CCCostas Courcoubetis

Costas Courcoubetis

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Costas Courcoubetis has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Market Mechanisms for TSO-DSO-Consumers Flexibility Coordination

    by Qisheng Huang, Zeyuan Suo, Ting Wu, Gaoqi Liang, Junhua Zhao, Costas Courcoubetis

  • Open Access

    Internet of Drones: Traffic Management Through Forwarding Strategies

    by Chuankai Xiang, Lishuai Li, Costas Courcoubetis

    Strong policy incentives and growing economic opportunities have driven the rapid development of the low-altitude economy (LAE) in China and other regions worldwide. A critical challenge in LAE is ensuring scalable traffic management to support the high volume of aerial vehicle operations in dense airspace. The Internet provides a compelling analogy for scalable, distributed management of massive data flows. However, drones differ fundamentally from data packets due to their physical presence and safety constraints, making it unclear how Internet-inspired forwarding strategies can be effectively adapted to drone networks. This paper compares two representative forwarding strategies: a best-effort scheme, commonly used on the Internet, and a back-pressure scheme that regulates access to congested backbone links. Using a simulation framework, we evaluate both strategies. The results show that the two strategies behave differently as demand increases. Best-effort remains close to free flow under light demand, but becomes sensitive to overload as demand approaches or exceeds capacity. Back-pressure, by contrast, controls admission through slot reservation and prevents large queues from forming inside the

  • Pricing Demand-Side Flexibility via Mean-Field Reverse Stackelberg Game

    by Qisheng Huang, Yunpeng Li, Bo Liu, Gaoqi Liang, Junhua Zhao, Costas Courcoubetis

    Pricing demand-side flexibility is crucial for incentivizing real-time adjustments in energy consumption, balancing grid supply and demand, and accelerating the integration of renewable resources. However, designing effective pricing mechanisms to guide large-scale consumers toward desired load profiles remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces a mean-field reverse Stackelberg game framework to model strategic interactions between a load aggregator and a population of consumers. The aggregator, acting as the leader, designs an affine pricing scheme to align aggregated demand with a target load profile, while consumers, as followers, optimize their demand response to maximize individual utility. To address computational intractability in large-scale settings, we employ a mean-field game to characterize consumer equilibrium behavior and demonstrate that the mean-field equilibrium serves as a precise approximation of the equilibrium arising from consumer interactions. We further propose efficient algorithms for computing both the mean-field equilibrium and optimal pricing policies. Numerical studies show that our reverse Stackelberg game-based pricing scheme effectively flattens both the demand curve and retail prices. This demonstrates the success of the proposed RSG-based pricing strategy in achieving peak shaving and valley filling, thereby improving the management of large-scale consumer demand in smart grids.


  • Strategic Storage Investment and Operation Under Uncertainty: Behavioral Economics Analysis

    by Qisheng Huang, Jin Xu, Peng Sun, Bo Liu, Ting Wu, Costas Courcoubetis

    In this paper, we propose a two-stage Stackelberg game to investigate the strategic storage investment and operation interaction between the storage aggregator and consumers under demand uncertainty. In the first stage, the storage aggregator makes the storage investment and pricing decisions to maximize its profit. After observing the storage aggregator's decisions, each consumer makes its own storage operation decisions to minimize its electricity bill. Different from previous studies that mainly assumed a risk-neutral consumer based on the expected utility theory (EUT), we propose a prospect theory (PT) model to capture consumers' risk preferences. To solve the PT-based non-convex problem, we exploit the unimodal structure of the objective function and characterize the equilibrium solutions. Theoretical and numerical results show that the consumers' risk preferences have significant impacts on the equilibrium solutions: 1) a PT-consumer with a low reference point is more willing to use energy storage to reduce risk compared with the EUT benchmark; 2) a PT consumer is more willing to use the energy storage when the probability of high demand is small, due to the probability distortion; 3) the consumers with a lower level of risk preference are easier to be affected by the increase of storage investment cost.


  • Average-Case Analysis of Greedy Matching for Large-Scale D2D Resource Sharing

    by Shuqin Gao, Costas A. Courcoubetis, Lingjie Duan

    Given the proximity of many wireless users and their diversity in consuming local resources (e.g., data-plans, computation and energy resources), device-to-device (D2D) resource sharing is a promising approach towards realizing a sharing economy. This paper adopts an easy-to-implement greedy matching algorithm with distributed fashion and only sub-linear $O(\log n)$ parallel complexity (in user number $n$ ) for large-scale D2D sharing. Practical cases indicate that the greedy matching's average performance is far better than the worst-case approximation ratio 50% as compared to the optimum. However, there is no rigorous average-case analysis in the literature to back up such encouraging findings and this paper is the first to present such analysis for multiple representative classes of graphs. For 1D linear networks, we prove that our greedy algorithm performs better than 86.5% of the optimum. For 2D grids, though dynamic programming cannot be directly applied, we still prove this average performance ratio to be above 76%. For the more challenging Erdos-Rényi random graphs, we equivalently reduce to the asymptotic analysis of random trees and successfully prove a ratio up to 79%. Finally, we conduct experiments using real data to simulate realistic D2D networks, and show that our analytical performance measure approximates well practical cases.


  • Strategic Production and Trading in Renewable Energy Certificate Markets: Existence, Uniqueness, and Efficiency of Market Equilibria

    by Qisheng Huang, Yunjian Xu, Costas A. Courcoubetis

    As an incentive policy to promote renewable generation, the renewable standard portfolio (RPS) scheme has been widely adopted to enforce utility companies to procure a certain fraction of their energy supply from renewable sources. We construct a non-cooperative game theoretic model to study the strategic behavior of utility companies in a renewable energy certificate (REC) market, where utility companies purchase REC from renewable producers to meet their RPS obligation. In the constructed game, each utility company makes the renewable production decisions so as to minimize its total cost (the sum of renewable production and RPS penalty costs). We establish mild conditions that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We further prove that if a Nash equilibrium exists, it must be unique and minimize the system cost. When symmetric utility companies' energy loads are independent and identical Gaussian distributed, as the number of utility companies increases to infinity, we show that the expected cost (of a utility company) converges to a lower bound, the product of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of renewable generation and its expected RPS obligation. Numerical studies on real-world (load, RPS requirement, penalty, and LCOE) data show that the REC trading can reduce 5%-10% of the system cost.


  • Open Access

    Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: A Mechanism to Destabilize Inefficient Locked-in Technologies

    by Stefanos Leonardos, Joseph Sakos, Costas Courcoubetis, Georgios Piliouras

    In multi-agent environments in which coordination is desirable, the history of play often causes lock-in at sub-optimal outcomes. Notoriously, technologies with significant environmental footprint or high social cost persist despite the successful development of more environmentally friendly and/or socially efficient alternatives. The displacement of the status quo is hindered by entrenched economic interests and network effects. To exacerbate matters, the standard mechanism design approaches based on centralized authorities with the capacity to use preferential subsidies to effectively dictate system outcomes are not always applicable to modern decentralized economies. What other types of mechanisms are feasible? In this article, we develop and analyze a mechanism that induces transitions from inefficient lock-ins to superior alternatives. This mechanism does not exogenously favor one option over another; instead, the phase transition emerges endogenously via a standard evolutionary learning model, Q-learning, where agents trade off exploration and exploitation. Exerting the same transient influence to both the efficient and inefficient technologies encourages exploration and results in irreversible phase transitions and permanent stabilization of the efficient one. On a technical level, our work is based on bifurcation and catastrophe theory, a branch of mathematics that deals with changes in the number and stability properties of equilibria. Critically, our analysis is shown to be structurally robust to significant and even adversarially chosen perturbations to the parameters of both our game and our behavioral model.


  • Drivers, Riders, and Service Providers: The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Mobility

    by Saif Benjaafar, Harald Bernhard, Costas Courcoubetis, Michail Kanakakis, Spyridon Papafragkos

    It is widely believed that ride sharing, the practice of sharing a car such that more than one person travels in the car during a journey, has the potential to significantly reduce traffic by filling up cars more efficiently. We introduce a model in which individuals may share rides for a certain fee, paid by the rider(s) to the driver through a ride-sharing platform. Collective decision making is modeled as an anonymous nonatomic game with a finite set of strategies and payoff functions among individuals who are heterogeneous in their income. We examine how ride sharing is organized and how traffic and ownership are affected if a platform, which chooses the seat rental price to maximize either revenue or welfare, is introduced to a population. We find that the ratio of ownership to usage costs determines how ride sharing is organized. If this ratio is low, ride sharing is offered as a peer-to-peer (P2P) service, and if this ratio is high, ride sharing is offered as a business-to-customer (B2C) service. In the P2P case, rides are initiated by drivers only when the drivers need to fulfill their own transportation requirements. In the B2C case, cars are driven all the time by full-time drivers taking rides even if these are not motivated by their private needs. We show that, although the introduction of ride sharing may reduce car ownership, it can lead to an increase in traffic. We also show that traffic and ownership may increase as the ownership cost increases and that a revenue-maximizing platform might prefer a situation in which cars are driven with only a few seats occupied, causing high traffic. We contrast these results with those obtained for a social welfare-maximizing platform. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.


  • Strategic Storage Operation in Wholesale Electricity Markets: A Networked Cournot Game Analysis

    by Qisheng Huang, Yunjian Xu, Costas A. Courcoubetis

    To investigate the impact of the strategic operation of grid-level energy storage systems on wholesale electricity markets, we study a Cournot competition model where each merchant storage owner seeks to maximize its own profit and the social planner makes the centralized economic dispatch decisions to maximize the social welfare. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the resulting (Cournot) equilibrium, and construct a convex optimization problem that yields the unique Cournot equilibrium. We show that the social welfare achieved at the equilibrium is always no less than that achieved in a market without energy storage. We further show that the social welfare achieved at the equilibrium converges to the maximum social welfare, as the number of symmetric (profit-maximizing) storage owners increases to infinity. Numerical experiments are conducted on the IEEE RTS-24 bus test system to validate established results.