NSNoam Shamir

Noam Shamir

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Noam Shamir has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption, and Investment in Resilience Measures

    by Terrence August, Daehoon Noh, Noam Shamir, Hyoduk Shin

    With the increased frequency and magnitude of cyberattacks, policymakers and the private sector search for ways to counter this threat. One of the main initiatives suggested to achieve this goal is sharing cybersecurity-related information. Although the general belief is that information sharing can increase both industry profit and social welfare, it is unclear whether firms would voluntarily share such information. In this paper, we examine the incentives of firms to share cybersecurity-related information, how information sharing impacts investments in cyber resilience, and the aggregate impact on welfare. We find that firms only voluntarily share information in less competitive markets when the impact of the disruption is high. In all other cases, firms elect not to share information, despite potential welfare benefits. To facilitate information sharing, we investigate an exclusionary policy (i.e., sharing must be mutual) and demonstrate market conditions under which this policy incentivizes information sharing. However, when competition is intense, even the exclusionary policy is ineffective because it reduces industry profit. To inform stronger interventions, we examine firms being mandated to disclose their private cyberthreat information. We demonstrate that an opportunity does exist for such disclosure, particularly when the cost of investing in cyber resilience is high. However, policymakers must use caution with such a policy because applying this intervention when investment costs are not high leads to a steep reduction in welfare. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00430 .


  • Information Provision from a Platform to Competing Sellers: The Role of Strategic Ambiguity

    by Tal Avinadav, Tatyana Chernonog, Noam Shamir

    Problem definition: With the rapid growth of e-commerce, platforms are able to gather large quantities of data, which can result in high-precision predictions regarding consumer purchasing patterns and future demand. A fundamental question is whether a platform has the incentives and ability to share such nonverifiable information with its sellers. Methodology/results: We show that when information is nonverifiable, sharing the precise value of the platform’s private information by means of cheap-talk cannot result in an equilibrium. This outcome is due to the incentive of the platform to portray a more favorable market condition than that predicted, in order to encourage the sellers to raise their prices and improve market efficiency. In spite of this negative result, we demonstrate that the level of incentives misalignment between the platform and its sellers is bounded; consequently, a region-forecast information-sharing equilibrium can emerge. In this equilibrium, the support of the platform’s private information is divided into several intervals, and the platform strategically chooses to report truthfully the interval containing its private information. The structure of the partition is influenced by two main factors: the incentive of the platform to reduce market uncertainty for the sellers, and the motivation of the platform to soften competition among the sellers. Although both the sellers and the platform benefit from the ability to share some level of information, such an outcome hurts the consumers. Managerial implications: This work explains the observed practice of a platform providing nonverifiable information to its sellers via cheap-talk. The main advantage of this equilibrium is the ability to share information in a costless manner; however, the amount of information that can be shared is limited and is influenced by the level of market competition between the sellers. Funding: N. Shamir gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 2358/22] and The Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel. T. Avinadav and T. Chernonog gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1571/20]. Supplemental Material: The electronic companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0262 .


  • Alleviating Court Congestion: The Case of the Jerusalem District Court

    by Shany Azaria, Boaz Ronen, Noam Shamir

    This paper investigates court congestion through a field study conducted at the Jerusalem District Court in Israel, aiming to reduce case processing time by adapting successful operational concepts to this unique environment. Using a modified difference-in-differences approach, the study suggests a notable 46.1% reduction in the duration of the treated part of the judicial process, demonstrating the efficacy of operational management tools in alleviating court congestion without compromising process quality or requiring additional resources.


  • Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain

    by Tal Avinadav, Noam Shamir

    Partial vertical ownership describes a situation in which a firm holds financial shares in either its supplier (referred to as partial backward integration) or its customer (partial forward integration). We study the effect of such financial interconnectedness on two operational decisions: capacity investment and information exchange. In our model, a retailer, who has superior information about the future market demand, has passive financial holdings in the supplier. Although this passive financial investment does not enable the retailer to directly influence the supplier’s operational decisions, it does affect the market equilibrium. Specifically, financial interconnectedness between the firms can result in the retailer financing the entire capacity in the market. In addition, we characterize the conditions that ensure that information between the retailer and the supplier can be exchanged via cheap-talk communication. Interestingly, a high level of information asymmetry facilitates the exchange of information via cheap talk in the presence of these financial links. When cheap talk is not possible, we study the separating equilibrium that is achieved through the retailer’s commitment to order in advance. In this case, the separating quantity can either increase or decrease with the level partial vertical ownership, and this trend does not depend the actual level of the financial holdings. We further analyze the incentive of the retailer to conceal demand information by choosing a pooling equilibrium and conclude with discussing the effect of the financial interconnectedness on the parties’ operational payoffs. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: N. Shamir gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 2358/22] and The Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel. T. Avinadav gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1571/20]. Supplemental Material: Data and the electronic companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4673 .


  • Sales Information Transparency and Trust in Repeated Vertical Relationships

    by Noam Shamir, Yaron Yehezkel

    Problem definition: We study a repeated interaction between a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer may share with the manufacturer past sales information. In our model, such information cannot improve the latter’s predictive capabilities of future demand, but it does allow him to infer past demand. Academic/practical relevance: Our main research questions are under what conditions the retailer and the manufacturer benefit from sharing such past sales information and how dynamic interaction and past sales information affect the efficiency of the distribution channel. Methodology: We model a repeated relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer, where demand fluctuates in an independent and identically distributed manner between periods. In each period, the retailer privately observes the current demand, and the manufacturer offers a menu of contracts to elicit the retailer to reveal its private information. The manufacturer may observe sales information that reveals past demand at the end of each period if the retailer chooses to share such information. Results: We find that even without sharing sales information, repeated interaction by itself enhances efficiency and profits for both firms. Past sales information further improves the channels’ efficiency and increases the manufacturer’s expected profit. Yet, past sales information increases (decreases) the retailer’s per-period expected profit when the retailer places a low (high) value on its future profits. Managerial implications: Our results provide a new strategic reasoning for sharing past sales information—as a way to increase trust in repeated vertical relationships. Furthermore, when the retailer can share a noisy signal regarding past demand, this may facilitate the exchange of sales information. We also consider the case of a financially constrained retailer and demonstrate that financial constraints may benefit the retailer as they limit the market power of the manufacturer. In contrast, the manufacturer and the channel’s efficiency are always worse off when the retailer is financially constrained. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the Coller Foundation, the Eli Hurvitz Institute, and the Henry Crown Institute. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1208 .


  • Open Access

    Justice in time: A theory of constraints approach

    by Shany Azaria, Boaz Ronen, Noam Shamir

    If there is some truth to the adage that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done, then surely it must be seen to be done in a timely manner. Yet court congestion and delays – which threaten to undermine the justice system – have become global phenomena with significant adverse implications for social welfare, economic development, and civil rights. This work describes an application of the Theory of Constraints (TOC) to the judicial system for the purpose of designing an intervention to alleviate court congestion – an intervention that won the 2012 Goldratt Foundation New Knowledge Award. In cooperation with the Jerusalem District Court in Israel, the judicial process was reviewed through the lens of TOC, and a set of operational changes was implemented to reduce case processing time. Data collected before and after this intervention indicate the potential of achieving lead‐time reduction by applying TOC to judicial environments.


  • Financial Cross-Ownership and Information Dissemination in a Supply Chain

    by Yossi Aviv, Noam Shamir

    Problem definition: We examine the effect of financial cross-ownership—a situation in which a retailer holds stocks in a competitor—on two crucial operational decisions in a supply chain with competing retailers sourcing from a single supplier: information acquisition and production output. Academic/practical relevance: Financial interconnectedness between competing retailers raises fundamental questions regarding the way information is managed in such markets and the way it affects consumer welfare. Thus, in addition to the relevance to operations management scholars, this subject is of potential interest to policy makers and regulators. Although financial cross-ownership has mainly been unchallenged by regulators, the European Commission has recently called for a deeper understanding of the competitive aspects of this investment tool. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model, in which we analyze a supply chain comprised of an incumbent retailer holding stocks in an entrant and both retailers source from a mutual supplier. The incumbent can obtain costless demand information, and the supplier decides whether to leak this information if it is available to him or her. Results: We demonstrate that holding stocks in a rival better aligns the incentives of the rival retailers and results in a lower competition level during the production stage. However, financial cross-ownership can also result in an increased incentive for information acquisition, even when the information is later leaked to the entrant. The acquisition of information benefits not only the retailers but can also make the consumers better off. Managerial implications: Our work contributes to the heated policy debate regarding the competitive effects of financial cross-ownership. In addition, we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to study the way financial cross-ownership affects operational decisions. Specifically, we show that financial cross-ownership provides incentives to acquire demand information even under the threat of information leakage.