Daehoon Noh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Daehoon Noh has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tunay I. Tunca
Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742
2 shared publications - Yi Xu
Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742
2 shared publications David Simchi-Levi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, OR Center, LIDS and IDSS, Massachusetts, United States
1 shared publicationHuan Cao
Lyft Inc, Marketplace, San Francisco, California, United States
1 shared publication- Hyoduk Shin
Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093
1 shared publication - Liu Ming
School of Management and Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518172, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Operations Management in the Sharing Economy: Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities
The rapid growth of the sharing economy over the past decade has changed many industries in profound ways. The innovative business models that have emerged in the sharing economy present unique opportunities as well as challenges, which have attracted a significant amount of attention from researchers in the operations management field. In this paper, we discuss the advances, challenges, and opportunities for research on operations management in the sharing economy. We divide sharing economy into eight categories: Ride Sharing, Space Sharing, Bike Sharing, Vehicle Sharing, Group Buying, Crowdfunding, Freelancing, and Last-Mile Delivery. For each business category, we identify the gaps and current challenges in the existing literature, discuss emerging industry trends and research topics, and suggest several future research directions. Our goal is to stimulate discussion and ideas about future studies in this area.
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Operations Management in the Sharing Economy: Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities
The rapid growth of the sharing economy over the past decade has changed many industries in profound ways. The innovative business models that have emerged in the sharing economy present unique opportunities as well as challenges, which have attracted a significant amount of attention from researchers in the operations management field. In this paper, we discuss the advances, challenges, and opportunities for research on operations management in the sharing economy. We divide sharing economy into eight categories: Ride Sharing, Space Sharing, Bike Sharing, Vehicle Sharing, Group Buying, Crowdfunding, Freelancing, and Last-Mile Delivery. For each business category, we identify the gaps and current challenges in the existing literature, discuss emerging industry trends and research topics, and suggest several future research directions. Our goal is to stimulate discussion and ideas about future studies in this area.
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Evolution of Ride Services: From Ride Hailing to Autonomous Vehicles
In recent years, the ride service industry has been evolving rapidly, driven by disruptive technologies such as mobile apps, artificial intelligence, and autonomous vehicles (AVs). Whereas platform-based decentralized ride-hailing (RH) companies have gained significant market share, vertically integrated robotaxi services using emerging AVs are starting to enter the market. In this paper, we aim to provide insights about the evolution and the future of ride services, studying these two competing business approaches. We game-theoretically model and analyze the competition between a platform-based RH firm and an AV-based ride-service firm. Although the AV model has a capacity commitment advantage, we find that, in larger markets with sufficiently patient customers, the RH firm surprisingly gains the upper hand in competition, having higher market share and profits as well as lower service delays and higher prices even if it has a cost disadvantage. Further, entry of the AV firm into a market with an RH monopolist incumbent may reduce total vehicle supply and increase customer wait costs. We also find that, when customers are impatient, the entry of a high-cost AV firm may lead to a decrease in social welfare despite introducing competition, suggesting that regulators should be careful about introduction of robotaxi services in a market if they are not sufficiently cost-efficient. From a broader perspective, our results demonstrate that platform business models may have significant strategic advantages over firms with traditional vertically integrated models under competition, and loss of platforms’ dominance in a market may result in welfare losses. This paper was accepted by Victor Martinez-de-Albeniz, operations management. Funding: This study is partially supported by Korea University Business School Research Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02733 .
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Evolution of Ride Services: From Ride Hailing to Autonomous Vehicles
In recent years, the ride service industry has been evolving rapidly, driven by disruptive technologies such as mobile apps, artificial intelligence, and autonomous vehicles (AVs). Whereas platform-based decentralized ride-hailing (RH) companies have gained significant market share, vertically integrated robotaxi services using emerging AVs are starting to enter the market. In this paper, we aim to provide insights about the evolution and the future of ride services, studying these two competing business approaches. We game-theoretically model and analyze the competition between a platform-based RH firm and an AV-based ride-service firm. Although the AV model has a capacity commitment advantage, we find that, in larger markets with sufficiently patient customers, the RH firm surprisingly gains the upper hand in competition, having higher market share and profits as well as lower service delays and higher prices even if it has a cost disadvantage. Further, entry of the AV firm into a market with an RH monopolist incumbent may reduce total vehicle supply and increase customer wait costs. We also find that, when customers are impatient, the entry of a high-cost AV firm may lead to a decrease in social welfare despite introducing competition, suggesting that regulators should be careful about introduction of robotaxi services in a market if they are not sufficiently cost-efficient. From a broader perspective, our results demonstrate that platform business models may have significant strategic advantages over firms with traditional vertically integrated models under competition, and loss of platforms’ dominance in a market may result in welfare losses. This paper was accepted by Victor Martinez-de-Albeniz, operations management. Funding: This study is partially supported by Korea University Business School Research Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02733 .
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (9) , 7390-7413
Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption, and Investment in Resilience Measures
With the increased frequency and magnitude of cyberattacks, policymakers and the private sector search for ways to counter this threat. One of the main initiatives suggested to achieve this goal is sharing cybersecurity-related information. Although the general belief is that information sharing can increase both industry profit and social welfare, it is unclear whether firms would voluntarily share such information. In this paper, we examine the incentives of firms to share cybersecurity-related information, how information sharing impacts investments in cyber resilience, and the aggregate impact on welfare. We find that firms only voluntarily share information in less competitive markets when the impact of the disruption is high. In all other cases, firms elect not to share information, despite potential welfare benefits. To facilitate information sharing, we investigate an exclusionary policy (i.e., sharing must be mutual) and demonstrate market conditions under which this policy incentivizes information sharing. However, when competition is intense, even the exclusionary policy is ineffective because it reduces industry profit. To inform stronger interventions, we examine firms being mandated to disclose their private cyberthreat information. We demonstrate that an opportunity does exist for such disclosure, particularly when the cost of investing in cyber resilience is high. However, policymakers must use caution with such a policy because applying this intervention when investment costs are not high leads to a steep reduction in welfare. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00430 .
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (9) , 7390-7413
Cyberattacks, Operational Disruption, and Investment in Resilience Measures
With the increased frequency and magnitude of cyberattacks, policymakers and the private sector search for ways to counter this threat. One of the main initiatives suggested to achieve this goal is sharing cybersecurity-related information. Although the general belief is that information sharing can increase both industry profit and social welfare, it is unclear whether firms would voluntarily share such information. In this paper, we examine the incentives of firms to share cybersecurity-related information, how information sharing impacts investments in cyber resilience, and the aggregate impact on welfare. We find that firms only voluntarily share information in less competitive markets when the impact of the disruption is high. In all other cases, firms elect not to share information, despite potential welfare benefits. To facilitate information sharing, we investigate an exclusionary policy (i.e., sharing must be mutual) and demonstrate market conditions under which this policy incentivizes information sharing. However, when competition is intense, even the exclusionary policy is ineffective because it reduces industry profit. To inform stronger interventions, we examine firms being mandated to disclose their private cyberthreat information. We demonstrate that an opportunity does exist for such disclosure, particularly when the cost of investing in cyber resilience is high. However, policymakers must use caution with such a policy because applying this intervention when investment costs are not high leads to a steep reduction in welfare. This paper was accepted by D. J. Wu, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00430 .
- Open Access
- 11 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Evolution of Ride Services: From Taxicabs to Ride Hailing and Self-Driving Cars
In recent years decentralized Ride Hailing companies have gained significant market share at the expense of vertically-integrated Taxi companies. Yet, Ride Hailing companies also experienced substantial setbacks, and it is not clear what the endgame between these two competing business models will be. Further, emerging self-driving car technologies, which leads to another form of a vertically-integrated ride service poses further questions on how the industry will shape in the future. In this paper, we aim to gain insights about the evolution and the future of ride services under these two distinct business approaches. We model and analyze competition and entry between Vertically Integrated (VI) and decentralized Ride Hailing (RH) firms. Although the VI model has an advantage for being centralized, we find that when customers are patient, in competition, the RH firm predominantly gains the upper hand in the market with lower delays and higher prices, as well as higher market share and profits even if it has a cost disadvantage. Surprisingly, entry may reduce total vehicle supply, and tends to increase customer waiting times. When customers are impatient, the entry of an inefficient VI firm may even lead to a decrease in social welfare despite introducing competition. Our results provide insights into how decentralized Ride Hailing companies may have a strategic advantage to dominate the market due to their agility and the structure of their business model, and how this can sometimes hurt service quality. Conversely, regulators should also be cautious about subsidizing inefficient Taxi services or self-driving ride services with costly technologies.
- 11 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEvolution of Ride Services: From Taxicabs to Ride Hailing and Self-Driving Cars
In recent years decentralized Ride Hailing companies have gained significant market share at the expense of vertically-integrated Taxi companies. Yet, Ride Hailing companies also experienced substantial setbacks, and it is not clear what the endgame between these two competing business models will be. Further, emerging self-driving car technologies, which leads to another form of a vertically-integrated ride service poses further questions on how the industry will shape in the future. In this paper, we aim to gain insights about the evolution and the future of ride services under these two distinct business approaches. We model and analyze competition and entry between Vertically Integrated (VI) and decentralized Ride Hailing (RH) firms. Although the VI model has an advantage for being centralized, we find that when customers are patient, in competition, the RH firm predominantly gains the upper hand in the market with lower delays and higher prices, as well as higher market share and profits even if it has a cost disadvantage. Surprisingly, entry may reduce total vehicle supply, and tends to increase customer waiting times. When customers are impatient, the entry of an inefficient VI firm may even lead to a decrease in social welfare despite introducing competition. Our results provide insights into how decentralized Ride Hailing companies may have a strategic advantage to dominate the market due to their agility and the structure of their business model, and how this can sometimes hurt service quality. Conversely, regulators should also be cautious about subsidizing inefficient Taxi services or self-driving ride services with costly technologies.