Tariq Elahi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tariq Elahi has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Florentin Rochet
University of Edinburgh University of Namur University of Edinburgh
3 shared publications Ian Goldberg
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
3 shared publications- Florentin Rochet
University of Namur, Namur, Belgium
2 shared publications Kevin Bauer
University of Waterloo
2 shared publicationsMashael AlSabah
University of Waterloo
2 shared publications- Siani Pearson
Hewlett Packard Labs
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 209-227
Empirical Mixnet Design
- Open Access
Quantifying Mix Network Privacy Erosion with Generative Models
Modern mix networks improve over Tor and provide stronger privacy guarantees by robustly obfuscating metadata. As long as a message is routed through at least one honest mixnode, the privacy of the users involved is safeguarded. However, the complexity of the mixing mechanisms makes it difficult to estimate the cumulative privacy erosion occurring over time. This work uses a generative model trained on mixnet traffic to estimate the loss of privacy when users communicate persistently over a period of time. We train our large-language model from scratch on our specialized network traffic ``language'' and then use it to measure the sender-message unlinkability in various settings (e.g. mixing strategies, security parameters, observation window). Our findings reveal notable differences in privacy levels among mix strategies, even when they have similar mean latencies. In comparison, we demonstrate the limitations of traditional privacy metrics, such as entropy and log-likelihood, in fully capturing an adversary's potential to synthesize information from multiple observations. Finally, we show that larger models exhibit greater sample efficiency and superior capabilities implying that further advancements in transformers will consequently enhance the accuracy of model-based privacy estimates.
Open AccessQuantifying Mix Network Privacy Erosion with Generative Models
Modern mix networks improve over Tor and provide stronger privacy guarantees by robustly obfuscating metadata. As long as a message is routed through at least one honest mixnode, the privacy of the users involved is safeguarded. However, the complexity of the mixing mechanisms makes it difficult to estimate the cumulative privacy erosion occurring over time. This work uses a generative model trained on mixnet traffic to estimate the loss of privacy when users communicate persistently over a period of time. We train our large-language model from scratch on our specialized network traffic ``language'' and then use it to measure the sender-message unlinkability in various settings (e.g. mixing strategies, security parameters, observation window). Our findings reveal notable differences in privacy levels among mix strategies, even when they have similar mean latencies. In comparison, we demonstrate the limitations of traditional privacy metrics, such as entropy and log-likelihood, in fully capturing an adversary's potential to synthesize information from multiple observations. Finally, we show that larger models exhibit greater sample efficiency and superior capabilities implying that further advancements in transformers will consequently enhance the accuracy of model-based privacy estimates.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-16
Towards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security on distributed trust over many volunteers running relays in diverse global locations. In practice, this distribution leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the Tor software co-exist, each with differing sets of protocol features. Because of this heterogeneity, Tor developers employ forward-compatible protocol design as a strategy to maintain network extensibility. This strategy aims to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast protocol tolerance that is enabled by forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. We argue that, while being beneficial for the developers, protocol tolerance has resulted in a number of strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose Flexible Anonymous Network (FAN), a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We i) instantiate an implementation, ii) evaluate its overheads and, iii) experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-16
Open AccessTowards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security on distributed trust over many volunteers running relays in diverse global locations. In practice, this distribution leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the Tor software co-exist, each with differing sets of protocol features. Because of this heterogeneity, Tor developers employ forward-compatible protocol design as a strategy to maintain network extensibility. This strategy aims to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast protocol tolerance that is enabled by forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. We argue that, while being beneficial for the developers, protocol tolerance has resulted in a number of strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose Flexible Anonymous Network (FAN), a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We i) instantiate an implementation, ii) evaluate its overheads and, iii) experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
- Open Access
Towards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security upon distributing the trust in many volunteers running relays in many locations globally. In practice, it leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the same Tor software exist, with a different set of protocol features. Because of the heterogeneous aspect of the network, the maintainers employ forward-compatible protocol design strategies to maintain network extensibility. These strategies aim to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast the protocol tolerance enabled with forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. Despite being beneficial for the developers, we argue that protocol tolerance is the cause of many strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose FAN for Flexible Anonymous Network, a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for the developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We realize an implementation, evaluate the overheads and, experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
Open AccessTowards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security upon distributing the trust in many volunteers running relays in many locations globally. In practice, it leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the same Tor software exist, with a different set of protocol features. Because of the heterogeneous aspect of the network, the maintainers employ forward-compatible protocol design strategies to maintain network extensibility. These strategies aim to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast the protocol tolerance enabled with forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. Despite being beneficial for the developers, we argue that protocol tolerance is the cause of many strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose FAN for Flexible Anonymous Network, a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for the developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We realize an implementation, evaluate the overheads and, experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
- Open Access
VeraSel: Verifiable Random Selection for Mixnets Construction
The security and performance of Mixnets depends on the trustworthiness of the Mixnodes in the network. The challenge is to limit the adversary's influence on which Mixnodes operate in the network. A trusted party (such as the Mixnet operator) may ensure this, however, it is a single point of failure in the event of corruption or coercion. Therefore, we study the problem of how to select a subset of Mixnodes in a distributed way for Mixnet construction. We present VeraSel, a scheme that enables Mixnodes to be chosen according to their weights in a distributed, unbiased, and verifiable fashion using Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs). It is shown that VeraSel enables any party to learn and verify which nodes has been selected based on the commitments and proofs generated by each Mixnode with VRF.
Open AccessVeraSel: Verifiable Random Selection for Mixnets Construction
The security and performance of Mixnets depends on the trustworthiness of the Mixnodes in the network. The challenge is to limit the adversary's influence on which Mixnodes operate in the network. A trusted party (such as the Mixnet operator) may ensure this, however, it is a single point of failure in the event of corruption or coercion. Therefore, we study the problem of how to select a subset of Mixnodes in a distributed way for Mixnet construction. We present VeraSel, a scheme that enables Mixnodes to be chosen according to their weights in a distributed, unbiased, and verifiable fashion using Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs). It is shown that VeraSel enables any party to learn and verify which nodes has been selected based on the commitments and proofs generated by each Mixnode with VRF.
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 132-145
Stopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performant, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets, a popular design with real-world adoption. We identify and measure significant impacts of practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects in design decisions, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason about and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage “Sample-Placement-Forward” pipeline and develop tools to analyze and evaluate design decisions. To address the identified gaps and weaknesses we propose Bow-Tie, a design that mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor’s guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. We develop and implement two tools, 1) a mixnet topology generator (Mixnet-Topology-Generator (MTG)) and 2) a path simulator and security evaluator (routesim) that takes into account temporal dynamics and user behavior, to assist our analysis and empirical data collection. These tools are designed to help Mixnet designers assess the security and performance impact of their design decisions.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 132-145
Open AccessStopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performant, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets, a popular design with real-world adoption. We identify and measure significant impacts of practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects in design decisions, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason about and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage “Sample-Placement-Forward” pipeline and develop tools to analyze and evaluate design decisions. To address the identified gaps and weaknesses we propose Bow-Tie, a design that mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor’s guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. We develop and implement two tools, 1) a mixnet topology generator (Mixnet-Topology-Generator (MTG)) and 2) a path simulator and security evaluator (routesim) that takes into account temporal dynamics and user behavior, to assist our analysis and empirical data collection. These tools are designed to help Mixnet designers assess the security and performance impact of their design decisions.
- Open Access
Stopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performance, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets -- a popular design with real-world adoption -- and identify that there still exist heretofore inadequately explored practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage ``Sample-Placement-Forward'' pipeline, and using the results of our evaluation propose a novel Mixnet design, Bow-Tie. Bow-Tie mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor's guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. Ultimately, Bow-Tie is a significant step towards addressing the gap between the design of Mixnets and practical deployment and wider adoption because it directly addresses real-world user and Mixnet operator concerns.
Open AccessStopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performance, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets -- a popular design with real-world adoption -- and identify that there still exist heretofore inadequately explored practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage ``Sample-Placement-Forward'' pipeline, and using the results of our evaluation propose a novel Mixnet design, Bow-Tie. Bow-Tie mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor's guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. Ultimately, Bow-Tie is a significant step towards addressing the gap between the design of Mixnets and practical deployment and wider adoption because it directly addresses real-world user and Mixnet operator concerns.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1068-1079
PrivEx
In addition to their common use for private online communication, anonymous communication networks can also be used to circumvent censorship. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which they are actually used for this purpose without violating the privacy of the networks' users. Knowing this extent can be useful to designers and researchers who would like to improve the performance and privacy properties of the network. To address this issue, we propose a statistical data collection system, PrivEx, for collecting egress traffic statistics from anonymous communication networks in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. Our solution is based on distributed differential privacy and secure multiparty computation; it preserves the security and privacy properties of anonymous communication networks, even in the face of adversaries that can compromise data collection nodes or coerce operators to reveal cryptographic secrets and keys.
- 3 November 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1068-1079
Open AccessPrivEx
In addition to their common use for private online communication, anonymous communication networks can also be used to circumvent censorship. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which they are actually used for this purpose without violating the privacy of the networks' users. Knowing this extent can be useful to designers and researchers who would like to improve the performance and privacy properties of the network. To address this issue, we propose a statistical data collection system, PrivEx, for collecting egress traffic statistics from anonymous communication networks in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. Our solution is based on distributed differential privacy and secure multiparty computation; it preserves the security and privacy properties of anonymous communication networks, even in the face of adversaries that can compromise data collection nodes or coerce operators to reveal cryptographic secrets and keys.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 143-163
The Path Less Travelled: Overcoming Tor’s Bottlenecks with Traffic Splitting
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 143-163
The Path Less Travelled: Overcoming Tor’s Bottlenecks with Traffic Splitting
- Open Access
- 15 October 2012
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Changing of the guards
- 15 October 2012
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Open AccessChanging of the guards