Domenico Menicucci
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Domenico Menicucci has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nicola Doni
University of Florence
5 shared publications - Doh-Shin Jeon
Toulouse School of Economics University of Toulouse Capitole Toulouse France
2 shared publications - Massimiliano Landi
School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, 178903 Singapore
2 shared publications - Andrea Greppi
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Bologna, Italy
1 shared publication Andrey Sarychev
1 shared publication- Doh‐Shin Jeon
Toulouse School of Economics University of Toulouse Capitole
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Design and Entry in Auctions
This paper is about a two-bidder auction setting with endogenous and costly entry in which, before the bidders' entry decisions, the seller may release information about the object on sale. This information affects each bidder's belief about the own distribution of value for the object on sale, hence it affects the bidder's incentive to enter. The seller uses a second price auction and we consider the class of unrestricted information structures using the techniques of information design in which the seller sends private messages to the bidders. We characterize the optimal information structure, which optimally trades off providing rents to the bidders in favorable (to the bidders) states of the world against inducing entry of all bidders in other states of the world (in order to generate a positive auction revenue). We compare the optimal information structure with some specific information structures examined in the literature and then show that a restriction to public messages hurts the seller significantly. We also show that using a first price auction allows the seller to earn the same revenue as when a second price auction is used. We then allow the seller to use an entry fee and jointly optimize, under some restrictions, with respect to the entry fee and the information structure. In this case the seller does not need to induce entry of all bidders to earn a positive revenue, and indeed induces entry of a single bidder, who is required to pay a high entry fee, if the entry cost is not small. But if the seller can also use a reserve price, then it is optimal to (almost) fully subsidize the entry cost and use the reserve price to extract all the bidders' rents while inducing the socially optimal entry.
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Design and Entry in Auctions
This paper is about a two-bidder auction setting with endogenous and costly entry in which, before the bidders' entry decisions, the seller may release information about the object on sale. This information affects each bidder's belief about the own distribution of value for the object on sale, hence it affects the bidder's incentive to enter. The seller uses a second price auction and we consider the class of unrestricted information structures using the techniques of information design in which the seller sends private messages to the bidders. We characterize the optimal information structure, which optimally trades off providing rents to the bidders in favorable (to the bidders) states of the world against inducing entry of all bidders in other states of the world (in order to generate a positive auction revenue). We compare the optimal information structure with some specific information structures examined in the literature and then show that a restriction to public messages hurts the seller significantly. We also show that using a first price auction allows the seller to earn the same revenue as when a second price auction is used. We then allow the seller to use an entry fee and jointly optimize, under some restrictions, with respect to the entry fee and the information structure. In this case the seller does not need to induce entry of all bidders to earn a positive revenue, and indeed induces entry of a single bidder, who is required to pay a high entry fee, if the entry cost is not small. But if the seller can also use a reserve price, then it is optimal to (almost) fully subsidize the entry cost and use the reserve price to extract all the bidders' rents while inducing the socially optimal entry.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 99-118
Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations
We examine a two-bidder auction setting in which the distributions for the bidders’ valuations are asymmetric over a support consisting of three elements. For the first price auction, for each parameter values we derive the unique Bayes Nash Equilibrium in closed form. We rely on this result to compare the revenue in the first price auction with the revenue in the second price auction. The latter is often revenue superior to the former, and we determine precisely, given a distribution for the value of a bidder, when a distribution for the value of the other bidder exists such that the first price auction is superior to the second price auction.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 99-118
Open AccessAsymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations
We examine a two-bidder auction setting in which the distributions for the bidders’ valuations are asymmetric over a support consisting of three elements. For the first price auction, for each parameter values we derive the unique Bayes Nash Equilibrium in closed form. We rely on this result to compare the revenue in the first price auction with the revenue in the second price auction. The latter is often revenue superior to the former, and we determine precisely, given a distribution for the value of a bidder, when a distribution for the value of the other bidder exists such that the first price auction is superior to the second price auction.
- Open Access
- 29 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 221, 327-349
Allocating vehicle registration permits
- 29 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 221, 327-349
Open AccessAllocating vehicle registration permits
- 12 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 57 (1-2) , 145-162
Data portability and competition: Can data portability increase both consumer surplus and profits?
- 12 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 57 (1-2) , 145-162
Data portability and competition: Can data portability increase both consumer surplus and profits?
- Open Access
- 28 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 106
Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- 28 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 106
Open AccessCompeting auctions with non-identical objects
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 198
In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 198
In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders
- Open Access
- 27 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 58 (4) , 561-581
On Bundling and Entry Deterrence
A multiproduct incumbent firm faces the threat of entry from another multiproduct (generalist) firm or from single-product (specialist) firms. Assuming that the incumbent offers higher quality products than its rivals, we inquire whether the possibility of bundling by the incumbent is more effective in deterring entry in one setting or the other, and explore how the quality difference affects the comparison. For instance, for relatively high-quality differences the generalist is more vulnerable to bundling than are the specialists; but bundling is a credible action for the incumbent more often against specialists than against the generalist.
- 27 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 58 (4) , 561-581
Open AccessOn Bundling and Entry Deterrence
A multiproduct incumbent firm faces the threat of entry from another multiproduct (generalist) firm or from single-product (specialist) firms. Assuming that the incumbent offers higher quality products than its rivals, we inquire whether the possibility of bundling by the incumbent is more effective in deterring entry in one setting or the other, and explore how the quality difference affects the comparison. For instance, for relatively high-quality differences the generalist is more vulnerable to bundling than are the specialists; but bundling is a credible action for the incumbent more often against specialists than against the generalist.
- 19 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 120, 58-66
On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)
- 19 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 120, 58-66
On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)
- Open Access
- 1 August 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-33
Dominance and Competitive Bundling
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41)
- 1 August 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-33
Open AccessDominance and Competitive Bundling
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41)
- 24 November 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (2)
A First Price Auction with an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Bidders
We examine an auction setting with private values and n≥2 $n\geq 2$ bidders, which differ in the probability to have a low (high) value. We prove that for the first price auction, the equilibrium strategies can be written in closed form and there are gaps in the equilibrium bid distribution of each bidder except the strongest two. Our equilibrium characterization allows to prove that in this setting the seller prefers the second price auction to the first price auction for each n≥2 $n\geq 2$.- 24 November 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (2)
A First Price Auction with an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Bidders
We examine an auction setting with private values and n≥2 $n\geq 2$ bidders, which differ in the probability to have a low (high) value. We prove that for the first price auction, the equilibrium strategies can be written in closed form and there are gaps in the equilibrium bid distribution of each bidder except the strongest two. Our equilibrium characterization allows to prove that in this setting the seller prefers the second price auction to the first price auction for each n≥2 $n\geq 2$.