EAEizo Akiyama

Eizo Akiyama

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Eizo Akiyama has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Effect of Agenda-Setting on Occurrence of Echo Chamber on Social Media

    by Takuya Nagura, Eizo Akiyama

    Echo chamber refers to a state in which individuals with similar preferences on social media construct closednetworks and consume similar information reflectively. This is one of the causes to prevalent fake news and conspiracyon social media. Previous research has shown that echo chamber is prevented in communication where there aremultiple topics. However, even though communication across multiple topics is common in daily social media use,echo chamber is still occurring on various topics. In this paper, we suggest the presence of agenda-setting as a potentialbackground factor for occurrence of echo chamber from communication on multiple topics. Agenda-setting is theconcept that topics frequently present to users are regarded as significant agendas. In this study, we experimented withmulti-agent simulations to investigate the communication among agents who assess the significance of specific topicsbased on the frequency of encountering them. Our result shows that if a specific topic is recognized as significant bymany users, users construct closed networks as echo chamber on the opinion of significant topic. We also conductedanother experiment to verify the effect of agenda setting by mass media coverage. In this experiment, a specific topiccame to be perceived as significant by many users, but echo chambers did not occur regarding significant topic.

  • Open Access

    The Effect of Increasing Number of Topics to Polarization and Echo Chambers on SNS

    by Takuya Nagura, Eizo Akiyama

    Communication through SNS (Social Networking Services) and function of SNS platform can cause two phenomena polarization and echo chambers. In previous study [sasahara 21] about the communication on SNSs regarding a single topic, it has been shown that there is a correlation between these two phenomena and also that SNS functions facilitate the occurrence of these phenomena. In this study, focusing on the fact that real SNS users often deal with multiple topics on a daily basis, we analyzed an agent-based model of SNS communication regarding multiple topics. The analysis revealed that polarization of opinions occurs even when the number of topics increases but that echo chambers are less likely to occur as the number of topics increases. We have also found that there is little correlation between polarization and echo chamber under the condition with more than certain number of topics. Additionally, some functions of SNS such as user recommendations and reposts was found to facilitate echo chambers regardless of the number of topics. This result implies that the findings of previous research are robust even in multiple topics environment. These results suggest that topic diversity and function of SNS platform amendment may be a means of reducing the occurrence of echo chambers. In this model, we cannot take into account the impact of an individual’s interest in a specific topic on such as unfollowing behavior. In future research, we should expand our model to implement these user’s real behavior.


  • Open Access

    Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment

    by Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Eizo Akiyama, Fujio Toriumi

    Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation shows that a situation containing a local game, local punishment, and global adaptation leads to the most robustly cooperative regime. Further, we show an interesting feature in local punishment. Previous studies showed that a local game and global adaptation are likely to generate cooperation. However, they did not consider punishment. We show that if local punishment is introduced in spatial public goods games, a situation satisfying either local game or local adaptation is likely to generate cooperation. We thus propose two principles. One is if interactions in games can be restricted locally, it is likely to generate cooperation independent of the interaction situations on punishment and adaptation. The other is if the games must be played globally, a cooperative regime requires both local punishment and local adaptation.


    • 24 October 2017
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Diversity in Cognitive Ability Enlarges Mispricing in Experimental Asset Markets

    by Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama, Yukihiko Funaki, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

    Does diversity of cognitive ability among market participants increase mispricing? Does common knowledge of heterogeneity in relation to cognitive ability of market participants further increase mispricing? We investigated these questions by measuring subjects' cognitive ability and categorizing those above median ability as type `H' and those below median ability as type `L'. We then constructed three market types, each containing six traders: 6H, 6L, and 3H3L. Subjects were informed of their own cognitive type and, depending on the treatment, that of the others in their market. We found that heterogeneous markets (3H3L) generated significantly larger mispricing than homogeneous markets (6H or 6L) regardless of whether subjects were informed about the cognitive type of others in their market. Thus, diversity of cognitive ability among market participants increased mispricing. However, common knowledge of heterogeneity or homogeneity in the market did not have a significant additional effect.

  • Open Access

    It is Not Just Confusion! Strategic Uncertainty in an Experimental Asset Market

    by Eizo Akiyama, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

    To what extent is the observed mispricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic uncertainty and by confusion? We address this question by comparing subjects' initial price forecasts in two market environments: one with six human traders, and the other with one human and five computer traders. We find that both strategic uncertainty and confusion contribute equally to the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental value. The effect of strategic uncertainty is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it is not significant for those with low scores.

  • Open Access

    Heterogeneity of link weight and the evolution of cooperation

    by M. Iwata, E. Akiyama

    In this paper, we investigate the effect of "heterogeneity of link weight", heterogeneity of the frequency or amount of interactions among individuals, on the evolution of cooperation. Based on an analysis of the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a weighted one-dimensional lattice network with "intra-individual heterogeneity", we confirm that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, we identify two key mechanisms by which link-weight heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation: mechanisms for spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derive the corresponding conditions under which the mechanisms can work through evolutionary dynamics.

    • 1 December 2013
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    How Do Experienced Traders Respond to Inflows of Inexperienced Traders? An Experimental Analysis

    by Eizo Akiyama, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

    We conducted asset market experiments where one experienced subject (EH) interacts with five inexperienced subjects (1EH5H) to investigate how EHs change their price forecasts and trading strategies when faced with strategic uncertainty caused by inflows of inexperienced subjects. Only half the EHs initially forecasted prices deviating more from the fundamental values in 1EH5H than in the final round of the experiment in which they had previously participated. Furthermore, the majority of our EHs did not change their trading behaviour. Many EHs act as price stabilisers when the inflow of inexperienced subjects is not associated with other changes in market conditions.