Nobuyuki Hanaki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Nobuyuki Hanaki has a total of 232 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Waseda University
11 shared publications Eizo Akiyama
8 shared publications- Nicolas Jacquemet
Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Paris, France
6 shared publications - Takashi Yamada
Yamaguchi University
6 shared publications - Adam Zylbersztejn
Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Emlyon Business School, GATE, CNRS, Lyon, France
5 shared publications - Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Department of Management, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1020 Vienna, Austria
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Happiness Studies
- Vol. 27 (7) , 130
The Evolved Nest in Childhood: Relation to Adult Well-being and Social Capital Across Cultures
Evolved nests are species-specific developmental systems that support biological, psychological, and social needs. The human evolved nest includes practices such as responsive care, self-directed play, and extensive affectionate touch. Previous studies have linked childhood experience of these practices to both child and adult well-being. Here we assessed whether recall of evolved nest experiences during childhood (age 0–18) was related to three dimensions of adult well-being and social capital (personal well-being, social relationships, and general prosociality) in three countries (USA, UK, Japan). Recalled evolved nest experience was positively associated with multiple measures under each dimension across cultures after controlling for demographic factors ( n = 1,401). In contrast, it was not found to be associated with incentivised measures of prosociality (elicited via a series of economic games) in any country. Exploratory factor analyses revealed that experiences of evolved nest practices clustered together under two common factors in each country: positive and negative experiences. These factors were independently associated with multiple indicators of adult well-being and social capital in each country, and these associations were generally stronger for positive (vs. negative) experiences. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that childhood experience of the evolved nest has long-term benefits for individual and societal well-being regardless of cultural differences.
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Happiness Studies
- Vol. 27 (7) , 130
Open AccessThe Evolved Nest in Childhood: Relation to Adult Well-being and Social Capital Across Cultures
Evolved nests are species-specific developmental systems that support biological, psychological, and social needs. The human evolved nest includes practices such as responsive care, self-directed play, and extensive affectionate touch. Previous studies have linked childhood experience of these practices to both child and adult well-being. Here we assessed whether recall of evolved nest experiences during childhood (age 0–18) was related to three dimensions of adult well-being and social capital (personal well-being, social relationships, and general prosociality) in three countries (USA, UK, Japan). Recalled evolved nest experience was positively associated with multiple measures under each dimension across cultures after controlling for demographic factors ( n = 1,401). In contrast, it was not found to be associated with incentivised measures of prosociality (elicited via a series of economic games) in any country. Exploratory factor analyses revealed that experiences of evolved nest practices clustered together under two common factors in each country: positive and negative experiences. These factors were independently associated with multiple indicators of adult well-being and social capital in each country, and these associations were generally stronger for positive (vs. negative) experiences. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that childhood experience of the evolved nest has long-term benefits for individual and societal well-being regardless of cultural differences.
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 249
Preferences for wealth accumulation and wealth inequality: Experimental evidence
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 249
Preferences for wealth accumulation and wealth inequality: Experimental evidence
- Open Access
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Real-time interaction and the signalling value of voluntary early cooperation in humans
Cooperative interaction often unfolds in real time, with individuals choosing not only what to do but also when to commit. This temporal feature gives rise to an endogenous decision order and can fundamentally alter the dynamics of social dilemmas. Here, we examine how endogenous decision timing shapes human cooperation by comparing two-player social dilemmas across three timing structures: simultaneous, assigned-order sequential, and real-time choices. Across two experiments (N = 718), pairs achieved mutual cooperation most often when they interacted in real time. This advantage was not explained by greater cooperation among first movers. Instead, second movers reciprocated cooperation more reliably when the move order emerged endogenously. A belief-dependent reciprocity model captured these patterns, suggesting that real-time interaction can change the meaning of early cooperation for humans. Because players can strategically wait and observe whether the other player acts first, choosing to cooperate early in real time is more demanding than cooperating as an assigned first mover. Voluntary early cooperation thus provides a stronger signal of the first mover’s cooperative intent and increases second movers’ willingness to reciprocate. Real-time interaction facilitates mutual cooperation not by increasing prosociality per se, but by changing the signalling value of actions under strategic uncertainty.
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessReal-time interaction and the signalling value of voluntary early cooperation in humans
Cooperative interaction often unfolds in real time, with individuals choosing not only what to do but also when to commit. This temporal feature gives rise to an endogenous decision order and can fundamentally alter the dynamics of social dilemmas. Here, we examine how endogenous decision timing shapes human cooperation by comparing two-player social dilemmas across three timing structures: simultaneous, assigned-order sequential, and real-time choices. Across two experiments (N = 718), pairs achieved mutual cooperation most often when they interacted in real time. This advantage was not explained by greater cooperation among first movers. Instead, second movers reciprocated cooperation more reliably when the move order emerged endogenously. A belief-dependent reciprocity model captured these patterns, suggesting that real-time interaction can change the meaning of early cooperation for humans. Because players can strategically wait and observe whether the other player acts first, choosing to cooperate early in real time is more demanding than cooperating as an assigned first mover. Voluntary early cooperation thus provides a stronger signal of the first mover’s cooperative intent and increases second movers’ willingness to reciprocate. Real-time interaction facilitates mutual cooperation not by increasing prosociality per se, but by changing the signalling value of actions under strategic uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 27 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 190
Trading Institutions, Emotional Arousal, and Overbidding
- 27 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 190
Open AccessTrading Institutions, Emotional Arousal, and Overbidding
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 248
An experimental analysis on cross-asset arbitrage opportunity and the law of one price
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 248
An experimental analysis on cross-asset arbitrage opportunity and the law of one price
- Open Access
- 15 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-26
An experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game
We present and conduct a novel experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game. Leveraging the multi-period feature, we investigate how participants revise their forecasts in periods when new information—such as shocks or announcements—arrives and how they form their expectations in the absence of new information. We make two key contributions. First, we develop a new method based on forecast revisions to evaluate whether participants behave in a forward-looking manner. The experimental results show that participants do react to anticipated shocks: namely, the announcements of future shocks. Second, we identify a new strategic environment effect during periods without new information; only when the game exhibits strategic complementarity do participants use extrapolation and expect continuously rising prices. This finding suggests that expectation formation is endogenous to the economic environment; and policy design should thus take this endogeneity into account.
- 15 May 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-26
Open AccessAn experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game
We present and conduct a novel experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game. Leveraging the multi-period feature, we investigate how participants revise their forecasts in periods when new information—such as shocks or announcements—arrives and how they form their expectations in the absence of new information. We make two key contributions. First, we develop a new method based on forecast revisions to evaluate whether participants behave in a forward-looking manner. The experimental results show that participants do react to anticipated shocks: namely, the announcements of future shocks. Second, we identify a new strategic environment effect during periods without new information; only when the game exhibits strategic complementarity do participants use extrapolation and expect continuously rising prices. This finding suggests that expectation formation is endogenous to the economic environment; and policy design should thus take this endogeneity into account.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Humans Bargain Differently with AI? Evidence from Alternating-Offer Games
Artificial intelligence increasingly participates in economic interactions not only as a tool, but also as an autonomous bargaining counterpart negotiating on behalf of firms, platforms, and consumers. Yet little is known about how humans respond psychologically and strategically when bargaining with such agents in dynamic settings. We study this question in a laboratory experiment using a three-stage alternating-offer bargaining game in which participants negotiate in real time with either another human or a GPT-based AI agent. We also introduce a human-beneficiary condition in which the AI agent's earnings may affect another participant's payment. Agreements are not reached earlier in human-human bargaining than in human-AI bargaining, but they are reached significantly earlier when the AI's payoff has human consequences. Human proposers offer more to human opponents than to AI agents, whereas responders become significantly more willing to accept unfair AI offers when AI earnings may benefit another human. These findings suggest that fairness and reciprocity toward AI are weaker and more conditional than toward humans, but partially re-emerge when AI outcomes affect real people. The results have implications for the design of AI negotiation systems and broader human-AI economic interactions.
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Humans Bargain Differently with AI? Evidence from Alternating-Offer Games
Artificial intelligence increasingly participates in economic interactions not only as a tool, but also as an autonomous bargaining counterpart negotiating on behalf of firms, platforms, and consumers. Yet little is known about how humans respond psychologically and strategically when bargaining with such agents in dynamic settings. We study this question in a laboratory experiment using a three-stage alternating-offer bargaining game in which participants negotiate in real time with either another human or a GPT-based AI agent. We also introduce a human-beneficiary condition in which the AI agent's earnings may affect another participant's payment. Agreements are not reached earlier in human-human bargaining than in human-AI bargaining, but they are reached significantly earlier when the AI's payoff has human consequences. Human proposers offer more to human opponents than to AI agents, whereas responders become significantly more willing to accept unfair AI offers when AI earnings may benefit another human. These findings suggest that fairness and reciprocity toward AI are weaker and more conditional than toward humans, but partially re-emerge when AI outcomes affect real people. The results have implications for the design of AI negotiation systems and broader human-AI economic interactions.
- Open Access
- 20 March 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (12)
The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- 20 March 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (12)
Open AccessThe private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Bidding and Entry Behavior in Surplus-Extracting Auctions: An Experiment
This study experimentally investigates bidding behavior and entry decisions in auctions designed for surplus extraction. The surplus-extracting auctions are based on the second-price auction format. We explicitly incorporate an opt-out option to examine the interaction between bidding and entry. Our results show that entry rates decline over time, while overbid amounts conditional on entry increase. To interpret these behavioral patterns, we analyze learning dynamics, which suggest that the full-entry value-bidding equilibrium attracts behavior only from a relatively small set of initial conditions. We also apply a quantal response equilibrium framework to capture systematic deviations from Nash equilibrium benchmarks.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBidding and Entry Behavior in Surplus-Extracting Auctions: An Experiment
This study experimentally investigates bidding behavior and entry decisions in auctions designed for surplus extraction. The surplus-extracting auctions are based on the second-price auction format. We explicitly incorporate an opt-out option to examine the interaction between bidding and entry. Our results show that entry rates decline over time, while overbid amounts conditional on entry increase. To interpret these behavioral patterns, we analyze learning dynamics, which suggest that the full-entry value-bidding equilibrium attracts behavior only from a relatively small set of initial conditions. We also apply a quantal response equilibrium framework to capture systematic deviations from Nash equilibrium benchmarks.