Adam Green
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
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Adam Green has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Journal of Philosophy Inc.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 919-932
Omnisubjectivity, counteractuals, and relating perfectly to subjectivity
The idea that God must relate perfectly to our subjectivity is central to Linda Zagzebski’s work on omnisubjectivity. There is a hitherto undiagnosed tension, however, between different criteria one might use to judge what perfectly relating to our subjectivity consists in. God’s relationship to what Zagzebski calls ‘counteractuals’, individuals that do not exist but that could have, brings this tension into focus. On the one hand, if God does not know what the subjective experiences of counteractuals would be like, then God’s omnisubjectivity would appear to be unacceptably limited in scope. On the other hand, if God knows the subjectivity of actual creatures in the same way that God knows the subjectivity of counteractual creatures, then the motivation for omnisubjectivity ends up being undercut to a significant extent. This essay resolves this tension with a model that draws on interpersonal perception and divine introspection.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 62 (4) , 919-932
Open AccessOmnisubjectivity, counteractuals, and relating perfectly to subjectivity
The idea that God must relate perfectly to our subjectivity is central to Linda Zagzebski’s work on omnisubjectivity. There is a hitherto undiagnosed tension, however, between different criteria one might use to judge what perfectly relating to our subjectivity consists in. God’s relationship to what Zagzebski calls ‘counteractuals’, individuals that do not exist but that could have, brings this tension into focus. On the one hand, if God does not know what the subjective experiences of counteractuals would be like, then God’s omnisubjectivity would appear to be unacceptably limited in scope. On the other hand, if God knows the subjectivity of actual creatures in the same way that God knows the subjectivity of counteractual creatures, then the motivation for omnisubjectivity ends up being undercut to a significant extent. This essay resolves this tension with a model that draws on interpersonal perception and divine introspection.
- Open Access
- 30 January 2026
- Published by University of Gävle in AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 2 (4) , 57-70
Omnisubjectivity and Transformative Experience
This essay investigates the intersection of omnisubjectivity, the idea that God knows what all experiences are like, with the idea of transformative experience, that some experiences cannot be experientially forecasted before they are had. The result is an argument that transformative experiences are hard to make sense of on some views of omnisubjectivity that make simulation or imagination key. Instead, the viability of a perception-based account is argued for.
- 30 January 2026
- Published by University of Gävle in AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 2 (4) , 57-70
Open AccessOmnisubjectivity and Transformative Experience
This essay investigates the intersection of omnisubjectivity, the idea that God knows what all experiences are like, with the idea of transformative experience, that some experiences cannot be experientially forecasted before they are had. The result is an argument that transformative experiences are hard to make sense of on some views of omnisubjectivity that make simulation or imagination key. Instead, the viability of a perception-based account is argued for.
- Open Access
- 30 January 2026
- Published by University of Gävle in AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 2 (4) , 1-14
Consciousness and the Divine
This issue of Agatheos has its origins in an important passing of a torch within the philosophy of religion. Linda Zagzebski was the Kingfisher Chair in Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma for over twenty years until her retirement in 2021. She was succeeded in January of 2024 by Yujin Nagasawa, who left a research chair in Birmingham for the honor. Zagzebski and Nagasawa, in addition to being leading figures in the philosophy of religion, have robust interests in the philosophy of mind. In both cases, there are important connection points and overlaps in their work in these two areas of philosophy. In particular, both see important connections between the unique place of consciousness and subjectivity in our lives and debates in the philosophy of religion that are not always or even typically prosecuted in that light. In addition, Nagasawa has an abiding interest in panpsychism, both its promise and problems, while Zagzebski has a similar interest in the prospects and peculiarities of panentheism as an elaboration of theism. To celebrate the instalment of Prof. Nagasawa as the Kingfisher Chair, a conference was convened with leading figures who work in both the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind giving talks in addition to keynote addresses by Profs. Nagasawa and Zagzebski. This volume reproduces those keynote addresses, now complemented by four papers solicited by Agatheos that interact in one way or another with the themes explored there. An early example of this intersection between the philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind in Nagasawa's work comes in the form of his first monograph, God and Phenomenal Consciousness (2008). In that book, he traces unappreciated parallels between arguments concerned with the epistemic status of someone who has an experience of something for the first time and certain atheological arguments. In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment (1986), Mary is a color scientist who lives in a black and white world. Despite Mary having a great deal of propositional knowledge about, say, the physiology and physics that come with color processing, it seems like Mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time. It seems like no knowledge about the physical underpinnings of red experiences or the
- 30 January 2026
- Published by University of Gävle in AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Vol. 2 (4) , 1-14
Open AccessConsciousness and the Divine
This issue of Agatheos has its origins in an important passing of a torch within the philosophy of religion. Linda Zagzebski was the Kingfisher Chair in Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma for over twenty years until her retirement in 2021. She was succeeded in January of 2024 by Yujin Nagasawa, who left a research chair in Birmingham for the honor. Zagzebski and Nagasawa, in addition to being leading figures in the philosophy of religion, have robust interests in the philosophy of mind. In both cases, there are important connection points and overlaps in their work in these two areas of philosophy. In particular, both see important connections between the unique place of consciousness and subjectivity in our lives and debates in the philosophy of religion that are not always or even typically prosecuted in that light. In addition, Nagasawa has an abiding interest in panpsychism, both its promise and problems, while Zagzebski has a similar interest in the prospects and peculiarities of panentheism as an elaboration of theism. To celebrate the instalment of Prof. Nagasawa as the Kingfisher Chair, a conference was convened with leading figures who work in both the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind giving talks in addition to keynote addresses by Profs. Nagasawa and Zagzebski. This volume reproduces those keynote addresses, now complemented by four papers solicited by Agatheos that interact in one way or another with the themes explored there. An early example of this intersection between the philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind in Nagasawa's work comes in the form of his first monograph, God and Phenomenal Consciousness (2008). In that book, he traces unappreciated parallels between arguments concerned with the epistemic status of someone who has an experience of something for the first time and certain atheological arguments. In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment (1986), Mary is a color scientist who lives in a black and white world. Despite Mary having a great deal of propositional knowledge about, say, the physiology and physics that come with color processing, it seems like Mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time. It seems like no knowledge about the physical underpinnings of red experiences or the
- Open Access
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 23 (1) , 63-78
Gratitude and the web of knowledge
Epistemic trust in others frequently cannot be disentangled from interpersonal trust more generally, but the epistemic implications of how we affectively express our trust in others are under-investigated. This essay claims that gratitude, despite its empirically undeniable importance to human flourishing generally, is also important epistemically and in several intersecting ways. To be grateful to a person is to represent the world differently in key respects. Gratitude, even if it is for past non-epistemic benefits, should play an important role in shaping who we epistemically rely on. Gratitude for specifically epistemic benefits is an important way in which we show our attunement to epistemic value and contribute to the incentive structures that make much of our public knowledge and informational ecosystems possible. Likewise, ingratitude is a crippling epistemic vice that renders our dependence on quality sources of information fragile and vulnerable to capture by misinformation.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 23 (1) , 63-78
Open AccessGratitude and the web of knowledge
Epistemic trust in others frequently cannot be disentangled from interpersonal trust more generally, but the epistemic implications of how we affectively express our trust in others are under-investigated. This essay claims that gratitude, despite its empirically undeniable importance to human flourishing generally, is also important epistemically and in several intersecting ways. To be grateful to a person is to represent the world differently in key respects. Gratitude, even if it is for past non-epistemic benefits, should play an important role in shaping who we epistemically rely on. Gratitude for specifically epistemic benefits is an important way in which we show our attunement to epistemic value and contribute to the incentive structures that make much of our public knowledge and informational ecosystems possible. Likewise, ingratitude is a crippling epistemic vice that renders our dependence on quality sources of information fragile and vulnerable to capture by misinformation.
- Open Access
- 6 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 61 (3) , 615-633
Counting hiddenness: cognitive science and the distribution of belief in God
Establishing the distribution of belief in something, especially something that spans cultures and times, requires close attention to empirical evidence and to certain inadequacies in our concept of belief. Arguments from divine hiddenness have quickly become one of the most important argument types in the philosophy of religion. These arguments and responses to them typically rely on robust but relatively undefended empirical commitments as to the distribution of belief in God. This article synthesizes results from psychology, anthropology, and the cognitive science of religion to show that the distribution of belief in God is much more messy and much more philosophically interesting than is currently appreciated. I then derive some implications for how one might reconceive the hiddenness debate in light of these findings.
- 6 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Religious Studies
- Vol. 61 (3) , 615-633
Open AccessCounting hiddenness: cognitive science and the distribution of belief in God
Establishing the distribution of belief in something, especially something that spans cultures and times, requires close attention to empirical evidence and to certain inadequacies in our concept of belief. Arguments from divine hiddenness have quickly become one of the most important argument types in the philosophy of religion. These arguments and responses to them typically rely on robust but relatively undefended empirical commitments as to the distribution of belief in God. This article synthesizes results from psychology, anthropology, and the cognitive science of religion to show that the distribution of belief in God is much more messy and much more philosophically interesting than is currently appreciated. I then derive some implications for how one might reconceive the hiddenness debate in light of these findings.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2021
- Published by Journal of Analytic Theology in Journal of Analytic Theology
- Vol. 9, 725-730
Review of Contemporary With Christ: Kierkegaard and Second-Personal Spirituality
- 22 September 2021
- Published by Journal of Analytic Theology in Journal of Analytic Theology
- Vol. 9, 725-730
Open AccessReview of Contemporary With Christ: Kierkegaard and Second-Personal Spirituality
- Open Access
- 26 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 21 (1) , 246-262
Forgiveness and the Repairing of Epistemic Trust
The epistemic relevance of forgiveness has been neglected by both the discussion of forgiveness in moral psychology and by social epistemology generally. Moral psychology fails to account for the forgiveness of epistemic wrongs and for the way that wrongs in general have epistemic implications. Social epistemology, for its part, neglects the way that epistemic trust is not only conferred but repaired. In this essay, I show that the repair of epistemic trust through forgiveness is necessary to the economy of knowledge for fallible persons like us. Despite the fact that forgiveness is never included on lists of important intellectual virtues or epistemic activities, it is vital to our lives as social knowers. Likewise, an account of forgiveness that neglects its epistemic dimension is importantly incomplete.
- 26 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 21 (1) , 246-262
Open AccessForgiveness and the Repairing of Epistemic Trust
The epistemic relevance of forgiveness has been neglected by both the discussion of forgiveness in moral psychology and by social epistemology generally. Moral psychology fails to account for the forgiveness of epistemic wrongs and for the way that wrongs in general have epistemic implications. Social epistemology, for its part, neglects the way that epistemic trust is not only conferred but repaired. In this essay, I show that the repair of epistemic trust through forgiveness is necessary to the economy of knowledge for fallible persons like us. Despite the fact that forgiveness is never included on lists of important intellectual virtues or epistemic activities, it is vital to our lives as social knowers. Likewise, an account of forgiveness that neglects its epistemic dimension is importantly incomplete.
- 17 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 18 (1) , 1-15
THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY AND HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE
Appeals to “being on the right side of history” or accusations of being on the wrong side of history are increasingly common on social media, in the media proper, and in the rhetoric of politics. One might well wonder, though, what the value is of invoking history in this manner. Is declaring who is on what side of history merely dramatic shorthand for one's being right and one's opponents wrong? Or is there something more to it than that? In this paper, I argue that an appeal to being on the right side of history is best construed as an invocation of higher-order evidence. I do not deny that there are purely rhetorical, non-evidential uses of the right and wrong side of history, but the phrase can be construed in a more substantive manner. I use work on virtual epistemic elections to model these appeals to history. Zeroing in on the kind of higher-order evidence invoked helps us clarify the criterion for better or worse, more or less convincing appeals to it.
- 17 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 18 (1) , 1-15
THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY AND HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE
Appeals to “being on the right side of history” or accusations of being on the wrong side of history are increasingly common on social media, in the media proper, and in the rhetoric of politics. One might well wonder, though, what the value is of invoking history in this manner. Is declaring who is on what side of history merely dramatic shorthand for one's being right and one's opponents wrong? Or is there something more to it than that? In this paper, I argue that an appeal to being on the right side of history is best construed as an invocation of higher-order evidence. I do not deny that there are purely rhetorical, non-evidential uses of the right and wrong side of history, but the phrase can be construed in a more substantive manner. I use work on virtual epistemic elections to model these appeals to history. Zeroing in on the kind of higher-order evidence invoked helps us clarify the criterion for better or worse, more or less convincing appeals to it.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 114 (7) , 381-391
An Epistemic Norm for Implicature
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 114 (7) , 381-391
An Epistemic Norm for Implicature