Anthony Creane
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Anthony Creane has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kaz Miyagiwa
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Japan
1 shared publication - Thomas D. Jeitschko
Michigan State University - Department of Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 22 (2) , 629-647
A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 141–56. In this note, it is shown that this assumption is violated if, roughly, each firm reaches less than half of all consumers unless it is a duopoly. This implies that most of the simulations in Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 are not actually equilibria. More importantly, this implies that for their equilibrium to exist nearly all consumers must receive at least one ad. For example, with just four firms in the market, at least 96% of the consumers must receive at least one ad, and this percentage increases with the number of firms in the market.
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 22 (2) , 629-647
A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 141–56. In this note, it is shown that this assumption is violated if, roughly, each firm reaches less than half of all consumers unless it is a duopoly. This implies that most of the simulations in Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 are not actually equilibria. More importantly, this implies that for their equilibrium to exist nearly all consumers must receive at least one ad. For example, with just four firms in the market, at least 96% of the consumers must receive at least one ad, and this percentage increases with the number of firms in the market.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (3) , 494-519
Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality
Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.
- 22 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 64 (3) , 494-519
Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality
Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 27 (5) , 632-638
Forgoing invention to deter entry
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 27 (5) , 632-638
Forgoing invention to deter entry
- 1 April 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 65 (2) , 585-599
Jamming a Rival′s Learning
- 1 April 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 65 (2) , 585-599
Jamming a Rival′s Learning