.