RSRichard Saouma

Richard Saouma

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Richard Saouma has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    Should Human Capital Development Programs be Mandatory or Voluntary? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Mentorship

    by Jason Sandvik, Richard Saouma, Nathan Seegert, Christopher Stanton

    In a field experiment, we find that a mandatory mentorship program raises worker productivity, whereas a voluntary version of the program does not. A significant reason why the mandatory program results in larger gains is that the lowest-productivity employees do not participate when the program is voluntary despite their having the greatest treatment benefits. A nationally representative survey of U.S. workers shows wide variation in human capital development program participation, suggesting that understanding self-selection is important for firms’ returns on these programs across a variety of settings. Our findings have implications for resource allocation, experimental design, productivity dispersion, and inequality. This paper was accepted by Maria Guadalupe, business strategy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07524 .


  • Incumbent Incentives in Response to Entry

    by Richard Saouma, Orie Shelef, Robert Wuebker, Anita McGahan

    How should an incumbent respond to the arrival of an entrant? A long-standing literature documents a host of potential responses, but little work explores when each strategy will be more or less effective. This paper develops a model of incumbent-entrant competition between vertically and horizontally differentiated firms and applies that model to understand the incentives that shape an incumbent’s response to entry and ultimately, long-run profits. Analysis reveals the conditions under which an incumbent facing the full strategy space of possible exogenous entrants has incentive to attack an entrant and conditions where the incumbent has incentive to retreat. By viewing the incumbent and entrant in terms of their level of vertical and horizontal differentiation, this paper offers a unified view of prior work that generates insights about incumbent responses to entry that have been underappreciated. Further, this unified view offers insight on the effectiveness of a particular incumbent response. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0060 .


  • Employee Responses to Compensation Changes: Evidence from a Sales Firm

    by Jason Sandvik, Richard Saouma, Nathan Seegert, Christopher Stanton

    What are the long-term consequences of compensation changes? Using data from an inbound sales call center, we study employee responses to a compensation change that ultimately reduced take-home pay by 7% for the average affected worker. The change caused a significant increase in the turnover rate of the firm’s most productive employees, but the response was relatively muted for less productive workers. On-the-job performance changes were minimal among workers who remained at the firm. We quantify the cost of losing highly productive employees and find that their heightened sensitivity to changes in compensation limits managers’ ability to adjust incentives. Our results speak to a driver of compensation rigidity and the difficulty managers face when setting compensation. This paper was accepted by Lamar Pierce, organizations.


  • Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns

    by Stanley Baiman, Mirko S. Heinle, Richard Saouma

    The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.


  • Workplace Knowledge Flows*

    by Jason J Sandvik, Richard E Saouma, Nathan T Seegert, Christopher T Stanton

    We conducted a field experiment in a sales firm to test whether improving knowledge flows between coworkers affects productivity. Our design allows us to compare different management practices and isolate whether frictions to knowledge transmission primarily reside with knowledge seekers, knowledge providers, or both. We find large productivity gains from treatments that reduced frictions for knowledge seekers. Workers who were encouraged to seek advice from a randomly chosen partner during structured meetings had average sales gains exceeding 15%. These effects lasted at least 20 weeks after the experiment ended. Treatments intended to change knowledge providers’ willingness to share information, in the form of incentives tied to partners’ joint output, led to positive—but transitory—sales gains. Directing coworkers to share knowledge raised average productivity and reduced output dispersion between workers, highlighting the role that management practices play in generating spillovers inside the firm.


  • Open Access

    Workplace Knowledge Flows

    by Richard Saouma, Jason Sandvik, Nathan Seegert, Christopher Stanton

  • A Theory of Participative Budgeting

    by Mirko S. Heinle, Nicholas Ross, Richard E. Saouma

    This paper complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by comparing its economic merits relative to a top-down budgeting alternative. In both budgeting regimes, private information is communicated vertically between a principal and a manager. We show that top-down budgeting incurs fewer agency costs than bottom-up budgeting whenever the level of information asymmetry is relatively low. Although the choice between top-down and bottom-up budgeting ultimately determines who receives private information within the firm, we find that both the principal and manager's preferences over the allocation of private information remain qualitatively similar across the two budgeting paradigms. Specifically, while the principal always prefers either minimal or maximal private information, the manager prefers an interim or maximal level of private information regardless of who is privately informed. Last, we use our model to address empirical inconsistencies relating the firm's choice of budgeting process, the resulting budgetary slack, and performance.


  • Multistage Capital Budgeting with Delayed Consumption of Slack

    by Stanley Baiman, Mirko S. Heinle, Richard Saouma

    Capital budgeting frequently involves multiple stages at which firms can continue or abandon ongoing projects. In this paper, we study a project requiring two stages of investment. Failure to fund Stage 1 of the investment precludes investment in Stage 2, whereas failure to fund Stage 2 results in early termination. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the firm can limit the manager's informational rents with the early termination of the project. In this setting, we find that the firm optimally commits to a capital allocation scheme whereby it forgoes positive net present value (NPV) projects at Stage 1 (capital rationing), whereas at Stage 2, depending on the manager's previous report, it sometimes implements projects with a negative continuation NPV but in other situations forgoes implementing projects with positive continuation NPVs. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.


  • Informativeness, Incentive Compensation, and the Choice of Inventory Buffer

    by Stanley Baiman, Serguei Netessine, Richard Saouma

    Previous research in management accounting and economics has noted the potential for complementarities between the firm’s performance measurement system and its other organizational design choices. We add to this literature by studying how the informativeness and incentive properties of a performance metric can be influenced by one particular organizational design choice—the size of the firm’s inventory buffers. We model a manufacturing setting in which an agent manages a workstation that processes intermediate units. As intermediate units arrive, they are stored in an inventory buffer until the agent can process them. The buffer can hold a maximum number of intermediate units—its buffer size. The agent is compensated on the basis of his workstation’s throughput. We characterize the conditions under which reducing the inventory buffer enhances/degrades the informativeness of the performance metric and, hence, mitigates/exacerbates the agent’s incentive problem.