Tansev Geylani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tansev Geylani has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Esther Gal-Or
Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
2 shared publications - Alex Jiyoung Kim
Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University
1 shared publication - Anthony Dukes
Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
1 shared publication - Subramanian Balachander
School of Business Administration, University of California Riverside, Riverside, California, 92521, USA
1 shared publication - Yue Wu
Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
1 shared publication - Yunchuan Liu
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (11) , 8045-8061
Regulating Native Advertising
Native advertising is not fully transparent to consumers because it bears similarity to editorial content. Increasing the opaqueness of native ads can raise publishers’ click-through rate, but can ...
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (11) , 8045-8061
Regulating Native Advertising
Native advertising is not fully transparent to consumers because it bears similarity to editorial content. Increasing the opaqueness of native ads can raise publishers’ click-through rate, but can ...
- 1 May 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing
- Vol. 81 (3) , 80-95
Provision of Optional versus Standard Product Features in Competition
Competing brands differ in the extent to which they offer a given feature as standard or optional in their product lines. In this article, the authors study the competitive basis for this difference in brands’ product line strategies. Specifically, they analyze the relationship between a brand's quality image and its propensity to offer a wider product line, from a relatively stripped-down base model to a more feature-rich model. They develop a conceptual framework and hypotheses by considering an analytical model with two vertically differentiated firms: They show that a low-quality firm would offer a feature as optional—that is, it would offer both a feature-added product and a stripped-down base product—if it chose to add the feature to its product. In contrast, a high-quality firm would offer the feature as a standard component unless the cost of the feature was high. This asymmetry in the propensity of high- and low-quality firms to offer optional and standard features with their products is tested using data from the U.S. passenger car market; the authors find empirical support for their model.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing
- Vol. 81 (3) , 80-95
Provision of Optional versus Standard Product Features in Competition
Competing brands differ in the extent to which they offer a given feature as standard or optional in their product lines. In this article, the authors study the competitive basis for this difference in brands’ product line strategies. Specifically, they analyze the relationship between a brand's quality image and its propensity to offer a wider product line, from a relatively stripped-down base model to a more feature-rich model. They develop a conceptual framework and hypotheses by considering an analytical model with two vertically differentiated firms: They show that a low-quality firm would offer a feature as optional—that is, it would offer both a feature-added product and a stripped-down base product—if it chose to add the feature to its product. In contrast, a high-quality firm would offer the feature as a standard component unless the cost of the feature was high. This asymmetry in the propensity of high- and low-quality firms to offer optional and standard features with their products is tested using data from the U.S. passenger car market; the authors find empirical support for their model.
- 21 June 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 25 (1) , 93-107
Dominant retailers’ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels
- 21 June 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 25 (1) , 93-107
Dominant retailers’ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels