Christina Kolb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Christina Kolb has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mariëlle Stoelinga
Formal Methods and Tools, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
3 shared publications - David Aspinall
The University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications - Lin Xie
Brandenburg University of Technology
2 shared publications - Luca Arnaboldi
University of Birmingham
2 shared publications - Marijn Peppelman
Formal Methods and Tools University of Twente Enschede The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Megha Quamara
Department of Informatics King's College London London UK
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 June 2026
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Progress in Safety & Security
- Vol. 2
Safety and Security Dependencies for Gridshield: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
Present-day cyber-physical systems, such as the Smart Grid, lead to the integration of multiple sub-systems into one single intertwined system. Such systems are characterized by many inter-dependencies between these sub-systems. This makes it complex to correctly assess the impact of new defense mechanisms with respect to the safety and security of the system as a whole. Existing formalisms, such as fault and attack trees, cannot describe the full system complexity. This paper presents a novel integrated model, namely the Attack-Fault-Defense Tree (AFDT), and tools to analyze such cyber-physical systems. The presented visual representation allows experts from various disciplines to discuss system dependencies together. In addition, we also present how minimum cut sets can be derived to formally quantify how the safety and security of the overall system is enhanced with the implementation of new defenses. We furthermore extend this to quantitative analysis by assigning safety and security metrics to these minimal cut sets. The presented AFDT is applied to the Gridshield concept, a novel defense mechanism to prevent grid overloading in power grids due to simultaneous charging of electric vehicles. One sentence summary: We introduce Attack-Fault-Defense Trees (AFDTs) and apply qualitative and approximate quantitative analysis to the Gridshield smart-grid defense mechanism.
- 16 June 2026
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Progress in Safety & Security
- Vol. 2
Open AccessSafety and Security Dependencies for Gridshield: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
Present-day cyber-physical systems, such as the Smart Grid, lead to the integration of multiple sub-systems into one single intertwined system. Such systems are characterized by many inter-dependencies between these sub-systems. This makes it complex to correctly assess the impact of new defense mechanisms with respect to the safety and security of the system as a whole. Existing formalisms, such as fault and attack trees, cannot describe the full system complexity. This paper presents a novel integrated model, namely the Attack-Fault-Defense Tree (AFDT), and tools to analyze such cyber-physical systems. The presented visual representation allows experts from various disciplines to discuss system dependencies together. In addition, we also present how minimum cut sets can be derived to formally quantify how the safety and security of the overall system is enhanced with the implementation of new defenses. We furthermore extend this to quantitative analysis by assigning safety and security metrics to these minimal cut sets. The presented AFDT is applied to the Gridshield concept, a novel defense mechanism to prevent grid overloading in power grids due to simultaneous charging of electric vehicles. One sentence summary: We introduce Attack-Fault-Defense Trees (AFDTs) and apply qualitative and approximate quantitative analysis to the Gridshield smart-grid defense mechanism.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 621-634
Ethical Requirements for AI Systems in Finance
- Open Access
- 29 December 2025
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Progress in Safety & Security
- Vol. 1
An Extended CIA-Based Multi-Level Model for AHP-Driven Safety and Security Decision-Making in Last-Mile Robotic Systems
The rapid growth of e-commerce and the increasing demand for efficient last-mile logistics have led to the rising use of last-mile robots. While these robots promise faster and cheaper deliveries, their operation in complex and dynamic urban environments introduces significant safety and security challenges. Sensor failures, communication disruptions, and cyber-physical attacks may affect the behaviour of the robots and influence human safety. This work models and analyses these challenges using the Extended Multi-Level Model to represent the different components of last-mile robotic systems and their influence on the environment. We apply Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) for parallel safety and security risk assessment, focusing on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the last-mile systems. Considering these three properties together allows priorities to be set within the CIA triad, which is essential for financial and economic decision-making when only limited resources for countermeasures are available. We extend the model to an Extended CIA Multi-Level Model that enables detailed evaluation of safety and security risks across all system levels. A case study involving robots transporting critical parcel contents demonstrates how confidentiality, integrity, and availability concerns arise throughout the model and how their violation may affect human safety. The approach supports structured decision-making and contributes to improving the safe and secure deployment of last-mile robots. One sentence summary: This work models the safety and security challenges in last-mile robotic systems (LMRS) using the Extended Multi-Level Model and a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) for risk assessment within the CIA triad.
- 29 December 2025
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Progress in Safety & Security
- Vol. 1
Open AccessAn Extended CIA-Based Multi-Level Model for AHP-Driven Safety and Security Decision-Making in Last-Mile Robotic Systems
The rapid growth of e-commerce and the increasing demand for efficient last-mile logistics have led to the rising use of last-mile robots. While these robots promise faster and cheaper deliveries, their operation in complex and dynamic urban environments introduces significant safety and security challenges. Sensor failures, communication disruptions, and cyber-physical attacks may affect the behaviour of the robots and influence human safety. This work models and analyses these challenges using the Extended Multi-Level Model to represent the different components of last-mile robotic systems and their influence on the environment. We apply Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) for parallel safety and security risk assessment, focusing on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the last-mile systems. Considering these three properties together allows priorities to be set within the CIA triad, which is essential for financial and economic decision-making when only limited resources for countermeasures are available. We extend the model to an Extended CIA Multi-Level Model that enables detailed evaluation of safety and security risks across all system levels. A case study involving robots transporting critical parcel contents demonstrates how confidentiality, integrity, and availability concerns arise throughout the model and how their violation may affect human safety. The approach supports structured decision-making and contributes to improving the safe and secure deployment of last-mile robots. One sentence summary: This work models the safety and security challenges in last-mile robotic systems (LMRS) using the Extended Multi-Level Model and a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) for risk assessment within the CIA triad.
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 88-100
From Bouncing Break-ins to Frictional Firewalls: Ideas About Interacting Requirements for Vehicle Safety and Security
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 88-100
From Bouncing Break-ins to Frictional Firewalls: Ideas About Interacting Requirements for Vehicle Safety and Security
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 316-328
Where Do Safety and Security Mutually Reinforce? A Multi-level Model-Based Approach for a Consistent Interplay
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 316-328
Where Do Safety and Security Mutually Reinforce? A Multi-level Model-Based Approach for a Consistent Interplay
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 34-46
Security and Safety in Urban Environments: Evaluating Threats and Risks of Autonomous Last-Mile Delivery Robots
- 9 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 34-46
Security and Safety in Urban Environments: Evaluating Threats and Risks of Autonomous Last-Mile Delivery Robots
- Open Access
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Science Review
- Vol. 50
Model-based joint analysis of safety and security:Survey and identification of gaps
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Science Review
- Vol. 50
Open AccessModel-based joint analysis of safety and security:Survey and identification of gaps
- Open Access
Model-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security: Survey and Identification of Gaps
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing.
Open AccessModel-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security: Survey and Identification of Gaps
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing.
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 176-187
Analyzing Origins of Safety and Security Interactions Using Feared Events Trees and Multi-level Model
- 14 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 176-187
Analyzing Origins of Safety and Security Interactions Using Feared Events Trees and Multi-level Model