Florentin Rochet
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Florentin Rochet has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jules Dejaeghere
University of Namur, Namur, Belgium
3 shared publications - Tariq Elahi
University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications - Benoit Donnet
University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
1 shared publication - Bolaji Gbadamosi
Karlstad University, Sweden
1 shared publication Emery Assogba
UCLouvain, Belgium
1 shared publication- Hosam Elkoulak
University of Namur, Namur, Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 119-133
Sociotechnical Aspects of Tor Relay Rejection
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 119-133
Open AccessSociotechnical Aspects of Tor Relay Rejection
- Open Access
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-16
Towards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security on distributed trust over many volunteers running relays in diverse global locations. In practice, this distribution leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the Tor software co-exist, each with differing sets of protocol features. Because of this heterogeneity, Tor developers employ forward-compatible protocol design as a strategy to maintain network extensibility. This strategy aims to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast protocol tolerance that is enabled by forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. We argue that, while being beneficial for the developers, protocol tolerance has resulted in a number of strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose Flexible Anonymous Network (FAN), a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We i) instantiate an implementation, ii) evaluate its overheads and, iii) experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-16
Open AccessTowards Flexible Anonymous Networks
Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security on distributed trust over many volunteers running relays in diverse global locations. In practice, this distribution leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the Tor software co-exist, each with differing sets of protocol features. Because of this heterogeneity, Tor developers employ forward-compatible protocol design as a strategy to maintain network extensibility. This strategy aims to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast protocol tolerance that is enabled by forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. We argue that, while being beneficial for the developers, protocol tolerance has resulted in a number of strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose Flexible Anonymous Network (FAN), a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We i) instantiate an implementation, ii) evaluate its overheads and, iii) experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-41
Comparing Security in eBPF and WebAssembly
- 10 September 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-41
Open AccessComparing Security in eBPF and WebAssembly
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 132-145
Stopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performant, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets, a popular design with real-world adoption. We identify and measure significant impacts of practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects in design decisions, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason about and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage “Sample-Placement-Forward” pipeline and develop tools to analyze and evaluate design decisions. To address the identified gaps and weaknesses we propose Bow-Tie, a design that mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor’s guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. We develop and implement two tools, 1) a mixnet topology generator (Mixnet-Topology-Generator (MTG)) and 2) a path simulator and security evaluator (routesim) that takes into account temporal dynamics and user behavior, to assist our analysis and empirical data collection. These tools are designed to help Mixnet designers assess the security and performance impact of their design decisions.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 132-145
Open AccessStopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering
Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performant, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets, a popular design with real-world adoption. We identify and measure significant impacts of practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects in design decisions, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason about and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage “Sample-Placement-Forward” pipeline and develop tools to analyze and evaluate design decisions. To address the identified gaps and weaknesses we propose Bow-Tie, a design that mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor’s guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. We develop and implement two tools, 1) a mixnet topology generator (Mixnet-Topology-Generator (MTG)) and 2) a path simulator and security evaluator (routesim) that takes into account temporal dynamics and user behavior, to assist our analysis and empirical data collection. These tools are designed to help Mixnet designers assess the security and performance impact of their design decisions.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 45-59
TCPLS
TCP and TLS are among the essential protocols in today's Internet. TCP ensures reliable data delivery while TLS secures the data transfer. Although they are very often used together, they have been designed independently following the Internet layered model. This paper demonstrates the various benefits that a closer integration between TCP and TLS would bring. By leveraging the extensible TLS 1.3 records, we combine TCP and TLS into TCPLS to build modern transport services such as multiplexing, connection migration, stream steering, and bandwidth aggregation. These services do not modify the TCP wire format and are resistant to middleboxes. TCPLS offers a powerful API enabling applications to precisely express the required transport services, ranging from a single-path single-stream connection to a multi-stream connection over several network paths, enabling choices between aggregated bandwidth and head-of-line blocking avoidance. Compared to MPTCP, our TCPLS prototype offers more control to the application and can be easily deployed as an extension to user-space TLS libraries, while being implemented at a low cost. Measurements demonstrate that it offers higher performance than existing QUIC libraries with a super set of transport services.
- 2 December 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 45-59
Open AccessTCPLS
TCP and TLS are among the essential protocols in today's Internet. TCP ensures reliable data delivery while TLS secures the data transfer. Although they are very often used together, they have been designed independently following the Internet layered model. This paper demonstrates the various benefits that a closer integration between TCP and TLS would bring. By leveraging the extensible TLS 1.3 records, we combine TCP and TLS into TCPLS to build modern transport services such as multiplexing, connection migration, stream steering, and bandwidth aggregation. These services do not modify the TCP wire format and are resistant to middleboxes. TCPLS offers a powerful API enabling applications to precisely express the required transport services, ranging from a single-path single-stream connection to a multi-stream connection over several network paths, enabling choices between aggregated bandwidth and head-of-line blocking avoidance. Compared to MPTCP, our TCPLS prototype offers more control to the application and can be easily deployed as an extension to user-space TLS libraries, while being implemented at a low cost. Measurements demonstrate that it offers higher performance than existing QUIC libraries with a super set of transport services.