Franck Malherbet
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Franck Malherbet has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pierre Cahuc
Sciences Po Paris, IZA, CEPR
3 shared publications - Olivier Charlot
CY Cergy Paris Université, CNRS, THEMA, Cergy, France
2 shared publications - Emeline Limon
Dares
1 shared publication - Hélène Benghalem
University of Lausanne
1 shared publication - Julien Prat
CREST, Ecole Polytechnique, IP Paris
1 shared publication Julien Trapp
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Employment Effects of Restricting Fixed-Term Contracts: Theory and Evidence
This paper examines a labor law reform implemented in Portugal in 2009 which restricted the use of fixed-term contracts to reduce labor market segmentation. The reform targeted establishments created by large firms above a specific size threshold, covering about 15% of total employment. Drawing on linked employer-employee longitudinal data and regression discontinuity methods, we find that, while the reform was successful in reducing the number of fixed-term jobs, it did not increase the number of permanent contracts and decreased employment in large firms. However, we find evidence of positive spillovers to small firms that may bias reduced form estimates. To evaluate general equilibrium effects, we build and estimate a directed search and matching model with endogenous number of establishments and jobs. We find spillover effects that induce small biases on reduced form estimates but that significantly change the evaluation of the overall impact of the reform because they diffuse to the whole economy. We estimate that the reform slightly reduced aggregate employment and had negative effects on the welfare of employees and unemployed workers.
Open AccessEmployment Effects of Restricting Fixed-Term Contracts: Theory and Evidence
This paper examines a labor law reform implemented in Portugal in 2009 which restricted the use of fixed-term contracts to reduce labor market segmentation. The reform targeted establishments created by large firms above a specific size threshold, covering about 15% of total employment. Drawing on linked employer-employee longitudinal data and regression discontinuity methods, we find that, while the reform was successful in reducing the number of fixed-term jobs, it did not increase the number of permanent contracts and decreased employment in large firms. However, we find evidence of positive spillovers to small firms that may bias reduced form estimates. To evaluate general equilibrium effects, we build and estimate a directed search and matching model with endogenous number of establishments and jobs. We find spillover effects that induce small biases on reduced form estimates but that significantly change the evaluation of the overall impact of the reform because they diffuse to the whole economy. We estimate that the reform slightly reduced aggregate employment and had negative effects on the welfare of employees and unemployed workers.
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 130 (626) , 422-445
Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?
This article analyses the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs of short duration recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers.
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 130 (626) , 422-445
Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?
This article analyses the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs of short duration recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers.
- 20 August 2019
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue française d'économie
- Vol. XXXIV (1) , 15-43
L’effet des coûts de licenciement sur la durée des emplois des travailleurs peu qualifiés en France
Jusqu’en septembre 2017, les employeurs devaient verser au moins six mois de salaire aux employés dont l’ancienneté était supérieure à deux ans en cas de licenciement sans cause réelle et sérieuse dans les entreprises de plus de 11 salariés. À partir des données du ministère de la justice, nous observons que cette réglementation entraîne une hausse des indemnités de licenciement à deux ans d’ancienneté, ce qui engendre une augmentation significative du taux de destruction d’emplois avant le seuil des deux ans et une baisse juste après. Les coûts de licenciement et leur composante procédurale sont évalués grâce à l’estimation d’un modèle de recherche et d’appariement reproduisant l’évolution du taux de destruction d’emplois. Nous constatons que le coût total des licenciements augmente avec l’ancienneté et qu’il est environ quatre fois plus élevé que les indemnités légales et conventionnelles à deux ans d’ancienneté. Des exercices contre-factuels montrent que la fragilité des emplois de faible ancienneté implique que les coûts de licenciement réduisent la durée moyenne de l’emploi pour un large éventail de paramètres empiriquement pertinents.
- 20 August 2019
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue française d'économie
- Vol. XXXIV (1) , 15-43
L’effet des coûts de licenciement sur la durée des emplois des travailleurs peu qualifiés en France
Jusqu’en septembre 2017, les employeurs devaient verser au moins six mois de salaire aux employés dont l’ancienneté était supérieure à deux ans en cas de licenciement sans cause réelle et sérieuse dans les entreprises de plus de 11 salariés. À partir des données du ministère de la justice, nous observons que cette réglementation entraîne une hausse des indemnités de licenciement à deux ans d’ancienneté, ce qui engendre une augmentation significative du taux de destruction d’emplois avant le seuil des deux ans et une baisse juste après. Les coûts de licenciement et leur composante procédurale sont évalués grâce à l’estimation d’un modèle de recherche et d’appariement reproduisant l’évolution du taux de destruction d’emplois. Nous constatons que le coût total des licenciements augmente avec l’ancienneté et qu’il est environ quatre fois plus élevé que les indemnités légales et conventionnelles à deux ans d’ancienneté. Des exercices contre-factuels montrent que la fragilité des emplois de faible ancienneté implique que les coûts de licenciement réduisent la durée moyenne de l’emploi pour un large éventail de paramètres empiriquement pertinents.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 385-416
Unemployment Compensation and the Allocation of Labor in Developing Countries
This paper studies the effects of the introduction of unemployment compensation (UC) in countries characterized by pervasive informality. We provide a simple framework to analyze the impact of UC on the allocation of workers between formal and informal activities, as well as the allocation of workers between sectors featuring different incentives to go informal. We show that a reasonable amount of UC may reduce informality, while larger amounts of UC induce large disincentives to go formal because of the level of taxation involved. We also argue that the financing of UC should be part and parcel of a well‐conceived UC system. We show that UC finance based on payroll taxes is likely to entail an excess level of informality resulting from cross‐subsidies between heterogenous sectors. The introduction of a simple layoff tax meant to finance the UC system is then shown to reduce informality, hence highlighting how a well‐designed financing scheme may be used as a supplementary instrument to curb informality.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 385-416
Unemployment Compensation and the Allocation of Labor in Developing Countries
This paper studies the effects of the introduction of unemployment compensation (UC) in countries characterized by pervasive informality. We provide a simple framework to analyze the impact of UC on the allocation of workers between formal and informal activities, as well as the allocation of workers between sectors featuring different incentives to go informal. We show that a reasonable amount of UC may reduce informality, while larger amounts of UC induce large disincentives to go formal because of the level of taxation involved. We also argue that the financing of UC should be part and parcel of a well‐conceived UC system. We show that UC finance based on payroll taxes is likely to entail an excess level of informality resulting from cross‐subsidies between heterogenous sectors. The introduction of a simple layoff tax meant to finance the UC system is then shown to reduce informality, hence highlighting how a well‐designed financing scheme may be used as a supplementary instrument to curb informality.
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 21, 42-58
Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 21, 42-58
Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?