Gabriele Gratton
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gabriele Gratton has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Barton E. Lee
Univ Oxford, Magdalen Coll, Oxford, England
3 shared publications - Massimo Morelli
Bocconi University
2 shared publications Anton Kolotilin
University of New South Wales (UNSW)
1 shared publication- Anton Kolotilin
School of Economics School of Economics School of Economics UNSW Business School UNSW Business School University of Edinburgh
1 shared publication Caixia Shen
1 shared publicationChris Teh
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Targeted Persuasion
Sender maximizes how many receivers buy a widget of uncertain quality. She targets receivers to privately communicate information about the widget's quality. After the target chooses whether to buy the widget, other receivers observe the target's choice with probability increasing in the target's popularity. We prove two results that hold remarkably generally: Sender optimally communicates with targets as if no other receiver exists; a target's popularity is a double-edged sword for Sender. We fully characterize the optimal choice of a single target under multiple communication protocols and establish that Sender can benefit from protocols that constrain her communication.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTargeted Persuasion
Sender maximizes how many receivers buy a widget of uncertain quality. She targets receivers to privately communicate information about the widget's quality. After the target chooses whether to buy the widget, other receivers observe the target's choice with probability increasing in the target's popularity. We prove two results that hold remarkably generally: Sender optimally communicates with targets as if no other receiver exists; a target's popularity is a double-edged sword for Sender. We fully characterize the optimal choice of a single target under multiple communication protocols and establish that Sender can benefit from protocols that constrain her communication.
- Open Access
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 259
Drain the swamp: A theory of anti-elite populism
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 259
Open AccessDrain the swamp: A theory of anti-elite populism
- 5 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 102 (338) , 476-480
Shared Prosperity in a Fractured World: A New Economics for the Middle Class, the Global Poor, and Our Climate, by DaniRodrik (Princeton University Press, Princeton, US, 2025), pp. 280*
- 5 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 102 (338) , 476-480
Shared Prosperity in a Fractured World: A New Economics for the Middle Class, the Global Poor, and Our Climate, by DaniRodrik (Princeton University Press, Princeton, US, 2025), pp. 280*
- Open Access
- 16 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 64 (2) , 871
ERRATUM: OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
- 16 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 64 (2) , 871
Open AccessERRATUM: OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism
We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDrain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism
We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.
- Open Access
- 20 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 63 (2) , 549-569
OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
Political checks and balances are debated desiderata in the evaluation of democratic systems. We suggest a framework where the pros and cons of checks and balances are, respectively, the reduction of type‐I errors and the increase of type‐II errors in policy decision making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when accountability is high. In policy areas where the effects of reforms are harder to evaluate and accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing less desirable regimes.
- 20 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 63 (2) , 549-569
Open AccessOPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
Political checks and balances are debated desiderata in the evaluation of democratic systems. We suggest a framework where the pros and cons of checks and balances are, respectively, the reduction of type‐I errors and the increase of type‐II errors in policy decision making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when accountability is high. In policy areas where the effects of reforms are harder to evaluate and accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing less desirable regimes.
- Open Access
- 23 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty
Political checks and balances are certainly among the most debated desiderata in the construction of democratic systems and their evaluation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework that could be useful to inform this debate. We propose a model where the pros and cons of a strengthening of checks and balances are respectively the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of potential type-II errors in policy decision-making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when in conjunction with high accountability. In policy areas where the welfare effects of a reform are harder to evaluate and effective accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design unfortunately reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing or defending the less desirable regime.
- 23 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOptimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty
Political checks and balances are certainly among the most debated desiderata in the construction of democratic systems and their evaluation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework that could be useful to inform this debate. We propose a model where the pros and cons of a strengthening of checks and balances are respectively the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of potential type-II errors in policy decision-making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when in conjunction with high accountability. In policy areas where the welfare effects of a reform are harder to evaluate and effective accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design unfortunately reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing or defending the less desirable regime.
- Open Access
- 3 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We briefly discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework.
- 3 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLiberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We briefly discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework.
- Open Access
Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning
All political actors, from world leaders to common citizens, make choices based on information that is noisy, perhaps biased, and sometimes fake
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning
All political actors, from world leaders to common citizens, make choices based on information that is noisy, perhaps biased, and sometimes fake
- Open Access
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Render Unto Caesar: Taxes, Charity, and Political Islam
Data from the first post-Arab Spring elections reveal that support for Islamic parties came from richer districts and individuals. We show that standard public finance arguments help explain the voting pattern in these elections and others in the Muslim world. Our model predicts that a voter’s probability to vote for a religious party (i) increases in income for the poorest voters, but possibly decreases in income for the richest; (ii) is greater for voters in richer districts; and (iii) increases with the voter’s religiosity. We test these predictions on original micro-level data in a nationally representative sample of 600 individuals in 30 districts in Tunisia. Our empirical results align with our predictions and suggest that belonging to the middle class and living in a richer district together affect voting decisions more than being a religious voter. We also test for other possible factors affecting voting decisions, such as education, or attitudes towards corruption or towards the West. Finally, we document similar patterns in other key elections in the Muslim world.
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRender Unto Caesar: Taxes, Charity, and Political Islam
Data from the first post-Arab Spring elections reveal that support for Islamic parties came from richer districts and individuals. We show that standard public finance arguments help explain the voting pattern in these elections and others in the Muslim world. Our model predicts that a voter’s probability to vote for a religious party (i) increases in income for the poorest voters, but possibly decreases in income for the richest; (ii) is greater for voters in richer districts; and (iii) increases with the voter’s religiosity. We test these predictions on original micro-level data in a nationally representative sample of 600 individuals in 30 districts in Tunisia. Our empirical results align with our predictions and suggest that belonging to the middle class and living in a richer district together affect voting decisions more than being a religious voter. We also test for other possible factors affecting voting decisions, such as education, or attitudes towards corruption or towards the West. Finally, we document similar patterns in other key elections in the Muslim world.