David Aspinall
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David Aspinall has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christina Kolb
University of Twente
2 shared publications - Christoph Lüth
University of Bremen
2 shared publications - Henry Clausen
University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications - Luca Arnaboldi
University of Birmingham
2 shared publications - Maria Klara Wolters
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
2 shared publications - Robert Flood
University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 88-100
From Bouncing Break-ins to Frictional Firewalls: Ideas About Interacting Requirements for Vehicle Safety and Security
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 88-100
From Bouncing Break-ins to Frictional Firewalls: Ideas About Interacting Requirements for Vehicle Safety and Security
- Open Access
- 31 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1867-1876
Formally Verifying Robustness and Generalisation of Network Intrusion Detection Models
- 31 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1867-1876
Open AccessFormally Verifying Robustness and Generalisation of Network Intrusion Detection Models
- Open Access
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 17-26
Measuring Cyber Essentials Security Policies
The design and maintenance of high-level security policies is an important starting point governing the implementation of security controls for a business. The choice of which security controls to implement is inherently a cost-benefit analysis that could greatly benefit from repeatable and adjustable quantitative methods, but defining a security policy is based on informal domain knowledge. In this paper we focus on security policies aimed to achieve a Cyber Essentials certification, a government backed scheme in the UK. We present a simple and transparent measure for such security policies, assigning them a numerical score to estimate their benefits for a particular network, allowing to compare them and to make them subject of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. The score for policies is based on the CVSS scores for vulnerabilities, estimating how would a policy affect CVSS scores.
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 17-26
Open AccessMeasuring Cyber Essentials Security Policies
The design and maintenance of high-level security policies is an important starting point governing the implementation of security controls for a business. The choice of which security controls to implement is inherently a cost-benefit analysis that could greatly benefit from repeatable and adjustable quantitative methods, but defining a security policy is based on informal domain knowledge. In this paper we focus on security policies aimed to achieve a Cyber Essentials certification, a government backed scheme in the UK. We present a simple and transparent measure for such security policies, assigning them a numerical score to estimate their benefits for a particular network, allowing to compare them and to make them subject of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. The score for policies is based on the CVSS scores for vulnerabilities, estimating how would a policy affect CVSS scores.
- Open Access
- 28 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Computer Science
- Vol. 3 (6) , 1-15
Checking Contact Tracing App Implementations with Bespoke Static Analysis
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing apps have been developed based on digital contact tracing frameworks. These allow developers to build privacy-conscious apps that detect whether an infected individual is in close proximity with others. Given the urgency of the problem, these apps have been developed at an accelerated rate with a brief testing period. Such quick development may have led to mistakes in the apps’ implementations, resulting in problems with their functionality, privacy and security. To mitigate these concerns, we develop and apply a methodology for evaluating the functionality, privacy and security of Android apps using the Google/Apple Exposure Notification API. This is a three-pronged approach consisting of a manual analysis, general static analysis and a bespoke static analysis, using a tool we have developed, dubbed MonSTER. As a result, we have found that, although most apps met the basic standards outlined by Google/Apple, there are issues with the functionality of some of these apps that could impact user safety.
- 28 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Computer Science
- Vol. 3 (6) , 1-15
Open AccessChecking Contact Tracing App Implementations with Bespoke Static Analysis
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing apps have been developed based on digital contact tracing frameworks. These allow developers to build privacy-conscious apps that detect whether an infected individual is in close proximity with others. Given the urgency of the problem, these apps have been developed at an accelerated rate with a brief testing period. Such quick development may have led to mistakes in the apps’ implementations, resulting in problems with their functionality, privacy and security. To mitigate these concerns, we develop and apply a methodology for evaluating the functionality, privacy and security of Android apps using the Google/Apple Exposure Notification API. This is a three-pronged approach consisting of a manual analysis, general static analysis and a bespoke static analysis, using a tool we have developed, dubbed MonSTER. As a result, we have found that, although most apps met the basic standards outlined by Google/Apple, there are issues with the functionality of some of these apps that could impact user safety.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 211-229
Towards Interdependent Safety Security Assessments Using Bowties
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 211-229
Towards Interdependent Safety Security Assessments Using Bowties
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 456-475
Controlling Network Traffic Microstructures for Machine-Learning Model Probing
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 456-475
Controlling Network Traffic Microstructures for Machine-Learning Model Probing
- Open Access
CBAM: A Contextual Model for Network Anomaly Detection
Anomaly-based intrusion detection methods aim to combat the increasing rate of zero-day attacks, however, their success is currently restricted to the detection of high-volume attacks using aggregated traffic features. Recent evaluations show that the current anomaly-based network intrusion detection methods fail to reliably detect remote access attacks. These are smaller in volume and often only stand out when compared to their surroundings. Currently, anomaly methods try to detect access attack events mainly as point anomalies and neglect the context they appear in. We present and examine a contextual bidirectional anomaly model (CBAM) based on deep LSTM-networks that is specifically designed to detect such attacks as contextual network anomalies. The model efficiently learns short-term sequential patterns in network flows as conditional event probabilities. Access attacks frequently break these patterns when exploiting vulnerabilities, and can thus be detected as contextual anomalies. We evaluated CBAM on an assembly of three datasets that provide both representative network access attacks, real-life traffic over a long timespan, and traffic from a real-world red-team attack. We contend that this assembly is closer to a potential deployment environment than current NIDS benchmark datasets. We show that, by building a deep model, we are able to reduce the false positive rate to while effectively detecting six out of seven access attacks, which is significantly lower than the operational range of other methods. We further demonstrate that short-term flow structures remain stable over long periods of time, making the CBAM robust against concept drift.Open AccessCBAM: A Contextual Model for Network Anomaly Detection
Anomaly-based intrusion detection methods aim to combat the increasing rate of zero-day attacks, however, their success is currently restricted to the detection of high-volume attacks using aggregated traffic features. Recent evaluations show that the current anomaly-based network intrusion detection methods fail to reliably detect remote access attacks. These are smaller in volume and often only stand out when compared to their surroundings. Currently, anomaly methods try to detect access attack events mainly as point anomalies and neglect the context they appear in. We present and examine a contextual bidirectional anomaly model (CBAM) based on deep LSTM-networks that is specifically designed to detect such attacks as contextual network anomalies. The model efficiently learns short-term sequential patterns in network flows as conditional event probabilities. Access attacks frequently break these patterns when exploiting vulnerabilities, and can thus be detected as contextual anomalies. We evaluated CBAM on an assembly of three datasets that provide both representative network access attacks, real-life traffic over a long timespan, and traffic from a real-world red-team attack. We contend that this assembly is closer to a potential deployment environment than current NIDS benchmark datasets. We show that, by building a deep model, we are able to reduce the false positive rate to while effectively detecting six out of seven access attacks, which is significantly lower than the operational range of other methods. We further demonstrate that short-term flow structures remain stable over long periods of time, making the CBAM robust against concept drift. - Open Access
- 9 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Automated Reasoning
- Vol. 65 (4) , 521-567
Formalising $\varSigma $-Protocols and Commitment Schemes Using CryptHOLMachine-checked proofs of security are important to increase the rigour of provable security. In this work we present a formalised theory of two fundamental two party cryptographic primitives: $$\varSigma $$ -protocols and Commitment Schemes. $$\varSigma $$ -protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they possess some knowledge without leaking information about the knowledge. Commitment schemes allow a committer to commit to a message and keep it secret until revealing it at a later time. We use CryptHOL (Lochbihler in Archive of formal proofs, 2017) to formalise both primitives and prove secure multiple examples namely; the Schnorr, Chaum-Pedersen and Okamoto $$\varSigma $$ -protocols as well as a construction that allows for compound (AND and OR) $$\varSigma $$ -protocols and the Pedersen and Rivest commitment schemes. A highlight of the work is a formalisation of the construction of commitment schemes from $$\varSigma $$ -protocols (Damgard in Lecture notes, 2002). We formalise this proof at an abstract level using the modularity available in Isabelle/HOL and CryptHOL. This way, the proofs of the instantiations come for free.- 9 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Automated Reasoning
- Vol. 65 (4) , 521-567
Open AccessFormalising $\varSigma $-Protocols and Commitment Schemes Using CryptHOLMachine-checked proofs of security are important to increase the rigour of provable security. In this work we present a formalised theory of two fundamental two party cryptographic primitives: $$\varSigma $$ -protocols and Commitment Schemes. $$\varSigma $$ -protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they possess some knowledge without leaking information about the knowledge. Commitment schemes allow a committer to commit to a message and keep it secret until revealing it at a later time. We use CryptHOL (Lochbihler in Archive of formal proofs, 2017) to formalise both primitives and prove secure multiple examples namely; the Schnorr, Chaum-Pedersen and Okamoto $$\varSigma $$ -protocols as well as a construction that allows for compound (AND and OR) $$\varSigma $$ -protocols and the Pedersen and Rivest commitment schemes. A highlight of the work is a formalisation of the construction of commitment schemes from $$\varSigma $$ -protocols (Damgard in Lecture notes, 2002). We formalise this proof at an abstract level using the modularity available in Isabelle/HOL and CryptHOL. This way, the proofs of the instantiations come for free.