Doh-Shin Jeon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Doh-Shin Jeon has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Domenico Menicucci
Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Florence, Italy
2 shared publications Jacques Crémer
2 shared publicationsPatrick Rey
2 shared publications- Yassine Lefouili
Toulouse School of Economics University of Toulouse Capitole
2 shared publications Andrew Daughety
1 shared publicationBernard Caillaud
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Decentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements
We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.
Open AccessDecentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements
We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.
- Open Access
Network Centrality and Device Ecosystems
Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.
Open AccessNetwork Centrality and Device Ecosystems
Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (121) , 257-260
Doh-Shin Jeon discussion of: AI stack competition
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (121) , 257-260
Doh-Shin Jeon discussion of: AI stack competition
- Open Access
Tying with network effects
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.
Open AccessTying with network effects
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.
- 12 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 57 (1-2) , 145-162
Data portability and competition: Can data portability increase both consumer surplus and profits?
- 12 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 57 (1-2) , 145-162
Data portability and competition: Can data portability increase both consumer surplus and profits?
- Open Access
- 1 August 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-33
Dominance and Competitive Bundling
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41)
- 1 August 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-33
Open AccessDominance and Competitive Bundling
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41)