Stanley Baiman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stanley Baiman has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mirko S. Heinle
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
1 shared publication - Richard Saouma
Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 3239-3253
Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns
The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 3239-3253
Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns
The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- Open Access
- 4 March 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 15 (3) , 441
Editorial
- 4 March 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 15 (3) , 441
Open AccessEditorial
- 10 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 14 (2-3) , 203
Editorial
- 10 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 14 (2-3) , 203
Editorial
- 27 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 13 (2-3) , 167
Editorial
- 27 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 13 (2-3) , 167
Editorial
- 8 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 12 (2-3) , 181
Editorial
- 8 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 12 (2-3) , 181
Editorial