DJDoh-Shin Jeon

Doh-Shin Jeon

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Doh-Shin Jeon has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 30 September 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Decentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements

    by Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili, Reiko Aoki, Claude D'Aspremont, Paul Belle, David Besanko, Jan Boone, Bernard Caillaud, Zhijun Chen, Jacques Crémer, et al.

    We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.

    • 24 February 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Network Centrality and Device Ecosystems

    by Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili, Yaxin Li, Timothy Simcoe

    Motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we develop a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, where one or more platforms provide inputs to a set of devices linked through demand-side externalities. Prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich centrality in a network dened by the externalities, and we show how the relevant network diers for an ecosystem monop- olist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. We use the model to revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies in a platform setting, and to analyze a partial (one-sided) merger of complementary platforms.

    • 3 April 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Tying with network effects

    by Jay Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon, Michael Whinston, Michael Dennis, Whinston Tying, Jacques Crémer, Vincenzo Denicolò, Chiara Fumagalli, Igal Hendel, Louis Kaplow, et al.

    We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.

  • Open Access

    Dominance and Competitive Bundling

    by Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci

    We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L41)