Olivier Charlot
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Olivier Charlot has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Franck Malherbet
5 shared publicationsBruno Decreuse
4 shared publications- Claire Naiditch
Univ. Lille, CNRS, IESEG School of Management, UMR 9221 ‐ LEM ‐ Lille Économie Management, and ICM Lille France
2 shared publications - Franck Malherbet
CREST-ENSAE, IZA
2 shared publications - Mustafa Ulus
Galatasaray University
2 shared publications - Radu Vranceanu
ESSEC Business School and THEMA Cergy France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Fragmented Stability: Recalls and Fixed-TermContracts in aDual LabourMarket
This paper documents a neglected dimension of labour market dualism: the repeated hiring of the same worker by the same employer through short fixed-term contracts. Using exhaustive French hiring declarations from 2012 to 2019, we show that recalls account for a large share of employment entries and that, unlike the classic temporary-layoff patterns emphasised in the United States, they occur overwhelmingly through fixed-term contracts of very short duration. Many workers are repeatedly rehired by the same employer, often several times within a year, while successive recalled contracts frequently have similar durations and are separated by short interruptions. These patterns reveal employment relationships that persist at the employer–worker dyad level while remaining fragmented at the contractual level, a configuration we term fragmented stability. We introduce an empirical measure of this phenomenon based on the timing of recalls and the similarity of successive contracts, and show that it represents a quantitatively important component of fixed-term hiring flows. We also find that many recall sequences appear difficult to reconcile with a strict reading of the intended constraints governing the repeated use of fixed-term contracts. Overall, our results suggest that labour market dual is moperates not only through the coexistence of permanent and temporary jobs, but also through the repeated interruption and reactivation of persistent employer–worker relationships.
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFragmented Stability: Recalls and Fixed-TermContracts in aDual LabourMarket
This paper documents a neglected dimension of labour market dualism: the repeated hiring of the same worker by the same employer through short fixed-term contracts. Using exhaustive French hiring declarations from 2012 to 2019, we show that recalls account for a large share of employment entries and that, unlike the classic temporary-layoff patterns emphasised in the United States, they occur overwhelmingly through fixed-term contracts of very short duration. Many workers are repeatedly rehired by the same employer, often several times within a year, while successive recalled contracts frequently have similar durations and are separated by short interruptions. These patterns reveal employment relationships that persist at the employer–worker dyad level while remaining fragmented at the contractual level, a configuration we term fragmented stability. We introduce an empirical measure of this phenomenon based on the timing of recalls and the similarity of successive contracts, and show that it represents a quantitatively important component of fixed-term hiring flows. We also find that many recall sequences appear difficult to reconcile with a strict reading of the intended constraints governing the repeated use of fixed-term contracts. Overall, our results suggest that labour market dual is moperates not only through the coexistence of permanent and temporary jobs, but also through the repeated interruption and reactivation of persistent employer–worker relationships.
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-29
Smuggling of forced migrants to Europe: a matching model
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-29
Smuggling of forced migrants to Europe: a matching model
- Open Access
SMUGGLING OF FORCED MIGRANTS TO EUROPE: A MATCHING MODEL
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) to analyze the smugglingmarket for forced migrants, building on the empirical evidence related to the smugglingof migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to the European region in thelast decade. Comparative statics for the equilibrium solution reveals that coercion-basedmeasures targeting the smugglers achieve a reduction in the number of irregular migrantsand smugglers at the expense of migrants’ overall welfare. Slightly increasing legal migrationopportunities has the interesting feature of reducing irregular flows, without deterioratingmigrants’ welfare nor increasing the total number of migrants. An extremely restrictiveasylum policy has similar effects in terms of the flows of irregular migrants as a quite looseone, with the largest flows of irregular migrants reached for a "middle-range" policy.
Open AccessSMUGGLING OF FORCED MIGRANTS TO EUROPE: A MATCHING MODEL
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) to analyze the smugglingmarket for forced migrants, building on the empirical evidence related to the smugglingof migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to the European region in thelast decade. Comparative statics for the equilibrium solution reveals that coercion-basedmeasures targeting the smugglers achieve a reduction in the number of irregular migrantsand smugglers at the expense of migrants’ overall welfare. Slightly increasing legal migrationopportunities has the interesting feature of reducing irregular flows, without deterioratingmigrants’ welfare nor increasing the total number of migrants. An extremely restrictiveasylum policy has similar effects in terms of the flows of irregular migrants as a quite looseone, with the largest flows of irregular migrants reached for a "middle-range" policy.
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 130 (626) , 422-445
Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?
This article analyses the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs of short duration recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers.
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 130 (626) , 422-445
Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?
This article analyses the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs of short duration recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers.
- 28 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 57 (2) , 533-572
EXPLAINING THE SPREAD OF TEMPORARY JOBS AND ITS IMPACT ON LABOR TURNOVER
This article provides a simple model that explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs, which significantly reduces aggregate production.
- 28 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 57 (2) , 533-572
EXPLAINING THE SPREAD OF TEMPORARY JOBS AND ITS IMPACT ON LABOR TURNOVER
This article provides a simple model that explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs, which significantly reduces aggregate production.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 385-416
Unemployment Compensation and the Allocation of Labor in Developing Countries
This paper studies the effects of the introduction of unemployment compensation (UC) in countries characterized by pervasive informality. We provide a simple framework to analyze the impact of UC on the allocation of workers between formal and informal activities, as well as the allocation of workers between sectors featuring different incentives to go informal. We show that a reasonable amount of UC may reduce informality, while larger amounts of UC induce large disincentives to go formal because of the level of taxation involved. We also argue that the financing of UC should be part and parcel of a well‐conceived UC system. We show that UC finance based on payroll taxes is likely to entail an excess level of informality resulting from cross‐subsidies between heterogenous sectors. The introduction of a simple layoff tax meant to finance the UC system is then shown to reduce informality, hence highlighting how a well‐designed financing scheme may be used as a supplementary instrument to curb informality.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 18 (3) , 385-416
Unemployment Compensation and the Allocation of Labor in Developing Countries
This paper studies the effects of the introduction of unemployment compensation (UC) in countries characterized by pervasive informality. We provide a simple framework to analyze the impact of UC on the allocation of workers between formal and informal activities, as well as the allocation of workers between sectors featuring different incentives to go informal. We show that a reasonable amount of UC may reduce informality, while larger amounts of UC induce large disincentives to go formal because of the level of taxation involved. We also argue that the financing of UC should be part and parcel of a well‐conceived UC system. We show that UC finance based on payroll taxes is likely to entail an excess level of informality resulting from cross‐subsidies between heterogenous sectors. The introduction of a simple layoff tax meant to finance the UC system is then shown to reduce informality, hence highlighting how a well‐designed financing scheme may be used as a supplementary instrument to curb informality.
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 51, 1-27
Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 51, 1-27
Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 20, 3-23
Education and employment protection
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 20, 3-23
Education and employment protection
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 118 (1) , 192-194
Efficiency in a search and matching economy with a competitive informal sector
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 118 (1) , 192-194
Efficiency in a search and matching economy with a competitive informal sector
- 1 February 2011
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue d'économie politique
- Vol. 120 (6) , 895-928
La couverture du risque chômage au regard de la situation familiale
Ce travail propose une synthèse des travaux consacrés au risque chômage et à la situation familiale. Nous examinons d’abord les liens croisés entre la situation familiale et le risque chômage. Le couple comme le nombre d’enfants affectent la durée du chômage. En retour, le chômage affecte la formation et la dissolution des couples, comme la décision d’avoir des enfants et l’agenda des naissances. Nous nous intéressons ensuite au rôle du conjoint comme assureur contre les fluctuations du revenu familial. Nous insistons sur le caractère limité de cette assurance en raison du risque de défaut de l’assureur, d’autant plus élevé qu’un épisode de chômage modifie les pouvoirs de négociation au sein des couples. Finalement, nous examinons la couverture publique du risque chômage à l’aune de la famille au travers de l’indemnisation du chômage et de la législation qui protège les emplois. De nombreux pays européens proposent une protection accrue contre le licenciement de ceux qui ont une famille à charge. En revanche, l’assurance chômage ne dépend que très peu de la situation familiale lorsqu’on tient compte de la fiscalité. Assurance-chomage - protection de l’emploi - économie de la famille
- 1 February 2011
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue d'économie politique
- Vol. 120 (6) , 895-928
La couverture du risque chômage au regard de la situation familiale
Ce travail propose une synthèse des travaux consacrés au risque chômage et à la situation familiale. Nous examinons d’abord les liens croisés entre la situation familiale et le risque chômage. Le couple comme le nombre d’enfants affectent la durée du chômage. En retour, le chômage affecte la formation et la dissolution des couples, comme la décision d’avoir des enfants et l’agenda des naissances. Nous nous intéressons ensuite au rôle du conjoint comme assureur contre les fluctuations du revenu familial. Nous insistons sur le caractère limité de cette assurance en raison du risque de défaut de l’assureur, d’autant plus élevé qu’un épisode de chômage modifie les pouvoirs de négociation au sein des couples. Finalement, nous examinons la couverture publique du risque chômage à l’aune de la famille au travers de l’indemnisation du chômage et de la législation qui protège les emplois. De nombreux pays européens proposent une protection accrue contre le licenciement de ceux qui ont une famille à charge. En revanche, l’assurance chômage ne dépend que très peu de la situation familiale lorsqu’on tient compte de la fiscalité. Assurance-chomage - protection de l’emploi - économie de la famille