Barton E. Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Barton E. Lee has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Haris Aziz
UNSW Sydney, Sydney, Australia
9 shared publications - Gabriele Gratton
UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics
3 shared publications Haris Aziz
3 shared publicationsHau Chan
2 shared publications- Hau Chan
University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln NE USA
2 shared publications - Alexander Lam
City University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 259
Drain the swamp: A theory of anti-elite populism
- 28 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 259
Open AccessDrain the swamp: A theory of anti-elite populism
- Open Access
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Power Is Power
We argue that in market democracies firms can wield political power through a mechanism that does not rely on lobbying, campaign contributions, or persuasion. When voters cannot commit to future regulation, firms can use irreversible technological investments to reshape ex-post political incentives. We call this mechanism the political holdup problem. We show that, in equilibrium, a firm's de facto power to avoid regulation coincides with standard measures of market power. This form of power is robust to a wide range of regulatory instruments, including bans, taxes, self-regulation, and delegation to technocrats, and limits the effectiveness of reforms targeting political influence. The political holdup problem distorts the direction of technological progress and may increase political demand for populism and nationalization. Institutional remedies instead require commitment: supermajoritarian institutions and independent oversight of industry standards.
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Power Is Power
We argue that in market democracies firms can wield political power through a mechanism that does not rely on lobbying, campaign contributions, or persuasion. When voters cannot commit to future regulation, firms can use irreversible technological investments to reshape ex-post political incentives. We call this mechanism the political holdup problem. We show that, in equilibrium, a firm's de facto power to avoid regulation coincides with standard measures of market power. This form of power is robust to a wide range of regulatory instruments, including bans, taxes, self-regulation, and delegation to technocrats, and limits the effectiveness of reforms targeting political influence. The political holdup problem distorts the direction of technological progress and may increase political demand for populism and nationalization. Institutional remedies instead require commitment: supermajoritarian institutions and independent oversight of industry standards.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Economic Shocks and the Electoral Fortunes of Effective Legislators
Successful economies rely upon effective lawmaking. Representatives must be effective legislators—able to craft and pass new laws—and voters must choose to (re)elect these effective legislators, particularly when circumstances demand new laws. Analyzing election outcomes from the U.S. House of Representatives, legislators’ effectiveness, and exogenous increases in import competition from China between 2002 and 2010, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts exposed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to continue to be elected compared to less effective legislators. Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were less likely to continue to be elected compared to less effective legislators. We interpret and provide evidence that this result is driven by trade shock exposure affecting whether voters demand policy change and, in turn, voters’ decisions to (re)elect more or less effective legislators.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEconomic Shocks and the Electoral Fortunes of Effective Legislators
Successful economies rely upon effective lawmaking. Representatives must be effective legislators—able to craft and pass new laws—and voters must choose to (re)elect these effective legislators, particularly when circumstances demand new laws. Analyzing election outcomes from the U.S. House of Representatives, legislators’ effectiveness, and exogenous increases in import competition from China between 2002 and 2010, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts exposed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to continue to be elected compared to less effective legislators. Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were less likely to continue to be elected compared to less effective legislators. We interpret and provide evidence that this result is driven by trade shock exposure affecting whether voters demand policy change and, in turn, voters’ decisions to (re)elect more or less effective legislators.
- Open Access
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.
Open AccessStrategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism
We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDrain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism
We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles.
- Open Access
- 13 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 212
Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling
- 13 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 212
Open AccessGridlock, leverage, and policy bundling
- Open Access
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 133, 248-255
A characterization of proportionally representative committees
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 133, 248-255
Open AccessA characterization of proportionally representative committees
- Open Access
A characterization of proportionally representative committees
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as possible outcomes of the Minimal Demand rule, which generalizes an approach pioneered by Michael Dummett.
Open AccessA characterization of proportionally representative committees
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as possible outcomes of the Minimal Demand rule, which generalizes an approach pioneered by Michael Dummett.
- Open Access
Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric weights. We propose proportional representation axioms and clarify how they fit into other preference aggregation settings, such as multi-winner voting and approval-based multi-winner voting. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept for approval-based multi-winner voting, which we call Inclusion PSC (IPSC). IPSC is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR), incomparable to extended justified representation (EJR), and yet compatible with EJR. The well-studied Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule produces a committee that satisfies both EJR and IPSC; however, both these axioms can also be satisfied by an algorithm that runs in polynomial-time.
Open AccessProportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric weights. We propose proportional representation axioms and clarify how they fit into other preference aggregation settings, such as multi-winner voting and approval-based multi-winner voting. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept for approval-based multi-winner voting, which we call Inclusion PSC (IPSC). IPSC is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR), incomparable to extended justified representation (EJR), and yet compatible with EJR. The well-studied Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule produces a committee that satisfies both EJR and IPSC; however, both these axioms can also be satisfied by an algorithm that runs in polynomial-time.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 124, 478-490
The capacity constrained facility location problem
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 124, 478-490
The capacity constrained facility location problem