Antonis Dimakis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Antonis Dimakis has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Costas Courcoubetis
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
3 shared publications - Costas A. Courcoubetis
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
2 shared publications Michalis Kanakakis
Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 10434, Greece
2 shared publications- Yunpeng Li
School of Data Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
2 shared publications Costas A. Courcoubetis
Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore 487372
1 shared publicationCostas Courcoubetis
Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
- Vol. 180
The impact of autonomous vehicles on ride-hailing platforms with strategic human drivers
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
- Vol. 180
Open AccessThe impact of autonomous vehicles on ride-hailing platforms with strategic human drivers
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 21-44
On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 21-44
On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy
- Open Access
On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent chooses an infinite sequence of actions and maximizes the total reward stream discounted over time under different ways of computing present values. Our model assumes that actions consume common resources that get congested, and the action choice by an agent affects the completion times of actions chosen by other agents, which in turn affects the time rewards are accrued and their discounted value. This is a mean-field game, where an agent's reward depends on the decisions of the other agents through the resulting action completion times. For this type of game we define stationary equilibria, and analyze their existence and price of anarchy (PoA). Overall, we find that the PoA depends entirely on the type of discounting rather than its specific parameters. For exponential discounting, myopic behaviour leads to extreme inefficiency: the PoA is infinity for any value of the discount parameter. For power law discounting, such inefficiency is greatly reduced and the PoA is 2 whenever stationary equilibria exist. This matches the PoA when there is no discounting and players maximize long-run average rewards. Additionally, we observe that exponential discounting may introduce unstable equilibria in learning algorithms, if action completion times are interdependent. In contrast, under no discounting all equilibria are stable.
Open AccessOn the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent chooses an infinite sequence of actions and maximizes the total reward stream discounted over time under different ways of computing present values. Our model assumes that actions consume common resources that get congested, and the action choice by an agent affects the completion times of actions chosen by other agents, which in turn affects the time rewards are accrued and their discounted value. This is a mean-field game, where an agent's reward depends on the decisions of the other agents through the resulting action completion times. For this type of game we define stationary equilibria, and analyze their existence and price of anarchy (PoA). Overall, we find that the PoA depends entirely on the type of discounting rather than its specific parameters. For exponential discounting, myopic behaviour leads to extreme inefficiency: the PoA is infinity for any value of the discount parameter. For power law discounting, such inefficiency is greatly reduced and the PoA is 2 whenever stationary equilibria exist. This matches the PoA when there is no discounting and players maximize long-run average rewards. Additionally, we observe that exponential discounting may introduce unstable equilibria in learning algorithms, if action completion times are interdependent. In contrast, under no discounting all equilibria are stable.
- Open Access
Closed Non-atomic Resource Allocation Games
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear programs as sequential resource allocation games. Players continuously select activities such that they maximize linear objectives interpreted as time-average of activity rewards, while active resource constraints cause queueing. In turn, the resulting waiting delays enter in the optimization problem of each player. The existence of Wardrop-type equilibria and their properties are investivated by means of a potential function related to proportional fairness. The inefficiency of the equilibria relative to optimal resource allocation is characterized through the price of anarchy which is 2 if all players are of the same type ($\infty$ if not).
Open AccessClosed Non-atomic Resource Allocation Games
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear programs as sequential resource allocation games. Players continuously select activities such that they maximize linear objectives interpreted as time-average of activity rewards, while active resource constraints cause queueing. In turn, the resulting waiting delays enter in the optimization problem of each player. The existence of Wardrop-type equilibria and their properties are investivated by means of a potential function related to proportional fairness. The inefficiency of the equilibria relative to optimal resource allocation is characterized through the price of anarchy which is 2 if all players are of the same type ($\infty$ if not).
- Open Access
- 21 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Surge-Type Pricing in Ridesharing Systems is Stability Optimal
The availability of drivers at a certain location affects the waiting time of passengers that arrive to be served by the platform. We introduce a queueing model for this waiting time and consider the effect on stability of available drivers’ mobility pattern, their willingness to accept rides in a given location, and the incentives offered by the platform. For any fixed number of drivers, we characterize the largest set of passenger arrival rates which can result to stable queues under some policy dictating the movement of available drivers and their acceptance of rides. It turns out that any such policy can be enforced by offering appropriate region-dependent rewards to drivers for passenger pick up. Next, we show that dynamic rewards which are proportional to the passenger queue lengths, have the property of stabilizing queues for any arrival rates within the stability region. Seen from the perspective of drivers, such rewards – which resemble surge pricing – maximize their utilization.
- 21 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Surge-Type Pricing in Ridesharing Systems is Stability Optimal
The availability of drivers at a certain location affects the waiting time of passengers that arrive to be served by the platform. We introduce a queueing model for this waiting time and consider the effect on stability of available drivers’ mobility pattern, their willingness to accept rides in a given location, and the incentives offered by the platform. For any fixed number of drivers, we characterize the largest set of passenger arrival rates which can result to stable queues under some policy dictating the movement of available drivers and their acceptance of rides. It turns out that any such policy can be enforced by offering appropriate region-dependent rewards to drivers for passenger pick up. Next, we show that dynamic rewards which are proportional to the passenger queue lengths, have the property of stabilizing queues for any arrival rates within the stability region. Seen from the perspective of drivers, such rewards – which resemble surge pricing – maximize their utilization.
- 19 June 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 25 (5) , 2743-2758
Congestion Control for Background Data Transfers With Minimal Delay Impact
Congestion control protocols for background data are commonly conceived and designed to emulate low priority traffic, which yields to transmission control protocol (TCP) flows. In the presence of even a few very long TCP flows, this behavior can cause bandwidth starvation, and hence, the accumulation of large numbers of background data flows for prolonged periods of time, which may ultimately have an adverse effect on the download delays of delay-sensitive TCP flows. In this paper, we look at the fundamental problem of designing congestion control protocols for background traffic with the minimum impact on short TCP flows while achieving a certain desired average throughput over time. The corresponding optimal policy under various assumptions on the available information is obtained analytically. We give tight bounds of the distance between TCP-based background transfer protocols and the optimal policy, and identify the range of system parameters for which more sophisticated congestion control makes a noticeable difference. Based on these results, we propose an access control algorithm for systems where control on aggregates of background flows can be exercised, as in file servers. Simulations of simple network topologies suggest that this type of access control performs better than protocols emulating low priority over a wide range of parameters.
- 19 June 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 25 (5) , 2743-2758
Congestion Control for Background Data Transfers With Minimal Delay Impact
Congestion control protocols for background data are commonly conceived and designed to emulate low priority traffic, which yields to transmission control protocol (TCP) flows. In the presence of even a few very long TCP flows, this behavior can cause bandwidth starvation, and hence, the accumulation of large numbers of background data flows for prolonged periods of time, which may ultimately have an adverse effect on the download delays of delay-sensitive TCP flows. In this paper, we look at the fundamental problem of designing congestion control protocols for background traffic with the minimum impact on short TCP flows while achieving a certain desired average throughput over time. The corresponding optimal policy under various assumptions on the available information is obtained analytically. We give tight bounds of the distance between TCP-based background transfer protocols and the optimal policy, and identify the range of system parameters for which more sophisticated congestion control makes a noticeable difference. Based on these results, we propose an access control algorithm for systems where control on aggregates of background flows can be exercised, as in file servers. Simulations of simple network topologies suggest that this type of access control performs better than protocols emulating low priority over a wide range of parameters.
- 18 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 79-88
Minimally Intrusive Server Policies for Background Data Transfers
- 18 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 79-88
Minimally Intrusive Server Policies for Background Data Transfers