Francesco Berti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Francesco Berti has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Olivier Pereira
UCLouvain
4 shared publicationsFrançois-Xavier Standaert
UCLouvain
3 shared publications- François-Xavier Standaert
UCLouvain, ICTEAM Institute, Crypto Group
3 shared publications - Itamar Levi
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
3 shared publications Thomas Peters
UCLouvain
3 shared publications- Carmit Hazay
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 17 (5) , 1191-1248
LR-OT: Leakage-resilient oblivious transfer
Oblivious Transfer ( $$\textsf{OT}$$ ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that becomes a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. $$\textsf{OT}$$ is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging due to their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complex design, and the need to run multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant $$\textsf{OT}$$ protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient $$\textsf{OT}$$ , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure $$\textsf{OT}$$ protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state.- 21 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cryptography and Communications
- Vol. 17 (5) , 1191-1248
Open AccessLR-OT: Leakage-resilient oblivious transfer
Oblivious Transfer ( $$\textsf{OT}$$ ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that becomes a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. $$\textsf{OT}$$ is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging due to their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complex design, and the need to run multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant $$\textsf{OT}$$ protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient $$\textsf{OT}$$ , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure $$\textsf{OT}$$ protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state. - Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Authenticity in the Presence of Leakage using a Forkcipher
Robust message authentication codes (MACs) and authenticated encryption (AE) schemes that provide authenticity in the presence of side-channel leakage are essential primitives. These constructions often rely on primitives designed for strong leakage protection, among others including the use of strong-unpredictable (tweakable) block-ciphers. This paper extends the strong-unpredictability security definition to the versatile and new forkcipher primitive. We show how to construct secure and efficient MAC and AEs that guarantee authenticity in the presence of leakage. We present a leakage-resistant MAC, ForkMAC, and two leakage-resistant AE schemes, ForkDTE1 and ForkDTE2, which use forkciphers instead of traditional secure (tweakable) block-ciphers as compared to the prior art. We prove and analyze their security in the presence of leakage based on a strong unpredictable forkcipher. A comparison with the state-of-the-art in terms of both security and efficiency is included in the paper. Key advantages and highlights promoted by the proposed constructions are that for the minimal assumptions they require, unpredictability with leakage-based security, the tag-generation of ForkMAC is the most efficient among leakage-resilient MAC proposals, like the block cipher based HBC. ForkDTE1 and 2 have a more efficient encryption than any other scheme, achieving integrity with leakage (and also providing misuse-resistance).
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessAuthenticity in the Presence of Leakage using a Forkcipher
Robust message authentication codes (MACs) and authenticated encryption (AE) schemes that provide authenticity in the presence of side-channel leakage are essential primitives. These constructions often rely on primitives designed for strong leakage protection, among others including the use of strong-unpredictable (tweakable) block-ciphers. This paper extends the strong-unpredictability security definition to the versatile and new forkcipher primitive. We show how to construct secure and efficient MAC and AEs that guarantee authenticity in the presence of leakage. We present a leakage-resistant MAC, ForkMAC, and two leakage-resistant AE schemes, ForkDTE1 and ForkDTE2, which use forkciphers instead of traditional secure (tweakable) block-ciphers as compared to the prior art. We prove and analyze their security in the presence of leakage based on a strong unpredictable forkcipher. A comparison with the state-of-the-art in terms of both security and efficiency is included in the paper. Key advantages and highlights promoted by the proposed constructions are that for the minimal assumptions they require, unpredictability with leakage-based security, the tag-generation of ForkMAC is the most efficient among leakage-resilient MAC proposals, like the block cipher based HBC. ForkDTE1 and 2 have a more efficient encryption than any other scheme, achieving integrity with leakage (and also providing misuse-resistance).
- 10 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 182-204
$\textsf{LR}$-$\textsf{OT}$: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer- 10 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 182-204
$\textsf{LR}$-$\textsf{OT}$: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer- Open Access
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 420-459
Provable Secure Parallel Gadgets
Side-channel attacks are a fundamental threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. One of the most prominent countermeasures against side-channel attacks is masking, where each intermediate value of the computation is secret shared, thereby concealing the computation’s sensitive information. An important security model to study the security of masking schemes is the random probing model, in which the adversary obtains each intermediate value of the computation with some probability p. To construct secure masking schemes, an important building block is the refreshing gadget, which updates the randomness of the secret shared intermediate values. Recently, Dziembowski, Faust, and Zebrowski (ASIACRYPT’19) analyzed the security of a simple refreshing gadget by using a new technique called the leakage diagram. In this work, we follow the approach of Dziembowski et al. and significantly improve its methodology. Concretely, we refine the notion of a leakage diagram via so-called dependency graphs, and show how to use this technique for arbitrary complex circuits via composition results and approximation techniques. To illustrate the power of our new techniques, as a case study, we designed provably secure parallel gadgets for the random probing model, and adapted the ISW multiplication such that all gadgets can be parallelized. Finally, we evaluate concrete security levels, and show how our new methodology can further improve the concrete security level of masking schemes. This results in a compiler provable secure up to a noise level of O(1) for affine circuits and O(1/√n) in general.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 420-459
Open AccessProvable Secure Parallel Gadgets
Side-channel attacks are a fundamental threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. One of the most prominent countermeasures against side-channel attacks is masking, where each intermediate value of the computation is secret shared, thereby concealing the computation’s sensitive information. An important security model to study the security of masking schemes is the random probing model, in which the adversary obtains each intermediate value of the computation with some probability p. To construct secure masking schemes, an important building block is the refreshing gadget, which updates the randomness of the secret shared intermediate values. Recently, Dziembowski, Faust, and Zebrowski (ASIACRYPT’19) analyzed the security of a simple refreshing gadget by using a new technique called the leakage diagram. In this work, we follow the approach of Dziembowski et al. and significantly improve its methodology. Concretely, we refine the notion of a leakage diagram via so-called dependency graphs, and show how to use this technique for arbitrary complex circuits via composition results and approximation techniques. To illustrate the power of our new techniques, as a case study, we designed provably secure parallel gadgets for the random probing model, and adapted the ISW multiplication such that all gadgets can be parallelized. Finally, we evaluate concrete security levels, and show how our new methodology can further improve the concrete security level of masking schemes. This results in a compiler provable secure up to a noise level of O(1) for affine circuits and O(1/√n) in general.
- 15 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-176
Reconsidering Generic Composition: The Modes A10, A11 and A12 are Insecure
- 15 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-176
Reconsidering Generic Composition: The Modes A10, A11 and A12 are Insecure
- 13 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 517-532
Strong Authenticity with Leakage Under Weak and Falsifiable Physical Assumptions
- 13 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 517-532
Strong Authenticity with Leakage Under Weak and Falsifiable Physical Assumptions
- 5 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2018, 70-90
Reconsidering Generic Composition: The Tag-then-Encrypt Case
- 5 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2018, 70-90
Reconsidering Generic Composition: The Tag-then-Encrypt Case
- Open Access
- 29 May 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 37-50
Ciphertext Integrity with Misuse and Leakage
- 29 May 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 37-50
Open AccessCiphertext Integrity with Misuse and Leakage
- 27 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 17 (5) , 957-971
Learning with Physical Noise or Errors
Hard learning problems have recently attracted significant attention within the cryptographic community, both as a versatile assumption on which to build various protocols, and as a potentially sound basis for lightweight (possibly side-channel and fault resistant) implementations. Yet, in this second case, a recurrent drawback of primitives based on the Learning Parity with Noise and Learning With Errors problems is their additional randomness requirements to generate noise or errors. In parallel, the move towards nanoscale devices renders modern implementations increasingly prone to various types of errors. As a result, inexact computing has emerged as a new paradigm to efficiently deal with the challenges raised by such erroneous computations, and mitigate the cost and power consumption overheads~they~cause. In this paper, we show that these cryptographic and electronic challenges can actually be turned into new opportunities, and provide an elegant solution one to the other. That is, we show that inexact implementations of inner product computations lead to a natural way to define new Learning with Physical Noise or Error assumptions, paving the way to more efficient and physically secure implementations, with potential interest for securing emerging Internet of Things applications.
- 27 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 17 (5) , 957-971
Learning with Physical Noise or Errors
Hard learning problems have recently attracted significant attention within the cryptographic community, both as a versatile assumption on which to build various protocols, and as a potentially sound basis for lightweight (possibly side-channel and fault resistant) implementations. Yet, in this second case, a recurrent drawback of primitives based on the Learning Parity with Noise and Learning With Errors problems is their additional randomness requirements to generate noise or errors. In parallel, the move towards nanoscale devices renders modern implementations increasingly prone to various types of errors. As a result, inexact computing has emerged as a new paradigm to efficiently deal with the challenges raised by such erroneous computations, and mitigate the cost and power consumption overheads~they~cause. In this paper, we show that these cryptographic and electronic challenges can actually be turned into new opportunities, and provide an elegant solution one to the other. That is, we show that inexact implementations of inner product computations lead to a natural way to define new Learning with Physical Noise or Error assumptions, paving the way to more efficient and physically secure implementations, with potential interest for securing emerging Internet of Things applications.