Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eilon Solan
School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
2 shared publications - Eran Shmaya
Kellogg School of Management; Northwestern University
1 shared publication - Gijs Schoenmakers
Maastricht University
1 shared publication - Jeroen Kuipers
Maastricht University
1 shared publication - János Flesch
Department of Quantitative Economics Maastricht University P.O.Box 616 6200 MD The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Koos Vrieze
Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 5 (1) , 120-135
Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs
- 12 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 5 (1) , 120-135
Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs
- 13 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (4) , 945-951
Non-existence of subgame-perfect $\varepsilon $ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon- 13 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (4) , 945-951
Non-existence of subgame-perfect $\varepsilon $ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon- 19 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (1) , 89-135
Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games
- 19 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (1) , 89-135
Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games
- Open Access
Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.
Open AccessBorel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.
- 28 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 38 (2) , 169-181
Periodic stopping games
- 28 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 38 (2) , 169-181
Periodic stopping games