FRFlorentin Rochet

Florentin Rochet

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Florentin Rochet has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Sociotechnical Aspects of Tor Relay Rejection

    by Jules Dejaeghere, Lionel Goffaux, Pierre Luycx, Hosam Elkoulak, Florentin Rochet

  • Open Access

    Towards Flexible Anonymous Networks

    by Florentin Rochet, Jules Dejaeghere, Tariq Elahi

    Anonymous Communication designs such as Tor build their security on distributed trust over many volunteers running relays in diverse global locations. In practice, this distribution leads to a heterogeneous network in which many versions of the Tor software co-exist, each with differing sets of protocol features. Because of this heterogeneity, Tor developers employ forward-compatible protocol design as a strategy to maintain network extensibility. This strategy aims to guarantee that different versions of the Tor software interact without unrecoverable errors. In this work, we cast protocol tolerance that is enabled by forward-compatible protocol considerations as a fundamental security issue. We argue that, while being beneficial for the developers, protocol tolerance has resulted in a number of strong attacks against Tor in the past fifteen years. To address this issue, we propose Flexible Anonymous Network (FAN), a new software architecture for volunteer-based distributed networks that shifts the dependence away from protocol tolerance without losing the ability for developers to ensure the continuous evolution of their software. We i) instantiate an implementation, ii) evaluate its overheads and, iii) experiment with several of FAN's benefits to defend against a severe attack still applicable to Tor today.


  • Open Access

    Comparing Security in eBPF and WebAssembly

    by Jules Dejaeghere, Bolaji Gbadamosi, Tobias Pulls, Florentin Rochet


  • Open Access

    Stopping Silent Sneaks: Defending against Malicious Mixes with Topological Engineering

    by Xinshu Ma, Florentin Rochet, Tariq Elahi

    Mixnets provide strong meta-data privacy and recent academic research and industrial projects have made strides in making them more secure, performant, and scalable. In this paper, we focus our work on stratified Mixnets, a popular design with real-world adoption. We identify and measure significant impacts of practical aspects such as: relay sampling and topology placement, network churn, and risks due to real-world usage patterns. We show that, due to the lack of incorporating these aspects in design decisions, Mixnets of this type are far more susceptible to user deanonymization than expected. In order to reason about and resolve these issues, we model Mixnets as a three-stage “Sample-Placement-Forward” pipeline and develop tools to analyze and evaluate design decisions. To address the identified gaps and weaknesses we propose Bow-Tie, a design that mitigates user deanonymization through a novel adaption of Tor’s guard design with an engineered guard layer and client guard-logic for stratified mixnets. We show that Bow-Tie has significantly higher user anonymity in the dynamic setting, where the Mixnet is used over a period of time, and is no worse in the static setting, where the user only sends a single message. We show the necessity of both the guard layer and client guard-logic in tandem as well as their individual effect when incorporated into other reference designs. We develop and implement two tools, 1) a mixnet topology generator (Mixnet-Topology-Generator (MTG)) and 2) a path simulator and security evaluator (routesim) that takes into account temporal dynamics and user behavior, to assist our analysis and empirical data collection. These tools are designed to help Mixnet designers assess the security and performance impact of their design decisions.


  • Open Access

    TCPLS

    by Florentin Rochet, Emery Assogba, Maxime Piraux, Korian Edeline, Benoit Donnet, Olivier Bonaventure

    TCP and TLS are among the essential protocols in today's Internet. TCP ensures reliable data delivery while TLS secures the data transfer. Although they are very often used together, they have been designed independently following the Internet layered model. This paper demonstrates the various benefits that a closer integration between TCP and TLS would bring. By leveraging the extensible TLS 1.3 records, we combine TCP and TLS into TCPLS to build modern transport services such as multiplexing, connection migration, stream steering, and bandwidth aggregation. These services do not modify the TCP wire format and are resistant to middleboxes. TCPLS offers a powerful API enabling applications to precisely express the required transport services, ranging from a single-path single-stream connection to a multi-stream connection over several network paths, enabling choices between aggregated bandwidth and head-of-line blocking avoidance. Compared to MPTCP, our TCPLS prototype offers more control to the application and can be easily deployed as an extension to user-space TLS libraries, while being implemented at a low cost. Measurements demonstrate that it offers higher performance than existing QUIC libraries with a super set of transport services.